Bans on court use of sharia/international law: GA House approves modified bill; Mississippi bill to ban sharia in divorce cases dies

The latest iterations of efforts to ban state courts from using foreign or international law in general, and sharia law in particular, appear to be stalling in most states. Since last month’s update there have been three pieces of activity, within only 1 bill moving.

Georgia: The House yesterday passed a heavily amended version of HB 171. As introduced, the bill provided

Any tribunal ruling shall be void and unenforceable if the tribunal bases its ruling in whole or in part on any foreign law that would deny the parties the rights and privileges granted under the United States Constitution or the Georgia Constitution.

As amended the bill adds to an existing list of items (O.C.G.A. 9-10-31.1) to be considered by a court when considering the issue of venue and the doctrine of forum non conveniens.

In determining whether to grant a motion to dismiss an action or to transfer venue under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, the court shall give consideration to the following factors

whether the forum outside of this state provides for impartial tribunals and procedures that are consonant to the requirements of due process of law as required by the Constitutions of the United States and the State of Georgia.

The bill was approved 165-0.

In Mississippi, which already enacted a foreign law ban in 2015, legislators attempted to enhance the existing law. SB 2400 would have allowed courts to award attorney’s fees to any party opposing recognition or enforcement of foreign law. SB 2595 specifically targeted the use of sharia law in divorce and child custody cases. Both bills died in committee.

Finally, a bill was introduced in Missouri (HB 2507) that dealt with the subject as well.

Full list of bills below the fold.

Continue reading Bans on court use of sharia/international law: GA House approves modified bill; Mississippi bill to ban sharia in divorce cases dies

Missouri: bill makes legislators serving 2 years attorneys, eligible to become judges; similar bills introduced in 2005 and 2007

A bill introduced this week would make any member of the Missouri General Assembly who had served at least 2 years both and attorney and eligible to sit as a circuit court judge in the state. HB 2610 provides

21.085. A person who has served at least two years as a member of the Missouri general assembly shall:

(1) qualify such person to practice law as an attorney in the state of Missouri; and

(2) satisfy any requirements for a person to become an associate or circuit court judge in the state of Missouri.

Section (2) is likely a reference to the state’s constitution, which provides “Every supreme, appellate, circuit, and associate circuit court judge shall be licensed to practice law in this state.”

This in not the first time a member of the Missouri General Assembly has proposed letting legislators become lawyers without going to law school. SB 531 of 2005 and HB 1168 of 2007 would have amended Missouri Supreme Court Rule 8.07 to allow any legislator serving 8 years to sit for the bar exam.

An applicant who has served at least eight years as a member of the Missouri general assembly shall be permitted to take the bar examination.

Neither bill advanced out of committee.

 

Missouri Senate bill would require governor receive unlimited number of names from judicial nominating commissions; could a 1-name list appear as in New Mexico?

Back in December I noted a pattern emerging in more and more states with merit/commission based systems: legislatures and governors want more names making their way to the governor’s desk. Today a Missouri Senate committee will be debating the latest proposal, SJR 30.

Under the current system when a vacancy occurs “the governor shall fill such vacancy by appointing one of three persons” from a list send by a judicial nominating commission the Appellate Judicial Commission or the various Circuit Judicial Commissions). SJR 30 would strike “three persons” but without specification of another number, thereby allowing for an unlimited number of nominees.

However, without a minimum could a commission send a single name? It has happened; in 2006 New Mexico’s merit/commission system resulted in a 1-name list given to that state’s governor to fill a District Court vacancy. When the governor asked for a second list with more names, none were provided. The Governor then sued the commission in the state supreme court and requested the commission meet again, which the supreme court ordered (State ex rel. Richardson v. Fifth Judicial Dist. Nominating Comm’n, 141 N.M. 657 (N.M. 2007)). When the commission again came up with a 1-name list the governor demanded the supreme court force the commission to send him every name they considered, a request the supreme court rejected. Ultimately the Governor refused to appoint anyone and the selection defaulted to the Chief Justice. A similar 1-name list scenario also occurred in 2012 as well.

SJR 30 marks a departure from prior efforts in Missouri which had focused on 4/8 or 5/10 plans under which an initial list would be made up of 4 or 5 names (vs. the current 3). The governor would be allowed to reject the list and ask for a new one, for a total of 8 or 10 nominees.

The 4/8 plan appeared in HJR 19 of 2009 (as introduced) and SJR 17 of 2011. The 5/10 provision appeared in HJR 49 of 2008, HJR 10 of 2009 (as amended), SJR 9 of 2009, HJR 58 of 2010, HJR 18 of 2011, and HJR 44 of 2012. A plan that would allow for only a single list of 5 names was considered as HJR 52 of 2008.

