Posts Tagged ‘Wisconsin’

Wisconsin Assembly considers ending non-lawyer judges, increasing municipal court fees

December 8th, 2011

I previously mentioned the December 15 meeting of the Wisconsin Assembly’s Committee on Judiciary and Ethics and its consideration of a plan to change the way the state’s chief justice is selected. Several other court-related bills are on the agenda that are of particular note.

Two bills focus on changes to the state’s municipal courts. In 2010, the courts were restructured and their manner of operation much tightly controlled under SB 383 of that year (for example, judges must wear black robes during proceedings and store all records in the office of the court clerk or in another appropriate facility designated by the municipal governing body). An amendment offered at the time (Assembly Amendment 2) would have required all municipal court judges elected or appointed after a certain date be attorneys. The amendment was introduced but never voted on in committee.

AB 101 of 2011, introduced by the same member of the Assembly who introduced Assembly Amendment 2 to SB 383 of 2010, replicates the amendment’s language and specifies January 1, 2011 as the date beyond with municipal court judges elected or appointed must be attorneys.

AB 285 increases maximum court fees assessed for ordinance violations in municipal courts from $28 to $38.

Other items on the December 15 agenda:

  • AB 168: resolution of claims against the state for wrongful imprisonment of innocent persons and exempting from taxation certain amounts an individual receives from the claims board or legislature
  • AB 249: privileged communications to a school guidance counselor, school teacher, or teacher’s aide
  • AB 284: eliminating the right to refuse probation
  • AB 391: creating the Uniform Foreign Country Money Judgments Recognition Act
  • SB 127: aggravating factors for a court to consider when sentencing persons

State-by-State 2011 Legislative Year in Review: Wisconsin

December 7th, 2011

New laws or resolutions affecting the courts enacted or adopted by the Wisconsin legislature in 2011 include the following:

AB 40 Increases small claims from $5,000 to $10,000.

SB 117 Provides actions in which state government is sole party may be filed in any county (currently must be filed in Dane County/state capital). Provides appeals must be heard in Court of Appeals district OTHER than the one in which the case was file. Provides district is to be selected by appellant

Wisconsin Assembly committee to consider plan to change selection & term of state’s chief justice

December 6th, 2011

Wisconsin’s legislature is considering two bills that would end the practice of making the longest serving justice of the state’s Supreme Court the Chief Justice. Under AJR 49 and SJR 36, the determination would instead be made every time a justice is elected or re-elected to the court. This could make the effective term of a chief justice in the state a single year; the state’s constitution programs “Only one justice may be elected in any year” and there’s been 9 elections since 2000 (2000, 2001, 2003, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, & 2011).

The Wisconsin Assembly’s Committee on Judiciary and Ethics is set to hold a public hearing on the proposal December 15.

 

Senate Interim Judiciary Committee meets in Wisconsin

November 1st, 2011

Wisconsin’s Senate Committee on Judiciary, Utilities, Commerce, and Government Operations meets today to consider:

  • AB 102 crimes against children committed by certain persons and providing a penalty
  • AB 103 receiving a stolen firearm and providing a penalty
  • SB 125 liability of cities, villages, towns, and counties for damages caused by an insufficiency or want of repair of a highway
  • Senate Bill 217 suspension of operating privilege or registration for unsatisfied judgment for damages arising out of a motor vehicle accident
  • September 2011 Special Session SB 14 interest rates on judgments in certain civil actions
  • September 2011 Special Session SB 22 the duty of care owed to trespassers

Ohio Issue 1: Supreme Court Commissions? Courts of Conciliation? Thank (or blame) New York…

October 28th, 2011

While much of the focus regarding Issue 1 has been on the proposed change to the judicial retirement age, Ohio voters will decide on the outright repeal of two sections of the state constitution’s Article 6. Both sections can be traced back to New York’s 1846 constitution.

Courts of Conciliation

Ohio Constitution (1851) Article 6, Section 19

The General Assembly may establish courts of conciliation, and prescribe their powers and duties; but such courts shall not render final judgment in any case, except upon submission, by the parties, of the matter in dispute, and their agreement to abide such judgment.

