3 states consider ending partisan judicial races, but 2 other states debate bringing them back; other states want an end to partisan election of clerks of court

Years ago, I noted the North Carolina/West Virginia paradox. As West Virginia moved to expand its public financing of judicial races (court of last resort at least), North Carolina moved to end their program. West Virginia moved to end partisan judicial races at almost the same moment North Carolina moved to bring their judicial races back to partisan.

The above dynamic is playing out in the 2019 legislative sessions in a host of states: one state moving one way on judicial selection, while a nearby (and sometimes neighboring) state considers going the other way.

Partisan to Nonpartisan
New Mexico SJR 12 would end partisan races for Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, District Court, and Metropolitan Court. A similar plan was introduced as SJR 10 of 2017 (discussed here). The 2017 effort was approved in the Senate Rules Committee but proceed no further.

Mississippi HB 1490 addresses a quirk in Mississippi law. The state has previously ended partisan judicial elections for all courts except the state’s lowest (justice court). HB 1490 would switch these elections to partisan and provide that judges elected to these courts would be considered legally “part-time” judges and eligible to continue to practice law.

South Carolina HB 3034 would require nonpartisan elections in probate courts. Interesting, South Carolina’s probate court judges are the only judges in the state subject to voters. Most (Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, Circuit, and Family) are chosen by the legislature. Magistrates Court judges are appointed by the governor with legislative confirmation. Municipal Court judges are appointed by local government.

Nonpartisan to Partisan
Kentucky HB 123 would amend the state’s constitution to require partisan elections for judges in the state. The move seems, at least in part, prompted by a recent decision of the state’s supreme court striking down the governor’s and legislature’s pension reform plan as unconstitutional.

South Dakota SJR 3 would end nonpartisan elections for all judges.

Clerk Races
While a great deal of focus is on judicial races, another key judiciary-related office is that of Clerk of Court. While there have been several attempts in states to make these races nonpartisan over the years, none have succeeded. Nevertheless, the topic is up for debate this year in the following states:

Mississippi SB 2374 would convert several county offices to nonpartisan including Chancery Clerk and Circuit Clerk.

Nebraska LB 72, LB 144, and LB 211 would allow for some of all county officers, including clerks of court, to be elected on a nonpartisan basis. The bills differ in how that change would occur: LB 72 and LB 211 would simply convert these elections to nonpartisan directly. HB 144 would require voters to approve such a change on a county-by-county basis.

South Carolina HB 3032 would end the practice of electing on a partisan basis the Clerk of Common Pleas who serves ex officio as the clerk for all courts of record in a county (unless specified by another statute).





New Mexico: constitutional amendment to give legislature more discretion to set appellate jurisdiction of courts by statute heading to ballot in 2018

A constitutional amendment discussed here to give the New Mexico legislature more discretion in setting the appellate jurisdiction of the state’s courts in general, and the District Court in particular, is heading to the 2018 ballot.

Currently the state’s constitution has three particular provisions when it comes to appeals

  1. District Court cases involving sentences of death or life imprisonment go directly to the state’s Supreme Court (Art. 6, Sec. 2).
  2. The District Courts themselves have “appellate jurisdiction of all cases originating in inferior courts and tribunals in their respective districts.” (Art. 6, Sec. 13)
  3. Finally, the constitution provides “Appeals shall be allowed in all cases from the final judgments and decisions of the probate courts and other inferior courts to the district courts, and in all such appeals, trial shall be had de novo unless otherwise provided by law.” (Art. 6, Sec. 27)

SJR 1 as approved by the House addresses items 2 and 3.

  1. The provision for death/life imprisonment cases going directly to the Supreme Court would remain. The Senate wanted remove the direct-to-the-Supreme-Court provision but the House struck that change.
  2. District Courts would not have appellate jurisdiction over “all” cases originating in inferior courts and tribunals in their respective district.
  3. The provision that probate/inferior court appeals go “to the district courts, and in all such appeals, trial shall be had de novo” would be struck.

SJR 1 now goes to the ballot in November 2018.