Citing “state sovereignty”, Arizona House cmte to vote this week to prohibit state courts from enforcing/recognizing federal court decisions; MO & TN considering similar bans

Citing the state’s “sovereign authority”, members of the Arizona, Missouri, and Tennessee legislatures are attempting to prohibit state judges from enforcing U.S. Supreme Court and/or federal courts decision. An Arizona House committee is set to vote on two such proposals this week.

Arizona

Under HB 2024 as introduced U.S. Supreme Court decisions could only be deemed valid in Arizona if they were “affirmed” by Congress and signed into law.

1-274.  Sovereign authority; United States supreme court opinions

Pursuant to the sovereign authority of this state and article II, section 3, Constitution of Arizona, this state and all political subdivisions of this state are prohibited from using any personnel or financial resources to enforce, administer or cooperate with an opinion of the supreme court of the United States that is not in pursuance of the constitution of the United States and that has not been affirmed by a vote of the Congress of the United States and signed into law as prescribed by the Constitution of the United States.

Similar provisions would also ban enforcement or acknowledgment of presidential executive orders (1-272) and federal agency policies (1-273).

HB 2201 would operate in a similar manner. The statute defines any cooperation with a “ruling issued by a court of the United States” as “commandeering” state judges and allows it only if the ruling has been “affirmed by a vote of the Congress of the United States and signed into law as prescribed by the Constitution of the United States.”

HB 2024 and HB 2201 are set for a vote on February 10 in the House Federalism and States’ Rights committee.

Missouri

HJR 62 is constitutional amendment directed broadly to any “federal law.” The state legislature could send to the ballot, or the general public could via referendum, any “federal law” for a vote as to its constitutionality. If approved by voters, the “federal law” would be valid. If not, “the courts of this state shall be stripped of jurisdiction to enforce such a particular federal law…”

HJR 62 has been filed in the House Government Oversight and Accountability Committee.

Tennessee

HB 1828 and the identical SB 1790 both repeat many of the same provisions of the Arizona bills, but with one difference. Where the Arizona bills required Congress “affirm” U.S. Supreme Court and/or federal court decisions before state courts can enforce them, the Tennessee version requires the Tennessee General Assembly consent to the federal court decisions first.

This state and all political subdivisions of this state are prohibited from using any personnel or financial resources to enforce, administer, or cooperate with the implementation, regulation, or enforcement of any opinion of the United States supreme court unless such has been first expressly implemented by the general assembly by law as the public policy of the state.

HB 1828 is in the House State Government Committee. SB 1790 is the Senate Judiciary Committee.

Bans on court use of sharia/international law: reintroduced or active in 12 states; bill moves in SC; threat of impeachment against judges in WV

As I noted last July 2015 saw some 32 pieces of legislation introduced in 17 states to ban or limit the use by state courts of sharia or foreign/international law. 2016 looks to pick up where 2015 left off with a raft of new legislation introduced in 12 states. Of note:

Continued reference to sharia in particular

Notable regarding many of these bills is the continued focus on specifically banning the use by state courts of sharia law (South Carolina HB 3521 as introduced; Missouri HJR 69). The specific targeting of sharia was held as unconstitutional in a decision by the Tenth Circuit in 2012 a sharia-specific constitutional amendment approved by Oklahoma voters in 2010. Perhaps as a result the version adopted by the South Carolina House last week eliminated the word “sharia”. That ruling has not stopped Missouri’s proposal, which is practically a verbatim copy of the Oklahoma 2010 proposal struck down by the Tenth Circuit.

Missouri HJR 69 of 2016

The courts provided for in this section, when exercising their judicial authority, shall uphold and adhere to the law as provided in the United States Constitution, the Constitution of Missouri, the United States Code, federal regulations promulgated pursuant thereto, and if necessary the law of another state of the United States, provided the law of the other state does not include sharia law, in making judicial decisions. The courts shall not look to the legal precepts of other nations or cultures. Specifically, the courts shall not consider international law or sharia law. The provisions of this section shall apply to all cases before the respective courts, including but not limited to cases of first impression.

Oklahoma HJR 1056 of 2010

The Courts provided for in subsection A of this section, when exercising their judicial authority, shall uphold and adhere to the law as provided in the United States Constitution, the Oklahoma Constitution, the United States Code, federal regulations promulgated pursuant thereto, established common law, the Oklahoma Statutes and rules promulgated pursuant thereto, and if necessary the law of another state of the United States provided the law of the other state does not include Sharia Law , in making judicial decisions. The courts shall not look to the legal precepts of other nations or cultures. Specifically, the courts shall not consider international law or Sharia Law. The provisions of this subsection shall apply to all cases before the respective courts including, but not limited to, cases of first impression.

Threat of impeachment

Also of note is a West Virginia version of this bill which threatens impeachment for any judge who violates the provision (“Any decision or ratification of a private agreement that is determined, on the merits, by a judge in this state who relies on any body of religious sectarian law or foreign law is void, is appealable error and is grounds for impeachment and removal from office.”)