New York Constitution (1846) Article 6, Section 23

Tribunals of conciliation may be established, with such powers and duties as may be prescribed by law; but such tribunals shall have no power to render judgment to be obligatory on the parties, except they voluntarily submit their matters in difference, and agree to abide the judgment, or assent thereto, in the presence of such tribunal, in such cases as shall be prescribed by law.

Provisions for tribunals of conciliation or courts of conciliation can be found in the 1800s constitutions of not only Ohio (1851), but Wisconsin (1848), California (1849), Michigan (1850), Indiana (1851), and North Dakota (1889). They are all taken, almost verbatim, from the 1846 New York Constitution, which for its time was considered revolutionary in terms of judicial proceedings (and also was the genesis for the appellate commissions discussed below).

Courts of conciliation were akin to small claims courts (Minnesota’s small claims courts are still called “conciliation courts”) and arbitration or mediation (statutes in Arizona, California, Montana, and Nebraska reference conciliation courts that focus to amicably resolve martial and domestic relations issues). The report of the debates of the 1851 Ohio Constitutional convention note the intent behind these courts:

This plan of a court of conciliation has many advocates, who desire to see it established. It has been tried in other countries, with excellent effect—greatly diminish litigation and subduing a litigious spirit—a spirit which is the bane of a community. It sets neighbor against neighbor, brother against brother and even father against son, and son against father. Such litigation have I often witnessed, and in some cases seen it prosecuted with an embittered spirit, little short of devilish. Every means which promises only a mitigation if the evil should be employed. The expense and time wasted in such controversies, employing judges, jurors, witnesses, lawyers and suitors, is but a little of the mischief. The monstrous evil consists in the engendering and perpetuating of strife and contention among neighbors, begetting and nursing discord and hatred in families, and in disturbing the harmony and peace of society. A judicious peace loving and peace making officer of this kind may be more useful, far more useful than the first judge of your State, whom you propose to dignify with title of Chief Justice of Ohio.

It should be noted that despite the above ringing endorsement, the provision almost never happened. According to the reports of the debates at the 1851 Ohio Constitutional Convention, the vote to put in the provision was adopted 42-39.

All references to such courts can trace back (constitutionally speaking) to similar courts in Denmark and Norway, the “other countries” alluded to above. Although intended as separate and independent from regular courts, most courts of conciliation instead became divisions of existing courts. For example, a 1909 report indicates Cleveland’s Municipal Court had a Conciliation Division.

According to a history of the New York Constitution, the courts were seldom used because existing laws, with respect to arbitration, were already in place and accessible. In New York, it wasn’t until 1862 that an actual  tribunal of conciliation was set up in a judicial district. The statute authorizing the court was repealed 3 years later. As the Ohio Legislative Service Commission’s review of Measure 1 (then called HJR 1) indicates, Ohio too opted to put in mediation/conciliation practices rather than create free-standing courts.

Supreme Court Commissions

Ohio Constitution (1875) Article 6, Section 22

A commission, which shall consist of five members, shall be appointed by the governor, with the advice and consent of the senate, the members of which shall hold office for the term of three years from and after the first day of February, 1876, to dispose of such part of the business then on the dockets of the supreme court, as shall, by arrangement between said commission and said court, be transferred to such commission; and said commission shall have like jurisdiction and power in respect to such business as are or may be vested in said court; and the members of said commission shall receive a like compensation for the time being, with the judges of said court. A majority of the members of said commission shall be necessary to form a quorum or pronounce a decision, and its decision shall be certified, entered, and enforced as the judgments of the supreme court, and at the expiration of the term of said commission, all business undisposed of shall by it be certified to the supreme court and disposed of as if said commission had never existed. The clerk and reporter of said court shall be the clerk and reporter of said commission, and the commission shall have such other attendants not exceeding in number those provided by law for said court, which attendants said commission may appoint and remove at its pleasure. Any vacancy occurring in said commission, shall be filled by appointment of the governor, with the advice and consent of the senate, if the senate be in session, and if the senate be not in session, by the governor, but in such last case, such appointment shall expire at the end of the next session of the general assembly. The general assembly may, on application of the supreme court duly entered on the journal of the court and certified, provide by law, whenever two-thirds of such [each] house shall concur therein, from time to time, for the appointment, in like manner, of a like commission with like powers, jurisdiction and duties; provided, that the term of any such commission shall not exceed two years, nor shall it be created oftener than once in ten years.