New Mexico: plan to end partisan judicial elections for top courts clears key Senate committee

The plan to end partisan judicial elections for New Mexico’s top courts (discussed here) cleared the Senate Rules Committee yesterday on a 10-1 vote.

SJR 10 as amended would amend the state constitution’s requirement that races for the New Mexico’s top courts (Supreme, Court of Appeals, District, and Metropolitan) be partisan and replace with the word nonpartisan.

SJR 10 now goes to the Senate Judiciary Committee.

 

New Mexico: Hearing today on ending partisan elections for state’s top courts

New Mexico uses a unique system of judicial selection for the state’s top courts (Supreme, Court of Appeals, District, and Metropolitan) that includes partisan elections. Under a proposal set for a hearing today in the Senate Rules Committee, the partisan portion would change to nonpartisan.

New Mexico uses a three-step process for these 4 courts under its constitution (Art. VI, Sec. 33)

  1. For initial terms all judicial vacancies are filled by the governor from a list of candidates recommended by a judicial nominating commission.
  2. The political parties then conduct primaries to pick candidates to face off at the next general election. The governor’s appointee is not guaranteed to win that primary.
  3. Whoever wins the partisan general election can obtain additional terms through yes/no retention elections, but there they must obtain at least a 57% yes vote (the original 1988 constitutional provision made it a simple majority; a 1994 amendment raised it).

SJR 10 as introduced would change the second step and require it be a nonpartisan contest.

Each justice of the supreme court, judge of the court of appeals, district judge or metropolitan court judge shall have been elected to that position in a partisan nonpartisan election process as provided by law prior to being eligible for a nonpartisan retention election.

A separate provision would ensure that any judge in office on January 1 after the constitutional amendment was approved would not be impacted by this change.

If a majority of the Senate and House approve the amendment, it would go on to the ballot in 2018.

New Mexico debates a “benchmark” of at least 3% of state general fund for state judiciary, South Carolina a guaranteed 1%

Should states guarantee or “benchmark” a minimum amount of general funds go to their judiciaries? As I discussed here, the topic has been debated since at least the 1970s as a way to keep court funding out of the political arena and help provide a (more) stable source of revenue for the branch. The debate is now being renewed in modified forms in New Mexico and South Carolina in 2017.

The New Mexico House Judiciary committee voted 10-3 yesterday to approve HB 81 as amended. Rather than a guarantee the bill as introduced “benchmarked” at least 3% of the state’s general fund after various payments were made. The amended version removed the various other payments and now reads in operative part.

Appropriations to the judiciary shall be benchmarked at not less than three percent of the recurring general fund appropriation for the next fiscal year. The provisions of this act apply to fiscal year 2018 and succeeding fiscal years.

HB 81 now goes to the House Appropriations and Finance Committee.

In South Carolina for the 4th year in a row a member of the Senate has proposed a constitutional amendment to provide 1% of general fund for the judiciary, this year as SJR 69 of 2017.

The General Assembly, in the annual general appropriations act, shall appropriate, out of the estimated revenue of the general fund for the fiscal year for which the appropriations are made, to the Judicial Department an amount equal to one percent of the general fund revenue of the latest completed fiscal year.

Previous versions (SJR 72 of 2013/2014 and SJR 317 of 2015/2016) failed to advance out of committee.

NC: So how many other states/courts elect their appellate judges in a partisan manner? It’s complicated.

Amid the debate on SB 4 today and the decision to switch North Carolina’s Supreme Court and Court of Appeals from nonpartisan to partisan races, there’s been a good amount of discussion of how many other states and appellate courts have partisan elections. Numbers have ranged widely. The reason for this is fairly straight forward in that for many states it is not a straight forward answer.

There are 8 states with 9 courts in which at one point or another justices of the supreme court/court of last resort show up with a party label somehow. It was 9 states with 10 courts until 2015 when West Virginia ended partisan races for their Supreme Court of Appeals.