List of proposals and their current status below the fold.

Continue reading Bans on court use of sharia/international law: reintroduced or active in 12 states; bill moves in SC; threat of impeachment against judges in WV

Missouri: legislator wants impeachment investigation of judge in child sodomy case; judge dismissed charges due to speedy trial violation

In October 2015 Missouri Circuit Judge Patricia Joyce dismissed forcible sodomy charges involving a five month old against Aaron Fisher due to a speedy trial violation. Now at least one member of the Missouri House wants the judge investigated for possible impeachment on the grounds of “incompetency.”

News reports indicate that Judge Joyce ordered the charges against Fisher dismissed after prosecutors failed to proceed to trial against Fisher for 6 years.

[Joyce’s order] says, “Missouri courts have found that delay of greater than 8 months is presumptively prejudicial.”

Joyce explains that after hearing evidence, the court concluded since charges were filed in October 2009, the state has failed to bring Fisher to trial without any reason.

The order shows that the only evidence of the defendant’s delay is on continuance request from May 23, 2011.

Fisher filed a motion for a speedy trial in February 2011, and the former Miller Co. prosecutor had 5 jury trial settings. No record was made to protect or address Fisher’s rights to a speedy trial, therefore the court can’t conclude that his rights were considered.

Immediately after the decision a local state legislator called for a House investigation of Judge Joyce. Rep. Rocky Miller has now introduced that investigation resolution (HR 5) which includes citations to caselaw and alluding to possible impeachment of Judge Joyce.

NOW THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED that the Missouri House of Representatives, Ninety-eighth General Assembly, Second Regular Session, requests that the House Judiciary Committee investigate the alleged actions by Judge Patricia Joyce related to the dismissal of charges against Aaron Michael Fisher for two counts of forcible sodomy involving a five-month-old child indicating she acted incompetently and which may constitute an impeachable offense under the Missouri Constitution.

HR 5 makes two references to Joyce as having “acted incompetently.” The state’s constitution provides that “incompetency” is a basis for impeachment.

All elective executive officials of the state, and judges of the supreme court, courts of appeals and circuit courts shall be liable to impeachment for crimes, misconduct, habitual drunkenness, willful neglect of duty, corruption in office, incompetency, or any offense involving moral turpitude or oppression in office.

This marks the third time in the last decade a Missouri legislator has threatened impeachment against a state judge for a ruling.

HR 5 has been filed but not yet assigned to a committee.

Across country, state legislatures consider altering number of nominees judicial nominating commissions must release

One particular aspect of judicial selection legislatures have had a keen interest has been the number of names that advance through judicial nominating commissions (JNCs). 2016 looks to be no exception; in Missouri SJR 30 prefiled for the new year would eliminate the restriction that the state’s JNCs send only three names to the governor. Moreover, an examination of legislation over the last two decades shows a marked uptick in interest outside of Missouri over the last several years.

Alaska

The state’s constitution provides the state’s JNC send “two or more persons” to the governor when a vacancy occurs in either the Supreme or Superior Court; statutes require “two or more persons” for Court of Appeals (Alaska Stat. § 22.07.070) and District Court (§ 22.15.170) vacancies. No recent attempt has been made to alter these provisions.

Arizona

The state’s constitution provides that if the vacancy is on the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, or Superior Court (in counties that use a commission system) the governor is to receive the names of “not less than three persons.” Several efforts have been made to amend this provision. SCR 1038 of 2005 would have increased this to 6 names for appellate vacancies and 7 for Superior Courts. In 2011 proposals were submitted (SCR 1040, SCR 1046, and SCR 1049) that would have increased the list to 6 names for appellate vacancies and 7 for Superior Courts.

The proposal that eventually made it on the ballot was SCR 1001 of 2011: 8 names for both trial and appellate vacancies. SCR 1001 also included several other changes to give governors more power over the JNCs. When it appeared on the 2012 ballot as Proposition 115 it received only a 27% yes vote. Undaunted by the loss, the legislature in 2013 passed HB 2600. Rather than amend the constitution, the legislature tried to force by statute the JNCs to provide governors “the names of at least five persons” for trial and appellate vacancies. In September 2013 the state’s supreme court held that law unconstitutional.

Colorado

The state’s constitution provides the JNCs in the state are to provide “a list of three nominees for the supreme court and any intermediate appellate court, and… a list of two or three nominees for all other courts of record…” No recent attempt has been made to alter these provisions.

Connecticut

Connecticut adopted a commission based system in 1986: governors nominate from a list provided by the state’s judicial selection commission but the constitution is silent as to the number. State law (Conn. Gen. Stat. § 51-44a) provides that the commission is to provide the governor a list of all “qualified candidates”. No recent attempt has been made to alter these provisions.

