2010

Write up of all 2010 efforts here

2010 saw three efforts make their way out of their respective legislatures. The Oklahoma constitutional amendment would never take force, having been struck down by a federal district court, a determination upheld by the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in January 2012.

• Louisiana HB 785 & SB 460: “Foreign law” means any law, rule, or legal code or system established and used or applied in a jurisdiction outside of the states or territories of the United States…A court, arbitrator, administrative agency, or other adjudicative, mediation, or enforcement authority shall not enforce a foreign law if doing so would violate a right guaranteed by the constitution of this state or of the United States.
• Oklahoma HJR 1056 (Constitutional Amendment): Prohibits the courts to “look to the legal precepts of other nations or cultures. Specifically, the courts shall not consider Sharia Law or international law.” Requires courts adhere only to the U.S. & Oklahoma Constitutions, federal and state law and regulations, and where necessary the laws and regulations of another state.
• Tennessee HB 3768 & SB 3740: Defines “law, legal code, or legal system” means a law, legal code, or legal system used or applied in any jurisdiction outside of Tennessee, including any foreign state, jurisdiction, country or territory of the United States…Notwithstanding any law to the contrary, and subject to provisions of superseding federal treaties, any otherwise enforceable contract which incorporates any substantive or procedural law, legal code or legal system of another state, foreign jurisdiction or foreign country that would violate rights and privileges granted under the United States or Tennessee Constitution is declared to be against public policy of this state and is unenforceable in this state.

2011

Write up of all 2011 efforts here

Despite having far more bills introduced in 2011 than in 2010, there was only one such piece of legislation enacted

• Arizona HB 2064 Defines “foreign law” as “any law, rule or legal code or system other than the constitution, laws and ratified treaties of the united states and the territories of the united states, or the constitution and laws of this state….a court, arbitrator, administrative agency or other adjudicative, mediation or enforcement authority shall not enforce a foreign law if doing so would violate a right guaranteed by the constitution of this state or of the united states or conflict with the laws of the united states or of this state.”

2012

15 sharia/international law bans were carried over from the 2011 session. Combined with 18 newly introduced bills this puts the issue front and center for the 2012 sessions. Already there has been activity, with the Florida Senate Judiciary Committee giving its approval to a ban.

Full roster of 33 bills introduced in 2012 in 20 states and their statuses after the jump.

This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.

Known commonly as the supremacy clause, it is unique in that it specifically mentions state courts, or more specifically the judges thereof, by title. Missouri’s legislature, however, is on the verge of adopting a state constitutional amendment that would direct its state judges to disregard numerous federal laws.

Initially introduced in 2011 as HJR 26 and SJR 15 and approved by their respective committees, the proposal has been reintroduced as SJR 45 of 2012. If approved by Missouri voters, the amendment would:

• Prohibit the Missouri judicial branch from recognizing, enforcing, or acting in furtherance of any federal action that exceeds the powers delegated to the federal government.
• Prohibit Missouri courts from recognizing, enforcing, or acting in furtherance of any federal actions that
• restrict the right to bear arms
• legalize or fund abortions, or the destruction of any embryo from the zygote stage
• require the sale or trade of carbon credits or impose a tax on the release of carbon emissions
• involve certain health care issues
• mandate the recognition of same sex marriage or civil unions
• increase the punishment for a crime based on perpetrator’s thoughts or designate a crime as a hate crime
• interpret the establishment clause as creating a wall of separation between church and state
• restrict the right of parents or guardians to home school or enroll their children in a private or parochial school or restrict school curriculum
• Requires Missouri courts interpret the U.S. Constitution based on its language and the original intent of the signers of the Constitution. Further provides amendments to the U.S. Constitution shall be interpreted based on their language and the intent of the congressional sponsor and co-sponsors of the amendment
• Grants standing to Missouri citizens to sue in state court to enforce the provisions of the amendment and that enforcement of the amendment applies to federal actions taken after the amendment is approved by the voters, federal actions specified in the amendment, and any federal action, regardless of when it occurred, that the Missouri Supreme Court determines to exceed the powers enumerated and delegated to the federal government by the U.S. Constitution.

Under Georgia’s HB 682 of 2012, elections for Clerks of the Superior Court, District Attorneys, and similar county-level officers would become nonpartisan. Similar bills have all died in committee in the last several years (HB 88 and HB 130  of 2009; SB 464 of 2010).