  1. Alabama: partisan primaries and partisan general elections.
  2. Illinois: partisan primaries, partisan general elections but only for the first election. If a person does get elected to the Illinois Supreme Court, the next time they are up they are put into a yes/no retention election, however to stay in office they need to get a 60% “yes to retain” vote.
  3. Louisiana: The state uses a “blanket primary” in which all candidates appear with party labels on the primary ballot. The two top votegetters compete in the general election. Thus in the general election, you could have two Republicans vying against each other for the seat, as occurred most recently in 2016 when Republican James “Jimmy” Genovese defeated fellow Republican Marilyn Castle for the 3rd Supreme Court District (Louisiana elects their justices by district, not statewide).
  4. Michigan: candidates for Supreme Court are nominated by political parties but the actual ballot in November is nonpartisan (i.e. no party labels).
  5. New Mexico: very complicated. When a vacancy occurs on the New Mexico Supreme Court, it is initially filled via merit selection (nominating commission sends list of names to governor, governor picks). The newly appointed justice must then run in a partisan primary and partisan general election but only for the first election. If a person does get elected to the New Mexico Supreme Court, the next time they are up they are put into a yes/no retention election, however to stay in office they need to get a 57% “yes to retain” vote.
  6. Ohio: Partisan primaries, but nonpartisan general elections.
  7. Pennsylvania: partisan primaries, partisan general elections but only for the first election. If a person does get elected to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, the next time they are up they are put into a yes/no retention election (50% “yes to retain” to remain in office).
  8. Texas: Everything is bigger in Texas, including their appellate courts. Texas has two “courts of last resort”: the Supreme Court for civil matters and the Court of Criminal Appeals. Both courts use partisan primaries and partisan general elections.

Election 2016: Results and Implications for State Courts

Time to review the 4 ballot items from last night I was focused in terms of affecting the courts.

Mandatory judicial retirement ages

Oregon’s attempt to repeal that state’s mandatory judicial retirement age of 75 failed with only a 37% yes vote. That number is consistent with other states that attempted to raise or remove their ages. Those efforts only received, at best, 40% (New York 2013) and at worst 22% (Hawaii in 2014).

The other attempt was in Pennsylvania. There the proposal on the ballot would have set the mandatory judicial retirement age at 75 but pointedly did not include language that this was an increase from the current 70. The language, which appears to have been unique to Pennsylvania, resulted in the proposal squeaking to victory with 50.88%.

As I’ve noted, this issue is not going away as more and more states look to put in such increases or repeals. The trend remains, however, one in which legislators are persuaded to put the items on the ballots, but voters when confronted with language related to increases or repeals are inclined to reject such efforts.

Judicial Disciplinary Commissions

The Georgia legislature’s attempt to take control over the membership of the Judicial Qualifications Commission was approved with 62% of the vote. This move comes after similar efforts in Tennessee approved in 2010 that give the legislature the power to name 6 out of 16 members of that state’s judicial disciplinary body (Board of Judicial Conduct).

That said, it is unclear whether legislators in other states will have an interest in changes such as those in Georgia and Tennessee, especially given that in 24 states changes to membership would require either a constitution amendment and in another 10 the membership is set by the judiciary, not the legislature.

Clerks of Court Terms

Arkansas’ amendment to increase the terms in office for county officials from 2 years to 4, including Clerks of the Circuit Court, was approved. This leaves only certain counties in North Dakota with clerks of general jurisdiction courts elected to 2-year terms. As such, last night’s vote to increase terms isn’t so much the start of a trend but the end (or near end) of one.

Bail Reform

One additional item not covered but that readers have shown an interest in that relates to the courts is New Mexico’s bail reform constitutional amendment (Amendment 1) that was approved with 87% of the vote. The plan allows judges to deny bail to defendants considered exceptionally dangerous and to grant  pretrial release to those who aren’t considered a threat but remain in jail because they can’t afford bail.

In light of increased interest in reforms to fees, fines, and bail practices in state courts, it is almost certain that some activity in this arena will take place in state legislatures, if not as a constitutional amendment then as legislation focused on pretrial release and risk assessment.