Florida

The state adopted a merit/commission system in 1972 for the state’s trial and appellate courts. The original provision required the JNCs to submit a list of “not fewer than three persons”. For the appellate courts, this was amended in 1976 to precisely 3 (“one of three persons nominated”). For trial courts, commission appointment was eliminated, but was made optional under a 1998 amendment that allowed voters to opt in for each county in the 2000 election. Under the 1998 trial court opt-in provision “not fewer than three” names were to go to the governor. No county opted into this system for its trial courts.

For the appellate courts, several efforts were made in the 1990s to change the “not fewer than three persons” language. The first was to change it to precisely “three persons” (SJR 18 of 1992). Eventually the legislature settled on “Not fewer than three persons nor more than six persons” (HJR 1415 and SJR 978 of 1996). The expansion to 3-6 names was approved by voters as Amendment 3 in November 1996.

By 2000 another round of efforts were made to expand the list, this time by dropping any numerical requirements and providing the JNCs were to send a list of all applicants (HB 923 of 2000) or a list of all persons eligible to fill the vacancy (HB 627, HB 827, SB 1794, and SB 1860 of 2001). None of the proposals advanced and the issue has appeared to have remained dormant since.

Hawaii

The state adopted a commission based appointment system in the 1978. Originally the commission was required to submit a “list of not less than six nominees” for each vacancy in the state’s appellate and trial courts. A 1994 amendment (SB 2294) modified this to “a list of not less than four, and not more than six” for the Supreme, Intermediate Appellate, and Circuit Courts; District Courts remained at “not less than six nominees”.

There the matter lay for over a decade until a 2005 effort (SB 1166) would have provided the lists for all courts were to be made up of “not less than three.” In 2007 a measure to change the threshold down to 3-5 names for all courts was introduced. SB 948 was approved by the full Senate and advanced through the House Judiciary Committee before ultimately dying when the legislature adjourned.

Indiana

The state’s constitution provides the judicial nominating commission must submit “a list of three nominees” to the governor for vacancies on the Supreme Court or Court of Appeals. No recent attempt has been made to alter these provisions.

Iowa

The state’s constitution provides that the judicial nominating commission is to provide “three nominees” for Supreme Court vacancies and “two nominees” for District Courts; a statute (Iowa Code § 46.14A) with respect to the Court of Appeals repeats the “three nominees” language.

With respect to the constitutional provision, there were several efforts (SJR 2006 of 2010; SJR 6 and SJR 7 of 2011) to allow the governor to reject the list of three names provided for Supreme Court vacancies and requiring the commission submit a list of three new names. None advanced.

With respect to the Court of Appeals, the statute creating the court in 1976 required the nominating commission provide the governor a list of 3 names for vacancies on that court (former § 46.15). That number was expanded to five when the state’s judiciary was reorganized in 1983. The number was reverted back to 3 when portions of section Iowa Code § 46.15 were recodified as § 46.14A (SF 381 of 2007).

Kansas

The state’s constitution specifies that with respect to the Supreme Court the Supreme Court Nominating Commission is to provide the governor a list of “three persons.” The state’s Court of Appeals had until 2013 also be selected in like fashion via a statutory system (Kan. Stat. Ann. § 20-3005) that required a list of “three nominees”. In addition District Courts in those judicial districts that have opted into the commission-select system have their vacancies filled from a list of “not less than two nor more than three persons for each office which is vacant” (§ 20-2909).

With respect to the Supreme Court, there was an effort to allow governors to reject the list of 3 names and be provided a second list of 3 new names for a total of 6 (HCR 5005 of 2009) or to simply have the commission submit 6 names on the first list (SCR 1619 of 2007 & SCR 1612 of 2009). Another (HCR 5027 of 2013) would have provided the commission submit all qualified persons to the governor.

With respect to the Court of Appeals no effort was made to expand the list the commission was required to provide, the commission system was simply eliminated in 2013 and the governor permitted to appoint any qualified person subject to senate confirmation.

With respect to the District Courts, no recent effort appears to have been made to modify the current practice of 2-3 names.

Missouri

Since adoption of its commission-based plan the Missouri constitution has specified that commissions are to submit “three persons” to fill vacancies in the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, and specified Circuit Courts. Although a 1976 constitutional revision moved the location of the language (from Art. V, Sec. 29(a) to the new Art. V, Sec 25(a)) the 3-persons provision was unchanged.

Much of the focus in this area has been for a 4/8 or 5/10 plan. Under the proposals the initial list submitted to the governor would be made up of 4 or 5 names (vs. the current 3). The governor would be allowed to reject the list and ask for a new one, for a total of 8 or 10 nominees.

The 4/8 plan appeared in HJR 19 of 2009 (as introduced) and SJR 17 of 2011.