New York Constitution (1869) Article 6, Section 4 & 5

Sec. 4 Upon the organization of the [new] Court of Appeals [New York's top court], under this article, the causes then pending in the present Court of Appeals shall become vested in the Court of Appeals hereby established. Such of said causes as are pending on the first day of January, eighteen hundred and sixty-nine, shall be heard and determined by a Commission, to be composed of five Commissioners of Appeals, four of whom shall be necessary to constitute a quorum; but the Court of Appeals hereby established may order any of said causes to be heard therein. Such Commission shall be composed of the Judges of the present Court of Appeals, elected or appointed thereto, and a fifth Commissioner who shall be appointed by the Governor, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate; or, if the Senate be not in session, by the Governor; but in such case, the appointment shall expire at the end of the next session.

Sec. 5 If any vacancy shall occur in the office of the said Commissioners, it shall be filled by appointment by the Governor by and with the advice and consent of the Senate; or if the Senate is not in session, by the Governor; but in such case, the appointment shall expire at the end of the next session. The Commissioners shall appoint, from their number, a Chief Commissioner; and may appoint and remove such attendants as may be necessary. The reporter of the Court of Appeals shall be the reporter of said Commission. The decisions of the Commission shall be certified to, and entered and enforced, as the judgments of the Court of Appeals. The Commission shall continue until the causes committed to it are determined, but not exceeding three years; and all causes then undetermined shall be heard by the Court of Appeals.

We take for granted the system in place in 40 states of an intermediate appellate court (usually called the Court of Appeals), however the creation of these courts met with fierce resistance both from voters and, on occasion, state supreme courts. Consider, for example, that Nevada voters have three times in the last three decades rejected the creation of such a court, most recently in 2010 (a fourth attempt may be made in 2014). When Colorado’s legislature made an attempt to create such a court in 1886, the state’s supreme court issued an advisory opinion that the proposed Court of Appeal was an unconstitutional infringement on the Supreme Court’s role as the supreme court of the state (the Supreme Court upheld a different version of the Court of Appeals in 1891).

Ohio and other large states like Texas tried to grapple with this problem through the use of appellate commissions. The appointment of special judicial officers to hear certain motions or matters was, and is, not uncommon. To this day subordinate judicial officers in California trial courts are called “commissioners“.

What made the New York, Ohio, and Texas provisions unique was that they provided for panels of commissioners to sit and render judgments. This avoided the exceptionally untenable situation of creating an intermediate appellate court or adding judges to existing courts which, as noted, had no real political support. The commission idea, however, got the votes in 1869 as part of a massive overhaul of New York’s judiciary article. The provisions appear to have been for the most part duplicated in Ohio (1875) and Texas (1879 by statute) a few years later.

Eventually these commissions fell out of favor for two reasons. First, states large and small simply needed dedicated, permanent intermediate appellate courts to handle the caseload. Second, there was a very real possibility that decisions of the commissions would be in conflict with the courts.

New York got such a dedicated court (the Appellate Divisions) in its 1894 constitution. Ohio got Circuit Courts of Appeals in 1851 consisting of 1 Supreme Court Justice riding circuit and sitting with the judges of the courts of common pleas, but it was not until an 1883 amendment that the Circuit Courts of Appeals consisted of judges specifically elected to serve in those courts. These eventually were made into the modern District Courts of Appeals.

What appellate commissioners remain today (such as in Oregon) are hearing officers who handle motion practice, not panels. Perhaps the only remaining vestiges of the old system are in Ohio’s constitution and North Dakota’s “Court of Appeals” which, despite the name, functions much the same as the commissions did, with panels coming into existence or only being used when the state’s top court is overwhelmed.