First Washington, now New Mexico debates requiring supreme court justices be elected by district

I’ve mentioned recently the series of efforts in the Washington state senate to require that state’s supreme court justices to run from districts. Now comes a similar plan for New Mexico. Under SJR 15 of 2016

The state shall be divided into at least five districts from which justices shall be elected, with one justice elected from each district, as provided by law…A justice of the supreme court, at the time the justice is first appointed to fill a vacancy or elected to office, shall reside in the district from which the justice is appointed or elected as provided by law. The provisions of this 2016 amendment shall not apply to justices serving at the time this amendment is adopted or to justices elected at the general election in 2016.

This appears to mark the first time such a proposal has ever been filed.

As a reminder, only 6 states elect or reelect some or all of the members of their courts of last resort by district: Illinois, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, and Nebraska (associate justices, chief justice reelected statewide).

SJR 15 has been assigned to the Senate Rules Committee.

New Mexico: constitutional amendment would move adult probation into the judicial branch; 2013 bill attempted similar move

Over the last several years there have been efforts, in particular those in Massachusetts (in 2011, discussed here) and New Jersey (most recently in 2013, discussed here), to move probation departments out of the judiciary and into the executive branch. Later today New Mexico’s House Government Committee will be hearing a plan to do the opposite.

HJR 14 as introduced would add a single sentence to the state constitution’s judiciary article (Article 6)

The judicial branch shall administer the adult probation services for the state, as provided by law.

Currently the adult probation is under the executive branch’s Corrections Department (N.M. Stat. Ann. § 9-3-3)

There is created in the executive branch the “corrections department”. The department shall be a cabinet department and consist of, but not be limited to, six divisions as follows…the adult probation and parole division.

This marks the third session in a row to discuss moving adult probation out of the executive branch.

  • In the 2011/2012 session the House asked for a study (House Memorial 12) of moving the adult probation and parole division into the judiciary. That study never occurred.
  • In the 2013/2014 session HB 572 would have moved adult probation only out of the Corrections Department and into the Administrative Office of the Courts. The bill failed to advance out of committee.

 

 

Across country, state legislatures consider altering number of nominees judicial nominating commissions must release

One particular aspect of judicial selection legislatures have had a keen interest has been the number of names that advance through judicial nominating commissions (JNCs). 2016 looks to be no exception; in Missouri SJR 30 prefiled for the new year would eliminate the restriction that the state’s JNCs send only three names to the governor. Moreover, an examination of legislation over the last two decades shows a marked uptick in interest outside of Missouri over the last several years.

Alaska

The state’s constitution provides the state’s JNC send “two or more persons” to the governor when a vacancy occurs in either the Supreme or Superior Court; statutes require “two or more persons” for Court of Appeals (Alaska Stat. § 22.07.070) and District Court (§ 22.15.170) vacancies. No recent attempt has been made to alter these provisions.

Arizona

The state’s constitution provides that if the vacancy is on the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, or Superior Court (in counties that use a commission system) the governor is to receive the names of “not less than three persons.” Several efforts have been made to amend this provision. SCR 1038 of 2005 would have increased this to 6 names for appellate vacancies and 7 for Superior Courts. In 2011 proposals were submitted (SCR 1040, SCR 1046, and SCR 1049) that would have increased the list to 6 names for appellate vacancies and 7 for Superior Courts.

The proposal that eventually made it on the ballot was SCR 1001 of 2011: 8 names for both trial and appellate vacancies. SCR 1001 also included several other changes to give governors more power over the JNCs. When it appeared on the 2012 ballot as Proposition 115 it received only a 27% yes vote. Undaunted by the loss, the legislature in 2013 passed HB 2600. Rather than amend the constitution, the legislature tried to force by statute the JNCs to provide governors “the names of at least five persons” for trial and appellate vacancies. In September 2013 the state’s supreme court held that law unconstitutional.

Colorado

The state’s constitution provides the JNCs in the state are to provide “a list of three nominees for the supreme court and any intermediate appellate court, and… a list of two or three nominees for all other courts of record…” No recent attempt has been made to alter these provisions.

Connecticut

Connecticut adopted a commission based system in 1986: governors nominate from a list provided by the state’s judicial selection commission but the constitution is silent as to the number. State law (Conn. Gen. Stat. § 51-44a) provides that the commission is to provide the governor a list of all “qualified candidates”. No recent attempt has been made to alter these provisions.