Missouri’s efforts at transitioning its judicial elections to nonpartisan have fared better. Although famous for the use and creation of merit selection (often called the “Missouri plan”), not every county in the Show Me State actually uses the merit selection for Circuit Court judgeships. SB 525 of 2012 would require all such races not already covered by the merit selection system to be nonpartisan, as well as prohibiting the judges from certain partisan activities. The bill is identical to SB 225 of 2011 which was approved by the Senate Financial and Government Organization and Elections Committee in February 2011.

The last time the issue came up in the mid to late 1990s, several attempts were made to impose the same conditions on not only the legislators enacting such laws, but on judges as well.

In 1997, the same year Louisiana mandated drug testing for certain adult recipients of public assistance (HB 2435), the state enacted a process for random drug testing of all “elected officials” (HB 646). The elected officials plan was struck down in 1998 by the Federal courts when Justice of the Peace Phillip O’Neill and other elected officials challenged the law. (O’Neill v. Louisiana., E.D. La. 1998, 61 F.Supp.2d 485, affirmed 197 F.3d 1169, cert. denied 120 S.Ct. 2740, 530 U.S. 1274, 147 L.Ed.2d 2005).

Undaunted, in 2006 an amendment to the Louisiana constitution (SB 274 of 2006) and bill (SB 361) were introduced that specifically targeted state judges for drug testing and that repeated almost verbatim the text of the law struck down by the federal courts, most particularly in the legislative declaration portion of the bills.

The legislature declares the interest of the state in ensuring that those who are elected to serve in public office as judges in any trial or appellate court within this state are persons who have a respect for the laws they are sworn to uphold and are persons of integrity, sound judgment, reliability, and seriousness of purpose. The legislature finds that judges are in a critical position to protect the citizens of the state of Louisiana from the numerous illegal activities associated with illegal drugs, and to ensure access to courts and other constitutional rights. The legislature finds that the use of illegal drugs by judges will put the citizens of the state of Louisiana in danger because judges who use illegal drugs cannot provide the state and its citizens with fair and impartial trials. The legislature finds that the use of illegal drugs which may impair the physical or mental ability of a judge to function effectively in all aspects of his duties cannot be condoned, and therefore the state has a compelling interest in establishing a requirement that all judges demonstrate that they do not use illegal drugs, without the necessity of showing any measure of individualized suspicion.

Interestingly, when Louisiana tried again in 2010 for a voluntary drug testing (and psychological evaluation) program for elected officials (HB 1352) it was focused only on statewide elected officials in the executive branch listed in Art. IV, Sec. 3 of the state constitution and legislators.

Several similar bills, either targeting judges in particular or sweeping them in as “elected officials”, have been introduced in state legislatures. Many seek to avoid the Fourth Amendment problems found by the O’Neill court by making the programs voluntary. Most recently South Carolina’s Senate in 2008 approved a voluntary plan for testing that state’s judges, however the bill died in the House Judiciary Committee and was apparently never reintroduced.

2011

Ohio HB 343 Mandatory drug testing for Supreme Court Justices, members of the General Assembly, the board of directors of JobsOhio, and recipients of Troubled Asset Relief Program money. Carried over into 2012 session.

Oklahoma SB 538 Mandatory drug testing for Temporary Assistance for Needy Families recipients and all “state elected officials”. Those declining must submit to substance abuse program. Carried over into 2012 session.

Puerto Rico PC 3215 Requires all individuals nominated for a judicial office submit a hair sample for drug testing (previously discussed here). Carried over into 2012 session.

2009

Oregon HB 2635 Mandatory drug testing for Supreme Court and Court of Appeals Judges and other elected officials specified by title. Died in committee.

2008

South Carolina SB 1070 Voluntary for any “popularly elected office or an office elected by the General Assembly”. (In South Carolina, judges are elected by the General Assembly). Approved by full Senate. Died in House.

2007

New Mexico SB 36 Voluntary drug testing for all “elected officials”. Died in committee.

Oregon HB 2306 Mandatory drug testing for Supreme Court and Court of Appeals Judges and other elected officials specified by title. Died in committee.

2006

Missouri HB 1646 Mandatory drug testing for “all state elected officials”. Died in committee.

Louisiana SB 274 (Constitutional Amendment) Requires judiciary commission develop and implement a program of random drug testing for elected judges. Died in committee.

Louisiana SB 361 Requires judiciary commission develop and implement a program of random drug testing for elected judges. Died in committee.

2005

New Mexico SB 20 Voluntary drug testing for all “elected officials”. Died in committee.

Welcome Post-Gazette readers!

Since the last update of this list in October, one piece of legislation has been introduced.  Pennsylvania’s HB 2029 bans court references to any “foreign legal code or system” if doing so would impair constitutional rights.