 

Wisconsin Interim Judiciary Committees meeting this week

October 25th, 2011

The busy week for interim activity I mentioned yesterday continues apace.  Wisconsin’s Senate Committee on Judiciary, Utilities, Commerce, and Government Operations is meeting October 26 for votes on SB 202 (elimination of compensatory and punitive damages for acts of employment discrimination or unfair honesty or genetic testing) and September 2011 Special Session SB 12 (factors for determining the reasonableness of attorney fees). Immediately after the votes there will be a hearing on several bills:

  • AB 102 crimes against children committed by certain persons and providing a penalty.
    AB 103 receiving a stolen firearm and providing a penalty.
  • LRB 2157/4 renaming the office of county treasurer in Milwaukee County, creating the elective office of county comptroller for Milwaukee County, transferring the duties of the Milwaukee County treasurer to that elective office, and expanding the duties and responsibilities of that office
  • SB 217 suspension of operating privilege or registration for unsatisfied judgment for damages arising out of a motor vehicle accident.
  • September 2011 Special Session SB 13 providing immunity from liability to drug and device manufacturers and sellers under certain circumstances.
  • September 2011 Special Session SB 14 interest rates on judgments in certain civil actions.
  • September 2011 Special Session SB 22 duty of care owed to trespassers.

On October 27, the Assembly Committee on Judiciary and Ethics has set a vote on September 2011 Special Session SB 14 (noted above) as well as September 2011 Special Session AB 22, the Assembly version of the bill on the duty of care owed to trespassers.

Will public financing for Wisconsin judicial races come back from the dead?

October 19th, 2011

Until 2011, Wisconsin was one of only a few states that provided for public financing of judicial candidates (in this case, for the supreme court). The plan was only adopted in May 2010 as SB 40 of that year and fell under the budget ax 13 months later in June 2011 (see this item from Gavel Grab for details). Bills introduced last week, however, may resurrect a heavily modified version of the program.

Under AB 317 and SB 213 taxpayers could designate $1 of their state income taxes to an Election Campaign Fund. A fiscal estimate attached to the bills expects the program to cost about $265,500 every two years and the bill puts $1,128,600 into the new Fund to start it.

However, unlike the original public financing plan, which was specific to the state supreme court, this new program would be open to candidates seeking various offices, including any candidate for a partisan state office, except district attorney. Candidates in the primary election (independents would have their name added to the ballot) who receive at least 6 percent of the total vote cast would be eligible to receive a grant from the fun.

Another big difference: the new program would rely on whatever moneys are in the fund in a given year. For example in those years in which  there is an election for supreme court justice, candidates for that office would receive 8 percent of the money in the fund divided equally among them. This is in contrast with the 2010 law which set specific funds available for Supreme Court candidates ($100,000 in the spring primary and $300,000 in the general election).

AB 317 is currently pending in the Assembly Election and Campaign Reform Committee while SB 213 is in the Senate Transportation and Elections Committee.

Why Senate confirmation for state judicial nominees? Why not House? Or joint?

October 11th, 2011

Numerous state legislatures in 2011 that have a version of merit selection (Arizona, Florida, Oklahoma) or have considered adopting merit selection (Mississippi, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin) have put in provisions for Senate confirmation. Additionally, Rhode Island (HB 5675) considered removing the state senate’s existing confirmation power with respect to a trial court (Superior Court) and transferring the power to the house.

But the question arises: why Senate confirmation? There’s the case for reference to the U.S. Senate and its role in federal judicial confirmations. And this was consistent when a) state senators were elected by counties to represent the county as a whole (as in New Jersey) or clusters of counties (as in New York) and b) trial judges (and occasionally appellate judges) were picked by districts made up of clusters of counties.

Thanks to one person/one vote decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court over the years, the practice of Senate districts following county lines is over. The practice of appellate judges being chosen based on geography is also on the decline with only 10 states continuing to use the practice for courts of last resort and 17 of 40 states with intermediate appellate courts using district based selection (although Montana may buck the trend in 2012, Oregon voters rejected the idea 2-1 in 2006).

Moreover, as I noted in March, such proposals have fared much better in state senates than in state houses, and history bears this out. In short, when the power to confirm has been handed solely to the state senate, it has had mixed support in the state’s house. The only way it happens, normally, is when there is a litany of other issues in play.

When does Senate confirmation of appellate nominees come into a constitution?

  • Conventions changing entire constitution: Delaware, Hawaii, and New Jersey
  • Constitutional amendment changing most/entire Judiciary Article: Maryland (1970 attempt) and Utah
  • Constitutional amendment changing judicial selection only: Maryland (1976), New York
  • Constitutional amendment changing most/entire Executive Branch Article: Maine, Vermont

In the case of Maryland (1976) and New York (1977) the amendments to have Senate confirmation met with lower House approval as part of a package of bills related to the courts.