Florida

The state adopted a merit/commission system in 1972 for the state’s trial and appellate courts. The original provision required the JNCs to submit a list of “not fewer than three persons”. For the appellate courts, this was amended in 1976 to precisely 3 (“one of three persons nominated”). For trial courts, commission appointment was eliminated, but was made optional under a 1998 amendment that allowed voters to opt in for each county in the 2000 election. Under the 1998 trial court opt-in provision “not fewer than three” names were to go to the governor. No county opted into this system for its trial courts.

For the appellate courts, several efforts were made in the 1990s to change the “not fewer than three persons” language. The first was to change it to precisely “three persons” (SJR 18 of 1992). Eventually the legislature settled on “Not fewer than three persons nor more than six persons” (HJR 1415 and SJR 978 of 1996). The expansion to 3-6 names was approved by voters as Amendment 3 in November 1996.

By 2000 another round of efforts were made to expand the list, this time by dropping any numerical requirements and providing the JNCs were to send a list of all applicants (HB 923 of 2000) or a list of all persons eligible to fill the vacancy (HB 627, HB 827, SB 1794, and SB 1860 of 2001). None of the proposals advanced and the issue has appeared to have remained dormant since.

Hawaii

The state adopted a commission based appointment system in the 1978. Originally the commission was required to submit a “list of not less than six nominees” for each vacancy in the state’s appellate and trial courts. A 1994 amendment (SB 2294) modified this to “a list of not less than four, and not more than six” for the Supreme, Intermediate Appellate, and Circuit Courts; District Courts remained at “not less than six nominees”.

There the matter lay for over a decade until a 2005 effort (SB 1166) would have provided the lists for all courts were to be made up of “not less than three.” In 2007 a measure to change the threshold down to 3-5 names for all courts was introduced. SB 948 was approved by the full Senate and advanced through the House Judiciary Committee before ultimately dying when the legislature adjourned.

Indiana

The state’s constitution provides the judicial nominating commission must submit “a list of three nominees” to the governor for vacancies on the Supreme Court or Court of Appeals. No recent attempt has been made to alter these provisions.

Iowa

The state’s constitution provides that the judicial nominating commission is to provide “three nominees” for Supreme Court vacancies and “two nominees” for District Courts; a statute (Iowa Code § 46.14A) with respect to the Court of Appeals repeats the “three nominees” language.

With respect to the constitutional provision, there were several efforts (SJR 2006 of 2010; SJR 6 and SJR 7 of 2011) to allow the governor to reject the list of three names provided for Supreme Court vacancies and requiring the commission submit a list of three new names. None advanced.

With respect to the Court of Appeals, the statute creating the court in 1976 required the nominating commission provide the governor a list of 3 names for vacancies on that court (former § 46.15). That number was expanded to five when the state’s judiciary was reorganized in 1983. The number was reverted back to 3 when portions of section Iowa Code § 46.15 were recodified as § 46.14A (SF 381 of 2007).

Kansas

The state’s constitution specifies that with respect to the Supreme Court the Supreme Court Nominating Commission is to provide the governor a list of “three persons.” The state’s Court of Appeals had until 2013 also be selected in like fashion via a statutory system (Kan. Stat. Ann. § 20-3005) that required a list of “three nominees”. In addition District Courts in those judicial districts that have opted into the commission-select system have their vacancies filled from a list of “not less than two nor more than three persons for each office which is vacant” (§ 20-2909).

With respect to the Supreme Court, there was an effort to allow governors to reject the list of 3 names and be provided a second list of 3 new names for a total of 6 (HCR 5005 of 2009) or to simply have the commission submit 6 names on the first list (SCR 1619 of 2007 & SCR 1612 of 2009). Another (HCR 5027 of 2013) would have provided the commission submit all qualified persons to the governor.

With respect to the Court of Appeals no effort was made to expand the list the commission was required to provide, the commission system was simply eliminated in 2013 and the governor permitted to appoint any qualified person subject to senate confirmation.