Full roster of 2010 bills are available. 2011 and 2012 bills after the jump.

2012

2011

Four legislatures have adopted statutes to alter retirement (Indiana 2011; Kansas 2003 & 2010; North Carolina 1992; Vermont 2003). Moreover, Arizona has advanced a proposed change for the 2012 ballot while New York voters will probably address the issue in 2014. This marks a trend over the last several year in particular of state legislatures confronting judges living longer and the question of whether there should be any limits on service at all.

State by state breakdown below the fold.

Alabama

In the last decade, Alabama’s House and Senate have at various times both passed constitutional amendments for the elimination of mandatory judicial retirement and rejected them as well.

Arizona

All efforts since 1990 to change the state’s mandatory retirement age of 70 have focused on increasing it to 75. The first round of bills (2002-2004) met with some success in the House but not the Senate. A second round (2005-2006) included a Senate effort to increase for the state’s main trial court judges (Superior Court) only. The Senate approved, the House balked. The third and continuing round (2007-2011) tied the increase to 75 with changes to the state’s merit selection system. Such a connective bill was passed in 2011 and is set to be voted on in 2012. Under SCR1001 the mandatory retirement age would go to 75, but the composition of the state’s merit selection commissions would be altered.

Florida

As with Arizona, the Florida interest in changing the mandatory retirement age was connected to changes to judicial selection. Bills introduced in 1994 and 1996 would have raised the limit or allowed the legislature to do so at a later date. The constitutional amendment that appeared on the ballot excluded the reference to the mandatory retirement age.

Hawaii

In 2005, Hawaii was faced with a Republican Governor (something which had not happened since 1962), a very Democratic legislature, and several members of the state’s courts up against the mandatory retirement age of 70. The state’s senate proposed a standalone constitutional amendment eliminating the retirement age which went down to a nearly 2-1 defeat. A 2008/2009 effort to increase the age to 80 for justices and judges appointed after November 4, 2008 (i.e. after the Republican governor would be term limited out of office) died in a conference committee.

Indiana

Kansas

Kansas had been considering a change to its statutes regarding mandatory judicial retirement at 70 for several years before a 2002 Supreme Court order reset the dynamics. In March of that year, in response to legislative cuts to the courts, the Supreme Court entered an order for emergency surcharges on various court filings, fees, and fines. The language of a 2000 bill was then reintroduced in 2003 to increase the mandatory retirement age for judges, even the Court of Appeals, except the Supreme Court. That version was enacted. It was not until 2010 that the law was further amended to include the Supreme Court in the increase.

Louisiana

Louisiana has had two efforts to increase the retirement ages of its judges. The first was in the early 1990s and sought an increase from 70 to 75. It was put up on the ballot in 1995, along with 14 other items, as Amendment 4. It was one of only 2 proposals to lose. The loss can at least in part be attributed to bad timing; the same 1995 ballot included as Amendment 2 term limits for the legislature. It passed overwhelmingly 75%-25%, making the “mere” 62%-38% drubbing Amendment 4 took somewhat remarkable. Thereafter the issue lay dormant for almost a decade until 2003 when a change was proposed to allow judges to serve out the term in which they turned 70. Like its 1995 its counterpart it was one of 14 items on an October ballot. The 2003 effort, however, succeeded.

Michigan

Massachusetts

Minnesota

Missouri

Missouri is one of only a handful of states that have a different retirement age for trial and appellate judges. Moreover, municipal judges have a higher retirement age (75) than that of the judges of all the other courts (Circuit, Court of Appeals, and Supreme Court = 70).

North Carolina

New Jersey

New York

Ohio

Pennsylvania

Throughout the 1990s several attempts were made to extend judicial terms to the end of the calendar year a judge turned 70.The extension was added onto a bill related to reapportionment, but approved by the voters in a separate vote in May 2001 where it won on a 2-1 vote.

South Dakota

Texas

The 2007 Texas amendment noted below was the first effort in a decade to change the state’s judicial retirement. It was one of 16 ballot items voters cast ballots on in November 2007, all of which passed.

Virginia

For each of the past 5 years it appeared that Virginia General Assembly would raise the mandatory retirement age for judges and in each one of those years it failed, often at the last minute. Part of the challenge is the statutory placement of the law itself; Virginia Code 51.1-305(B1) not only sets 70 as the mandatory age for judges, but for members of the state Corporation Commission who are also members of the Judicial Retirement System. Trying to craft a bill that does, or does not, also change the retirement provisions for the members of the Commission has been a sticking point. The result has been numerous attempts, including three tie-vote-failures in committee.