The 5/10 provision appeared in HJR 49 of 2008, HJR 10 of 2009 (as amended), SJR 9 of 2009, HJR 58 of 2010, HJR 18 of 2011, and HJR 44 of 2012. A plan that would allow for only a single list of 5 names was considered as HJR 52 of 2008.

The latest iteration prefiled for the 2016 session (SJR 30) would simply eliminate the 3-name provision.

Nebraska

The state’s constitution provides vacancies in the state’s Supreme and District Courts must be filed from a list of “of at least two nominees” presented to the governor. Various statutes extend this practice to the Court of Appeals (Neb. Rev. Stat. § 24-1101), County Courts (§ 24-820) and Juvenile Courts (§ 43-2,114) and incorporate the constitutional provision by reference. No recent attempt has been made to alter these provisions.

New Mexico

New Mexico uses a unique two-step process for judicial selection. When a vacancy occurs one of three JNCs (appellate judges, district court judges, or metropolitan court judges commissions) meets and submits to the governor a list of all “persons qualified for judicial office and recommended for appointment”. The governor can then ask for a second list of names. Whoever is picked, however, must then face off in partisan elections at the next general election.

While the constitution does not provide for a minimum or maximum number of names, one bill did seek to put such a provision in place after a single name was submitted in 2006 to the state’s governor to fill a District Court vacancy and no additional names sent when he asked for a second list. SB 1075 of 2007 would have required JNCs provide at least two names per vacancy. The bill never proceeded out of committee.

New York

New York’s constitution since 1977 requires vacancies for the state’s top court (called the Court of Appeals) be filled via a commission on judicial nomination, but gives the legislature power to set the organization and procedure of the commission. State law on this subject (Judiciary Law § 63) specifies the list to fill associate judgeship must contain “at least three persons and not more than seven persons.” Interestingly, the chief judgeship must be made up of at least 7 persons (“In recognition of the unique responsibilities of the chief judge of the court of appeals for policies of judicial administration, for a vacancy in the office of chief judge the commission shall recommend to the governor seven persons.”)

In 1993 an effort (AB 916) was made to raise the 7-name limit for chief judge to 11 names and automatically put all serving associate judges on that list. The bill was reintroduced for several sessions thereafter (AB 3699 of 1995 & AB 2148 of 1997).

In 2009 an attempt was made to eliminate the numerical restrictions and require the commission send all qualified names to the governor. AB 3866 of that year failed to advance but was reintroduced in the 2011 session as AB 309.

Also in 2009 an attempt was made to increase the limits from 3-7 to 5-9 (associate judge) and from 7 to 9 (chief judge). It too failed to advance.

Oklahoma

The state’s constitution provides that vacancies in the state’s two top courts (Supreme Court and Court of Criminal Appeals) are to be filled from a list of “three (3) nominees” submitted to the governor. A statute (Okla. Stat. tit. 20, § 30.17) extends this practice to the state’s intermediate appellate court (Court of Civil Appeals). No recent attempt has been made to alter these provisions.

Rhode Island

In 1994 the state’s constitution was amended to provide vacancies in the Supreme Court were to be filled from a list provided by a judicial nominating commission to be established by the legislature and confirmed by the House and Senate. Lower court vacancies (Superior, Family, and District) were also to be filled by commission-based appointment but required only Senate confirmation. A statute (R.I. Gen. Laws 8-16.1-6) provides that the list provided by the commission is to be made up of between 3-5 names.

From 2008 to 2015 governors were not limited to just those 3-5 names. Under laws enacted annually from 2008 to 2014 (HB 7829 of 2008, HB 5567 of 2009, SB 2645 of 2010, SB 686 of 2011, HB 8043 of 2012, SB 471 of 2013, and HB 8006 of 2014) anyone vetted and approved by the JNC for a judgeship would be eligible for any other judgeship of the same court for 5 years. The program lapsed on July 1, 2015 when HB 6307 failed to be enacted to give the program yet another 1-year extension.

South Carolina

South Carolina is one of only two states (Virginia is the other) in which the legislature elects judges with no involvement by the governor. In 1997 the state’s constitution was amended to require the creation of a “Judicial Merit Selection Commission” to recommend nominees to the legislature for the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, Circuit Court, and Family Court. The commission’s membership and processes were left up to the legislature to set. The law enacted to implement the constitutional provision (S.C. Code Ann. § 2-19-80) requires the release by the commission of “the three candidates whom it considers best qualified.”

There have been over two dozen pieces of legislation to alter the number of names released by the commission. Almost all focused on the release of all qualified names, with “qualified” meaning either a) that the individual meets the minimum requirements for the position (age, attorney, etc.) or b) the person was “qualified” to serve in the opinion of the commission.