This institutional inertia may explain some 2011 activity. Consider the following:

  • The original Florida House proposal HJR 7111, introduced March 22, 2011 included nothing about Senate confirmation of justices of the planned modified supreme court with civil and criminal panels. The only mention of the Senate was a provision stripping the power of the court(s) to name their chief justice and giving it to the Governor with Senate confirmation. Six days later, SJR 1664 requiring Senate confirmation for the Supreme Court was passed by the Senate Judiciary Committee. On April 5, the Senate Governmental Oversight and Accountability Committee gave its approval of SJR 1664. By April 8, SCR 1046) and Oklahoma Senate (SB 621) did not fare as well. The Arizona bill went nowhere. The Oklahoma bill moved through the Senate and was not even brought up for a House committee hearing.

Roles of legislatures in appellate judicial selection

Both chambers

Connecticut: since the 1818 Constitution. An 1880 amendment (Article XXVI) allowed for the Governor to nominate, but still required confirmation by both chambers. A 1986 amendment added merit selection, permitting the Governor to nominate only from those names submitted by the Judicial Selection Commission.

Rhode Island: since the 1842 Constitution and kept as part of the 1986 constitution. A 1994 amendment added merit selection, permitting the Governor to nominate only from those names submitted by an independent non-partisan judicial nominating commission.

South Carolina: since the 1776 Constitution and kept as a part of the 1778, 1790, 1861, 1865 and 1868 constitutions, plus a 1973 revision to the judiciary article. A 1997 constitutional amendment added merit selection allowing the legislature to elect only from those names submitted by the Judicial Merit Selection Commission.

Virginia: since the 1776 Constitution and kept as part of the 1850, 1861, 1864, 1870, and 1902 constitutions.

Senate only

Delaware: since the 1897 Constitution. The 1776 Constitution specified a joint ballot of both chambers of the general assembly and the “president” (i.e. governor) of the state. The 1792 and 1831 Constitutions placed the power of appointment solely in the hands of the Governor.

Hawaii: since the 1949 Constitution.

Maryland: since a 1976 constitutional amendment. The 1776 Constitution gave appointment to the Governor with the Council “for the time being” and put it solely in the hands of the Governor via an 1837 amendment. Maryland’s 1864 Constitution provided for direct election of the judges of the top court (Court of Appeals), but provided the Governor with Senate confirmation would select the chief judge. The 1867 Constitution made 7 of the 8 chief judges of the state’s judicial circuits the state’s top court and provided the Governor with the confirmation of the Senate would select the chief judge of the Court of Appeals. This practice continued until a 1943 constitutional amendment separated the roles of chief circuit judge from judge of the Court of Appeals but still required direct election. A 1960 amendment reaffirmed direct election, while changing the geographic boundaries.

It should be noted that the Maryland proposal was initially rejected in 1970 (1970 version) and included most courts in the state (judges of the Court of Appeals, intermediate courts of appeal, Circuit Courts, and the Supreme Bench of Baltimore City), increased terms of office to 15 years, and made revisions to the power of the Commission on Judicial Disabilities which had just been created in 1966. The successful 1976 version focused exclusively on merit selection with Senate confirmation for appellate courts only.

New Jersey: since the 1844 Constitution. The 1776 Constitution made the Governor and Council the state’s top court (Court of Appeals). The current 1947 Constitution replicated the Governor-appoints-Senate confirms system of the 1844 Constitution, but with a significant change. Rather than being re-confirmed every 7 years, the justices would face only 2 Senate confirmations: one for their initial appointment and a second after 7 years. If reconfirmed a second time, they would remain in office until age 70.

New York Court of Appeals (state’s court of last resort): sporadically since the 1777 Constitution. Under the 1777 Constitution, a Council on Appointments made up of 4 Senators chosen by the Assembly, plus the Governor (to break ties) was used. The 1821 Constitution changed this to a Governor-appoints-Senate-confirms system. The 1846 Constitution created a bifurcated election system: 4 of the 8 judges would be elected by the statewide, the other 4 would be locally elected judges of the general jurisdiction court (confusingly called the “supreme court”) “having the shortest time to serve.” A new constitution was voted on, section by section, in 1869; the judicial article was the only one approved. That new article provided for statewide election. The 1894 Constitution and 1938 Constitution continued the statewide election system. A 1977 amendment that revamped much of the Judiciary Article created the present merit-selection-Senate-confirmation system.