Vermont

When originally proposed in the Vermont Senate, the bill to simply eliminate the retirement age. A committee amendment changed it to a range to be set by the legislature instead. The legislature would later opt for the high end, passing a statute in 2003 to set it as being the end of the calendar year the judge turns 90.

Washington

Wyoming

SB 59 Increases small claims from $3,000 to $5,000.

According to this post from Gavel Grab, the Tennessee legislature is considering a legislative enactment regarding judicial recusal. For prior blog posts on events in Tennessee, click here and here. For a review of all recent efforts to make changes to Codes of Judicial Conduct, see Issue 5:31.

The Gavel Grab post cites this Knoxville News Sentinel article, as follows:

Legislators are eyeing repeal of the state law that allows keeping the admonishments wayward judges receive secret and imposing stricter rules concerning when judges must bow out of a case when accused of a conflict of interest.

…

Changing the rules for recusal of a judge, which are now established by the state Supreme Court, also is criticized on policy grounds. But it could also be a violation of the state constitution, according to Chris Craft, presiding judge of the Court of the Judiciary (COJ).

As I noted in my article “’The Legislature Must Save the Court From Itself?’: Recusal, Separation of Powers, and the Post-Caperton World” in the Drake Law Review, it is not unheard of for legislatures to try and impose by law recusal standards for state courts. Moreover, it is also not unheard of for the same courts to strike down the laws as a violation of the state constitution. I suggested four possible outcomes: Cooperation, Co-option, Comity, and Conflict.

Missouri had a similar instance in the late 1990s which was decidedly in the Conflict category. There, the legislature tried to expand a 1978 recusal statute (Mo. Ann. Stat. 105.464).

The expansion was struck down by the state’s Supreme Court on the grounds that its “‘general superintending control over all courts and tribunals’” and power to “‘establish rules relating to the practice, procedure, and pleading for all courts,’” rendered the expansion a “violat[ion of] constitutional principles concerning separation of legislative and judicial functions.”  (Weinstock v. Holden, 995 S.W.2d 408, 410–11 (Mo. 1999) (per curiam)).

A few weeks after Weinstock was handed down, the legislature adopted a repeal of the expansion, but kept in place the original 1978 statute that imposed criminal sanctions for judges who heard cases in which they were related to a party.

So, will Tennessee end up in Cooperation, Co-option, Comity, or Conflict? We’ll see when the legislature comes back on January 10 or even earlier if a bill is filed before session starts.

The other bill is Alabama SB 33 of 2012, a prefiled bill for the next session. SB 33 of 2012 is a constitutional amendment that looks more like HB 607 / SB 61 than HB 597 / SB 62 in that it does not specifically mention “sharia”.

It should be noted that at least some 2011 bills will make a return in 2012; roughly half of states allow bills to be “carried over” from one session to the next. Definitive answers as to which bills will return will be available as the legislatures come back into session in January.

Full roster of bills going back to 2010 after the jump.

2012

2011

2010

North Dakota HB 1023 Strikes provision that certain court fees must be used to contract for indigent defense.

North Dakota HB 1065 Clarifies that the cities are responsible for indigent defense services in all prosecutions for violations of city ordinances, whether in city court, district court, or on appeal.

Vetoed

Minnesota HB 988 Requires the court, prior to appointing a public defender, to inquire whether a prosecutor intends to certify a misdemeanor as a petty misdemeanor. Provides that if an offense is certified as a petty misdemeanor, a defendant would not be eligible for a public defender. Clarifies that only those persons with a statutory right to a public defender under law may request appointment of a public defender. Establishes criteria to determine eligibility for public defender representation based on the offense level charged and the defendant’s income: misdemeanor 125% of federal poverty guideline; gross misdemeanor 150%; felony 175%. Maintains current language allowing the court to also determine eligibility based on defendant’s ability to pay for private counsel with current income and liquid assets. Strikes language limiting applicant’s duty to disclose information about changes in financial circumstances that is only relevant to eligibility for a public defender; language that allows only the public defender representing the applicant to see information in the application; and language providing that the court has the sole duty to conduct a financial inquiry, not the public defender. Requires all district courts to use financial statement forms furnished by the state public defender. Authorizes the court to reduce the $75 copayment for public defender representation. Provides that the court shall not appoint a public defender if a defendant: is financially able to retain counsel but refuses to do so; refuses to execute the required financial statement or provide information; or waives appointment of a public defender. Provides that the chief appellate public defender represents persons pursuing an appeal or post-conviction relief and the district public defender represents persons in all other statutorily defined cases. Strikes language mandating continued representation of an arrested individual and maintains permissive language allowing the public defender discretion in such cases. Eliminates restrictions on how reimbursements collected from defendants may be used by a district public defender’s office. Adds language requiring a defendant who is or becomes able to make partial payments to reimburse the state for the cost of the public defender. Strikes language referring to reimbursement guidelines (which is repealed in section 9). Directs the court, in determining a defendant’s payment schedule, to consider the defendant’s financial statement application. Requires the court to evaluate a defendant’s ability to make partial payments if the court originally determined that the defendant was financially unable to afford counsel due to the private retainer fee. Provides that the Board of Public Defense must fund all items and services necessary to satisfy its obligations law. Provides that a county is not responsible for public defender costs, expect for costs currently paid by Hennepin County.