The practice for the better part of a decade was for the House to pass the “all qualified names” provision and for the Senate to either reject it or amend it to “no more than 3 qualified names” but with a provision that more than 3 names could be sent if two-thirds of the commission approved. This House/Senate split occurred in the 2003/2004 (HB 4734), 2005/2006 (HB 2079), and 2007/2008 (HB 3463 & SB 40) sessions. The Senate passed its own standalone version (3 names, more if two-thirds of commission approved) in 2007 (SB 40) that the House failed to act on.

The matter lay dormant until the 2015/2016 session when again the House passed an “all qualified” names bill (HB 3979); the Senate has yet to act on the legislation.

South Dakota

The state’s constitution was amended in 1980 to provide that vacancies in the Supreme Court are to be filled from a list of “two or more persons” nominated by the judicial qualifications commission. No recent attempt has been made to alter these provisions.

Utah

The state’s constitution was amended in 1985 to provide for a commission-system with senate confirmation for all courts of record (Supreme, Court of Appeals, District and Juvenile). The list given to the governor for these courts must consist “of at least three nominees.” A statutory change in 2008 (SB 72) brought the state’s other courts (Justice) into a commission system. The Justice Court Commission was required to submit “at least two names to the appointing authority.”

For the courts of record, a 1995 statute (former Utah Code § 20A-12-105, recodified in 2008 as § 78A-10-104) provided the appellate commission was to provide the governor at least 5 names for each vacancy while trial court commissions were to provide at least 3 names. In 2010 this was further amended (SB 289) to provide that the appellate court commission is to submit 7 names to the governor, while the trial court commissions are to send 5. SB 108 of the same year had similar provisions. A 1998 effort (SJR 3) would have allowed the governor to reject a list of names from the commission and request a new list. There was no limit to the number of rejections.

For the Justice Courts, a 2015 proposal (SB 141) increased the number of names from “at least two” to “at least three” for the local appointing authority to choose from. The bill was signed into law in March of this year.

Vermont

The state’s constitution provides the governor is to nominate Supreme Court and other judges (other than Probate judges) from a list provided by a judicial nominating body to be created by the legislature. A state statute (4 VSA 602) provided that the Judicial Nominating Board is to submit all “candidates” to the governor for consideration; this was amended in 2009 (HB 470) to “qualified candidates”. Other than the 2009 amendment, no recent attempt has been made to alter these provisions.

Wyoming

The state’s constitution as amended in 1972 provides for a judicial nominating commission for the supreme court, district courts and any other courts the legislature decides. The commission is to give the governor “a list of three nominees” for vacancies. No recent attempt has been made to alter these provisions.

Missouri Legislative Year in Review: revisions to municipal court statutes

Law

SB 5 Modifies Municipal Court system. Creates minimum standards for municipal governance and creates a remedy process for citizens who believe the minimum standards are not being met. Requires the presiding judge of the circuit court in which each municipal division is located to notify the clerk of the Supreme Court of the name and address of the municipal division by September 1, 2016. Requires the presiding judge of the circuit court in which each municipal division is located to notify the clerk of the Supreme Court if a municipality elects to abolish the municipal division. Requires the Missouri Supreme Court to develop rules regarding conflict of interest for any prosecutor, defense attorney, or judge that has a pending case before the municipal division of any circuit court. Create conditions for the prosecution of minor traffic violations including. Allows for a request for an income tax refund setoff for unpaid court costs, fines, fees, or other sums ordered by a municipal court in excess of twenty-five dollars. Replaces the restrictions on annual general operating revenue. Requires the limit on annual general operating revenue from traffic fines to be reduced from 30% to 20% effective January 1, 2016. St. Louis County and municipalities within that county are restricted to 12.5% of annual general operating revenue from traffic fines. Requires all counties, cities, towns, and villages to submit an addendum with their annual financial report to the State Auditor with an accounting of annual general operating revenue, total revenues from fines, bond forfeitures, and court costs for traffic violations, and the percent of annual general operating revenue from traffic violations. Requires all counties, cities, towns, and villages to submit an addendum signed by its municipal judge certifying substantial compliance with certain municipal court procedures. Provides that any county, city, town, or village failing to timely file or remit excess revenues from traffic fines shall not receive any amount of moneys to which the county, city, town, or village would otherwise be entitled to receive from local sales tax revenues or county sales tax pool revenues. Require an election automatically be held upon the question of disincorporation for any county, city, town, or village which has failed to remit excess revenues. Upon the affirmative vote of sixty percent of those persons voting on the question, the county governing body is required to disincorporate the city, town, or village.

Review of 2015 efforts to change, alter, or end merit selection/commission based judicial appointment systems

The last several years have seen numerous efforts to modify or simply abolish merit selection/commission-based judicial appointive systems and 2015 was no exception. In these systems , a commission provides a list of names to an executive, or in the case of South Carolina the legislature, from which the appointing authority must select (as opposed to some states where the commission’s list is a recommendation only).