With respect to the District Courts, no recent effort appears to have been made to modify the current practice of 2-3 names.

Missouri

Since adoption of its commission-based plan the Missouri constitution has specified that commissions are to submit “three persons” to fill vacancies in the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, and specified Circuit Courts. Although a 1976 constitutional revision moved the location of the language (from Art. V, Sec. 29(a) to the new Art. V, Sec 25(a)) the 3-persons provision was unchanged.

Much of the focus in this area has been for a 4/8 or 5/10 plan. Under the proposals the initial list submitted to the governor would be made up of 4 or 5 names (vs. the current 3). The governor would be allowed to reject the list and ask for a new one, for a total of 8 or 10 nominees.

The 4/8 plan appeared in HJR 19 of 2009 (as introduced) and SJR 17 of 2011.

The 5/10 provision appeared in HJR 49 of 2008, HJR 10 of 2009 (as amended), SJR 9 of 2009, HJR 58 of 2010, HJR 18 of 2011, and HJR 44 of 2012. A plan that would allow for only a single list of 5 names was considered as HJR 52 of 2008.

The latest iteration prefiled for the 2016 session (SJR 30) would simply eliminate the 3-name provision.

Nebraska

The state’s constitution provides vacancies in the state’s Supreme and District Courts must be filed from a list of “of at least two nominees” presented to the governor. Various statutes extend this practice to the Court of Appeals (Neb. Rev. Stat. § 24-1101), County Courts (§ 24-820) and Juvenile Courts (§ 43-2,114) and incorporate the constitutional provision by reference. No recent attempt has been made to alter these provisions.

New Mexico

New Mexico uses a unique two-step process for judicial selection. When a vacancy occurs one of three JNCs (appellate judges, district court judges, or metropolitan court judges commissions) meets and submits to the governor a list of all “persons qualified for judicial office and recommended for appointment”. The governor can then ask for a second list of names. Whoever is picked, however, must then face off in partisan elections at the next general election.

While the constitution does not provide for a minimum or maximum number of names, one bill did seek to put such a provision in place after a single name was submitted in 2006 to the state’s governor to fill a District Court vacancy and no additional names sent when he asked for a second list. SB 1075 of 2007 would have required JNCs provide at least two names per vacancy. The bill never proceeded out of committee.

New York

New York’s constitution since 1977 requires vacancies for the state’s top court (called the Court of Appeals) be filled via a commission on judicial nomination, but gives the legislature power to set the organization and procedure of the commission. State law on this subject (Judiciary Law § 63) specifies the list to fill associate judgeship must contain “at least three persons and not more than seven persons.” Interestingly, the chief judgeship must be made up of at least 7 persons (“In recognition of the unique responsibilities of the chief judge of the court of appeals for policies of judicial administration, for a vacancy in the office of chief judge the commission shall recommend to the governor seven persons.”)

In 1993 an effort (AB 916) was made to raise the 7-name limit for chief judge to 11 names and automatically put all serving associate judges on that list. The bill was reintroduced for several sessions thereafter (AB 3699 of 1995 & AB 2148 of 1997).

In 2009 an attempt was made to eliminate the numerical restrictions and require the commission send all qualified names to the governor. AB 3866 of that year failed to advance but was reintroduced in the 2011 session as AB 309.

Also in 2009 an attempt was made to increase the limits from 3-7 to 5-9 (associate judge) and from 7 to 9 (chief judge). It too failed to advance.

Oklahoma

The state’s constitution provides that vacancies in the state’s two top courts (Supreme Court and Court of Criminal Appeals) are to be filled from a list of “three (3) nominees” submitted to the governor. A statute (Okla. Stat. tit. 20, § 30.17) extends this practice to the state’s intermediate appellate court (Court of Civil Appeals). No recent attempt has been made to alter these provisions.

Rhode Island

In 1994 the state’s constitution was amended to provide vacancies in the Supreme Court were to be filled from a list provided by a judicial nominating commission to be established by the legislature and confirmed by the House and Senate. Lower court vacancies (Superior, Family, and District) were also to be filled by commission-based appointment but required only Senate confirmation. A statute (R.I. Gen. Laws 8-16.1-6) provides that the list provided by the commission is to be made up of between 3-5 names.