Active/Carried over in 2012

Michigan HB 4742 Creates statewide public defense commission. Require commission develop, implement, and administer public defense system. Specifies manner for attorney representation of indigent criminal and juvenile defendants and standards for the appointment of legal counsel.

Ohio HB 49 Provides that specified fees, costs, and fines that currently are deposited into the state treasury to the credit of funds that help pay for the defense of indigent criminal defendants be deposited instead into the municipal treasury to help compensate counsel appointed by the court to represent indigent defendants if the court that imposed the fees, costs, or fines is a municipal court that is not a county?operated municipal court and that appoints counsel for indigent defendants in a manner other than that in law.

Died in committee

Indiana HB 1454 Establishes a statutory right to counsel for a child who is alleged or adjudicated to be a child in need of services or the subject of a parent- child termination proceeding. Establishes the office of the state juvenile public defender. Provides for representation of indigent children in cases filed in a juvenile court under a plan developed by the office of the state juvenile public defender and approved by the supreme court. Provides for counties to distribute to the state the average net amount (after deducting certain reimbursements) that the counties spent for these services over a five year period.

Indiana HB 1456 Provides that if a person is represented by a public defender in a probation violation hearing and the court determines the person is able to pay for part of the costs of the representation, the court shall order the person to pay $100. Provides that a court may make a finding of ability to pay the costs of representation for a probation violation hearing.

Indiana SB 253 Specifies that 20% of the late surrender fees collected under the Indiana bail law must be deposited in the county supplemental public defender services fund. (see also SB 518)

Iowa HB 602 Provides that legal services for indigent persons contracted through the state public defender may be paid based on other than an hourly rate, including a fixed rate basis. Provides for the handling of appeals for indigent persons by the state appellate defender or by transfer of the case to a person under contract with the state public defender. Provides that the expenses of the public defender in determining the amount of restitution for a case include all expenses approved by the state public defender together with the attorney fees for the public defender. Specifies an exception to payment of fees for appointed counsel by the person filing or on whose behalf a petition for termination of parental rights is filed.

Kansas HB 2197 Allows a public defender to withdraw from a court-appointed case when the defender determines a conflict of interest exists or when the defender’s current caseload would preclude them from providing adequate representation to new or existing clients. Requires withdrawal be communicated to Chief Judge of the District Court. Provides any public defender, with the approval of the Executive Director of the State Board of Indigents Defense Services, would be allowed to accept misdemeanor or juvenile appointments not covered by contract or agreement in the district county of jurisdiction. Requires public defender keep a record of time spent on a case and submit the timesheet to the Executive Director of BIDS and the Clerk of the District Court of the county in which the case was heard.

Kansas HB 2305 Reduces the number of members of the State Board of Indigents Defense Services from nine to seven. Reduces the number of members required to be lawyers from five to four and the number required not to be lawyers from four to three. Allows a member to represent both a congressional district and a county with a population of over 100,000.

Minnesota HB 987 Eliminates restrictions on use of reimbursements received by the Board of Public Defense.

Minnesota SB 1027 Authorizing counties and contiguous county groups to withdraw from the statewide public defense system for a certain specified period and allowing renewal of election to withdraw. Requires state board of public defense and commissioner of management and budget notification. Requires withdrawing counties to agree to provide court-ordered representation of indigent people Requires advisory board formation for comprehensive plan development. Requires state board of public defense to transfer a portion of state funding to withdrawing counties. Requires continued chief appellate public defender continued representation in appeals.

Missouri SB 89 Abolishes the state public defender system and requires circuit courts to provide legal defense for indigents.

Nebraska LB 214 In those areas where public defenders are elected, converts election from partisan to nonpartisan.

North Dakota SB 2105 Requires Commission on Legal Counsel for Indigents to provide legal counsel services to persons who refuse to retain their own counsel, if the court has determined that they are incompetent to represent themselves.