Much of the effort in 2015 focused on either a) reducing the percentage of lawyer-appointed members of the nomination commissions and/or b) requiring judges appointed under such systems receive super-majority support in subsequent yes/no retention elections. While major changes failed to pass in 2015, they do indicate where legislative activity will likely be focused in this area in 2016.

Alaska

In a repeat of efforts first started in 2014, legislators pressed to give more control to the governor and legislature over the state’s Judicial Council which serves as the judicial nominating commission for the state. Under SJR 3 the Council would have been expanded from 7 members to 10 by the addition of 3 new non-attorney members appointed by the governor. Moreover, all Council members would have been required to be confirmed by the legislature (currently the attorney-elected councilmembers and chief justice are not required to be confirmed into their council positions). Facing heavy opposition SJR 3 was approved by the Senate State Affairs Committee on March 25 but proceeded no further.

Arizona

Two constitutional amendments to modify the commission system (which applies to appellate judges and general jurisdiction judges in the state’s largest counties) were filed this year. HCR 2002 would have required judges facing retention elections receive at least a 60% “yes” vote. HCR 2006 would have allowed the state’s legislature to remove from office on a 2/3rds vote judges appointed under such a system without the need to prove an impeachable offense. Both bills died in committee.

Colorado

No changes offered.

Connecticut

No changes offered.

Florida

For the first session in nearly a decade there were no bills introduced to change the state’s judicial selection system, this after a loss in 2014 of a plan to allow governors to “prospectively appoint” to fill judicial vacancies that had not occurred yet.

Hawaii

SB 615 would have modified the Senate-confirmation portion of the state’s commission-based judicial selection system. Under the state’s constitution the governor (or chief justice for some lower courts) has 30 days to select from the list of names provided by the judicial selection commission. The Senate then has 30 days to confirm the appointee otherwise the person is confirmed by default. In 2012 several judicial appointments were made at or near the deadline and in one case without giving written notification to the Senate until a week later.

SB 615 would have specified that the Senate was to receive written notice concurrently with the appointment and that the 30 day clock for the Senate to confirm started only “on the senate’s receipt of the written notice”.

SB 615 was approved by the full Senate on March 10 but the House Judiciary Committee made several amendments to clarify some of the technical language regarding notification. The House amended version ultimately died in the House Finance Committee at session’s end.

Indiana

Indiana saw three separate efforts to change judicial selection in 2013. SJR 8 and SJR 9 sought to end commission-based selection for judges, allowing the governor to appoint anyone to the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals subject to Senate confirmation. Both constitutional amendments would have also repealed any judicial canons that prohibited a judge from speaking in their campaigns or making a donation of money, services, or property to a political party or a candidate for office, including a candidate for a judicial office. Finally, judges appointed under this system would have been required to receive a supermajority of “yes” votes to be retained in office: 67% under SJR 8 and 60% under SJR 9.

SJR 15 took a different tack on the issue of judicial selection. The constitutional amendment would have reduced the number of attorney-designated seats on the state’s merit selection commission and required Senate confirmation. In a unique proposal not found in any other state, the bill would have ended elections for subsequent terms, instead requiring a judge receive a 60% yes vote not of the general public but of the House of Representatives.

Neither SJR 8, SJR 9, nor SJR 15 proceeded out of committee.

Iowa

No changes offered.

Kansas

Having abolished the merit selection/commission-based judicial appointive system for the Court of Appeals in 2013 by statute, the state’s legislature urged on by the state’s governor debated numerous statutory and constitutional changes to the way the state’s Supreme Court is chosen, most focused on ending the state’s merit selection/commission based system.

  • HCR 5004: Direct partisan election of all appellate judges. Approved by House Judiciary Committee 2/17/2015.
  • HCR 5005: Allow Governor to appoint to Supreme Court or Court of Appeals subject to Senate confirmation. As is currently the case for the Court of Appeals by statute there would be a default-confirmation provision; if the Senate fails to vote on a candidate within a certain number of days (depending on if in session or out of session) the candidate is automatically confirmed. Judges would remain subject to yes/no retention elections. Approved by House Judiciary Committee 2/17/2015.
  • HCR 5006: Same as 5005, but judges would serve for life and not be subject to retention or other election.
  • HCR 5009: Require judges receive 67% “yes” vote in retention elections.
  • HCR 5012: Allow Governor to appoint to Supreme Court or Court of Appeals, but only from a list provided by the House of Representatives. The person appointed would be subject to Senate confirmation.
  • HCR 5013: Changes membership of Supreme Court nominating commission: 4 chosen by bar members, 5 chosen by governor, 6 chosen by legislative leaders.
  • HCR 5015: Keeps nominating commission, but gives governor power to name 5 out 9 members. Requires any name submitted to governor be approved by 2/3rds of commission.