From 2008 to 2015 governors were not limited to just those 3-5 names. Under laws enacted annually from 2008 to 2014 (HB 7829 of 2008, HB 5567 of 2009, SB 2645 of 2010, SB 686 of 2011, HB 8043 of 2012, SB 471 of 2013, and HB 8006 of 2014) anyone vetted and approved by the JNC for a judgeship would be eligible for any other judgeship of the same court for 5 years. The program lapsed on July 1, 2015 when HB 6307 failed to be enacted to give the program yet another 1-year extension.

South Carolina

South Carolina is one of only two states (Virginia is the other) in which the legislature elects judges with no involvement by the governor. In 1997 the state’s constitution was amended to require the creation of a “Judicial Merit Selection Commission” to recommend nominees to the legislature for the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, Circuit Court, and Family Court. The commission’s membership and processes were left up to the legislature to set. The law enacted to implement the constitutional provision (S.C. Code Ann. § 2-19-80) requires the release by the commission of “the three candidates whom it considers best qualified.”

There have been over two dozen pieces of legislation to alter the number of names released by the commission. Almost all focused on the release of all qualified names, with “qualified” meaning either a) that the individual meets the minimum requirements for the position (age, attorney, etc.) or b) the person was “qualified” to serve in the opinion of the commission.

The practice for the better part of a decade was for the House to pass the “all qualified names” provision and for the Senate to either reject it or amend it to “no more than 3 qualified names” but with a provision that more than 3 names could be sent if two-thirds of the commission approved. This House/Senate split occurred in the 2003/2004 (HB 4734), 2005/2006 (HB 2079), and 2007/2008 (HB 3463 & SB 40) sessions. The Senate passed its own standalone version (3 names, more if two-thirds of commission approved) in 2007 (SB 40) that the House failed to act on.

The matter lay dormant until the 2015/2016 session when again the House passed an “all qualified” names bill (HB 3979); the Senate has yet to act on the legislation.

South Dakota

The state’s constitution was amended in 1980 to provide that vacancies in the Supreme Court are to be filled from a list of “two or more persons” nominated by the judicial qualifications commission. No recent attempt has been made to alter these provisions.

Utah

The state’s constitution was amended in 1985 to provide for a commission-system with senate confirmation for all courts of record (Supreme, Court of Appeals, District and Juvenile). The list given to the governor for these courts must consist “of at least three nominees.” A statutory change in 2008 (SB 72) brought the state’s other courts (Justice) into a commission system. The Justice Court Commission was required to submit “at least two names to the appointing authority.”

For the courts of record, a 1995 statute (former Utah Code § 20A-12-105, recodified in 2008 as § 78A-10-104) provided the appellate commission was to provide the governor at least 5 names for each vacancy while trial court commissions were to provide at least 3 names. In 2010 this was further amended (SB 289) to provide that the appellate court commission is to submit 7 names to the governor, while the trial court commissions are to send 5. SB 108 of the same year had similar provisions. A 1998 effort (SJR 3) would have allowed the governor to reject a list of names from the commission and request a new list. There was no limit to the number of rejections.

For the Justice Courts, a 2015 proposal (SB 141) increased the number of names from “at least two” to “at least three” for the local appointing authority to choose from. The bill was signed into law in March of this year.

Vermont

The state’s constitution provides the governor is to nominate Supreme Court and other judges (other than Probate judges) from a list provided by a judicial nominating body to be created by the legislature. A state statute (4 VSA 602) provided that the Judicial Nominating Board is to submit all “candidates” to the governor for consideration; this was amended in 2009 (HB 470) to “qualified candidates”. Other than the 2009 amendment, no recent attempt has been made to alter these provisions.

Wyoming

The state’s constitution as amended in 1972 provides for a judicial nominating commission for the supreme court, district courts and any other courts the legislature decides. The commission is to give the governor “a list of three nominees” for vacancies. No recent attempt has been made to alter these provisions.