10/24/11 update: Selection to the state’s primary intermediate appellate court, the Appellate Division, has no role for the legislature. The Governor alone elevates from the judges elected locally in partisan elections to the general jurisdiction court (confusingly called the “Supreme Court”).

Utah: since a 1984 constitutional amendment. The original 1895 constitution provided for statewide election. The 1984 amendment overhauling the entire Judiciary Article provided for the present merit-selection-Senate-confirmation system. A subsequent 1992 amendment increased the time for the Senate to consider nominations.

Vermont: since a 1971 constitutional amendment. The 1793 Constitution provide for joint election by the unicameral House and Executive Council, a practice that was continued when the Council was made the Senate via a 1836 amendment. An 1890 effort to shift this to the Senate alone was rejected by the Senate itself but was incorporated into the 1971 revision of the state’s entire Judiciary Article.

Hybrid

Maine: since a 1975 constitutional amendment (L.D. 25). The 1820 Constitution in place when Maine was separated from Massachusetts and became a state kept the Massachusetts practice of supreme court selection method of governor-appoints-and-executive-council-confirms. The 1975 amendment abolishing the Council created the current procedure for confirmation: the Governor nominates and a Joint House/Senate legislative committee recommends confirmation or rejection. That recommendation is binding unless the Senate overrides with 2/3 vote.

Merit selection bills introduced in Pennsylvania and Wisconsin

October 7th, 2011

The summer/interim months have seen only a marginal reduction in the amount of activity surrounding judicial selection. Merit selection proponents have 3 new bills in two states to point to in their efforts.

On August 22, Pennsylvania HB 1815 (Constitutional Amendment) and HB 1816 providing for a merit selection system for appellate judges (Supreme, Superior, and Commonwealth courts) was introduced. Under the constitutional amendment, the Governor would select a name from a list of 5 provided from an Appellate Court Nominating Commission for Senate confirmation. Moreover, the amendment spells out the criteria the Commission must use to examine the candidates and establishes the composition of the 15 member commission, with 4 chosen by the Governor who must not be lawyers and 4 by legislative leaders who must be lawyers but must not be judges. The remaining 7 are:

  1. dean of one of the law schools located in Pennsylvania
  2. designee from bar associations
  3. designee from business organizations designee
  4. designee from civic organizations
  5. designee from professional associations
  6. designee from public safety organizations
  7. designee from unions

HB 1816 spells out details of how each of the above groups is defined, their designee chosen, and details about the commission’s operations.

About a month later on September 29, Wisconsin SJR 42 was introduced. The constitutional amendment would establish a merit selection system for that state’s appellate judges (Supreme Court and Court of Appeals).

It is similar to Pennsylvania HB 1815 in that it provides for the Governor to select a name from a list of 5 provided by a commission and requires the person chosen be subject to Senate confirmation. Unlike Pennsylvania HB 1815, it leaves the commission membership entirely up to the legislature and makes no mention of whether judges are to be retained via retention election or otherwise. In that sense it looks more like the proposal in Tennessee to put that state’s merit selection system explicitly in the state’s constitution (SJR 183, see prior post here).

Wisconsin Senate Interim Judiciary Committee to meet 10/4

October 3rd, 2011

The Wisconsin Senate Committee on Judiciary, Utilities, Commerce, and Government Operations will meet on October 4. On the executive session agenda are votes on:

  • SB 44 Closing hours for certain alcohol beverage retailers
  • SB 80 Changing the boundaries of Marquette County and Green Lake County
  • SB 85 Theft of certain services and providing a penalty

After the votes, hearings are set on:

  • SB 87 Changing the composition of the State Capitol and Executive Residence Board
  • SB 125 Liability of cities, villages, towns, and counties for damages caused by an insufficiency or want of repair of a highway
  • SB 151 Opportunities to win prizes that are received by employees as compensation from employers
  • SB 199 Adoption by governmental units of a maintenance program that applies to private sewage systems