In addition to the above SB 197 would have made statutory changes with respect to these commissions, placing them under the state’s Open Meetings Act. The records of attorneys who voted in elections to place attorney-members on the commissions would be subject to the state’s Open Records Act as well.

Missouri

No changes offered.

Nebraska

No changes offered.

Oklahoma

Angry at several recent decisions of the state’s Supreme Court which had resulted an impeachment effort in 2014, both the House and Senate debated either changing or ending the commission-system currently in place.

Two constitutional amendments were offered: HJR 1006 would have targeted just the Supreme Court (and not the other appellate courts), effectively replicating the system in place in Michigan and Ohio. There political parties nominate or hold primaries for judicial candidates who then appear without party labels on the November ballot. HJR 1006 would also have provided that the Governor was to name the Chief Justice from among the justices of the Supreme Court and remove the Chief Justice from that office at will. SJR 32 would have allowed the governor to appoint anyone to the appellate courts subject to Senate confirmation. The existing judicial nominating commission would remain, but as an advisory body to review the appointee prior to Senate confirmation as either “qualified” or “not qualified”. Retention elections would have remained in place for subsequent terms. Neither HJR 1006 nor SJR 32 proceeded out of committee.

Several statutory efforts were undertaken to change the composition of the judicial nominating commission. HB 2214 and SB 795 would have vacated all 6 currently serving attorney-selected members of the commission. The House bill would have refilled the positions with 6 attorneys, 2 each for the Lt. Governor, the Attorney General, and the state bar. The Senate version provided 3 selections each for the Speaker of the House and President Pro Tempore of the Senate. Neither proceeded out of committee.

Rhode Island

In a repeat of a practice that has been renewed annually for almost a decade, HB 6307 would have allowed governors to fill vacancies in judicial office not only based on the contemporary list provided by the judicial nominating commission but from any list submitted by the commission in the previous 5 years. The existing statutory authorization for the 5-year look back provision lapsed as of July 31, 2015. While the House passed HB 6307 prior to the deadline (June 18), the bill remains locked in the Senate Judiciary Committee.

South Carolina

South Carolina’s legislature electes the judges of the state’s higher courts and has for the last several years used a merit selection commission to obtain a list of names for consideration. Presently the commission submit a list of the three best qualified candidates, however HB 3979 and SB 247 would have required the commission release the names of all qualified candidates. That plan was approved by the House on April 29 and remains pending in the Senate Judiciary Committee into the 2016 session. Other bills focused on giving the governor a role in the selection process.

  • HB 3123: Ends legislative selection and use of nominating commission. Provides for governor to appoint subject to Senate confirmation.
  • SB 111: Ends legislative selection and use of nominating commission. Provides for governor to appoint subject to Senate confirmation.
  • SB 180: Commission sends governor list of names, governor picks 3 names, commission reviews 3 names, legislature then picks from 3.
  • SB 242: Commission members to be selected by governor, not legislature.

South Dakota

No changes offered.

Utah

In 2008 Utah’s Justice Courts were brought into the state commission-based judicial selection system. At that time the statute required the nominating commission submit at least two names to the local appointing authority to fill a judicial vacancy. SB 141 included among its various amendments to a variety of statutes a provision that the commission must now submit at least three names. It was signed into law March 23.

Wyoming

No changes offered.

 

Missouri Legislative Year in Review: crime to file false liens on judges

Vetoed

HB 1553 Specifies current law must not be construed to permit the adoption of any local court rule that grants a judge the discretion to remove or direct the removal of any pleading, file or communication from a court file or record without the agreement of all parties.

SB 615 Specifies current law must not be construed to permit the adoption of any local court rule that grants a judge the discretion to remove or direct the removal of any pleading, file or communication from a court file or record without the agreement of all parties. Specifies that any overpaid funds owed to a municipal division of the circuit court may be retained by the municipality for the operation of the municipal court.

Law

HB 1231  Modifies the number of judges to serve in each district of the court of appeals, in order to reflect the current total number authorized by statute. Specifies current law must not be construed to permit the adoption of any local court rule that grants a judge the discretion to remove or direct the removal of any pleading, file or communication from a court file or record without the agreement of all parties. Specifies that any overpaid funds owed to a municipal division of the circuit court may be retained by the municipality for the operation of the municipal court.

HB 1412 Specifies that it shall be a crime to intentionally file a fraudulent financing statement or any financing statement against a judge or other person with the Secretary of State with the intent to harass or defraud any other person.

HB 1665 Requires all courts that process documents via mandatory e-filing to accept, file, and docket a notice of entry of appearance filed by an attorney in a criminal case if the filing document is no longer than one page and was sent by fax or regular mail.

SB 621 Reduces number of meetings of the state judicial conference to every two years (currently annual). Creates permanent legislative committee (Joint Committee on the Justice System) to examine all aspects of justice system.