Posts Tagged ‘Maryland’

Maryland: Punishing judges for their opinions via the Commission on Judicial Disabilities; judges are just “employees”

March 7th, 2012

The last several years have seen efforts to make use of the judicial disciplinary process to examine judicial opinions and punish judges for those opinions.

The latest such effort is Maryland’s HB 1061, a constitutional amendment that:

  • Authorizes Commission on Judicial Disabilities to remove a judge from office for refusal to enforce applicable law, rendering a decision contrary to applicable law, or knowingly disregarding applicable law.
  • Provides judge found by commission to have engaged in above conduct forfeits pension.
  • Provides any person may file complaint alleging above with commission.

Prior coverage here.

The video below is from the hearing held this afternoon on the bill.

Add Maryland to list of states considering public financing of judicial races

February 29th, 2012

First it was Kentucky, Ohio, and Wisconsin considering public financing for judicial races.

Then Pennsylvania.

Somewhere in between I neglected to mention Maryland’s SB 181, an error I am now rectifying. But first, some background.

In 2011 the Maryland legislature adopted HJR 7, which created a Commission to Study Campaign Finance Law. The 17 member commission is made up of mostly legislators (12) and members of the executive branch (State Administrator of Elections & Executive Director of the State Ethics Commission). The Governor opted to use one of his appointments to name a retired judge to the panel.

The commission was tasked with examining numerous issues, including public financing of campaigns for judicial offices and the costs and practical funding sources for such a system (other than via the state’s general fund). The commission submitted an interim report on December 31, 2011 that made no mention of public financing of judicial elections. Its final report is due December 31, 2012.

Enter SB 181 of 2012, a bill to create a Task Force to Study the Public Financing of Judicial Elections. The sole purposes of this task force, made up of legislators, judges, and others, would be to:

  1. study the feasibility of adopting a public finance system for judicial elections
  2. review best practices for publicly financing judicial elections
  3. develop a proposal to institute a public finance system for judicial elections

SB 181 requires the Task Force report back on these three elements by December 31, 2012.

The video below is from the February 7, 2012 hearing on the bill.

Maryland joins other states in considering ways to allow judicial disciplinary commission to remove judges from office for their opinions

February 23rd, 2012

Maryland’s legislature is just the latest (including Florida, Minnesota, and Tennessee) that may seek to use the state’s judicial disciplinary process to punish or remove judges from office not for misconduct but for their opinions and rulings. (see here and here for prior write-ups in Gavel to Gavel the publication).

HB 1061, as introduced, is an amendment to the state’s constitition that would expand the authority of the state’s Commission on Judicial Disabilities to remove judges from office that:

  • Refused to enforce applicable law, court rules, or provisions of this constitition or the United States constitution
  • Rendered a decision or issued an order that is contrary to applicable law, court rules, or provisions of this constitition or the United States constitution
  • Knowingly disregarded applicable law, court rules, or provisions of this constitition or the United States constitution

Judges could be merely reprimanded if they “misinterpreted” the applicable law, as determined by the Commission. Judges found by the Commission to have engaged in the above conduct would be removed from office, forfeit their pensions and “any rights and privileges”, possibly including judicial immunity and permitting the judge to be sued personally.

Complaints to the Commission under these provisions would accepted from any litigant, whether the case in question is pending or concluded.

HB 1061 is before the House Judiciary Committee and set for a March 7 hearing.

Why Senate reconfirmation for incumbent state judges? Why not House? Or joint? Or election?

October 24th, 2011

Several weeks ago I looked at the historical development of why some states have legislative involvement in judicial confirmation for their appellate courts and whether it was only the state’s senate that had a role or if it was a joint process. To reiterate, one of the big presses in the last year has been to put into place something akin to the “federal model” of senate (only) confirmation. But unlike the federal model, which includes life tenure, almost all these proposals include a reconfirmation at some point.

It should be noted that of the 11 states that give their legislature some role in the confirmation of appellate judges:

  • 6 give at least some appellate  judges a decade or more on the bench between reconfirmations: Delaware (12 years), Hawaii (10 years), South Carolina (10 years), Utah (Supreme Court: 10 years), Virginia (Supreme Court: 12 years),  and New York (Court of Appeals: 14 years)
  • 3 give reconfirmation to the House and Senate: Connecticut, South Carolina, and Virginia
  • 3 remove the legislature outright from reconfirmation: Hawaii (judicial nominating commission); Maryland and Utah (retention election)
  • 2 at least have the option of lifetime or near-lifetime appointment: Rhode Island (life) and New Jersey (until 70 after reconfirmation)

Roles of legislatures in appellate judicial re-confirmation

Connecticut: 8 year term for Supreme Court and Appellate Court. Judicial Selection Commission evaluates incumbent judge, with statutory presumption “that each incumbent judge who seeks reappointment to the same court qualifies for retention in judicial office” and provides burden on commission to demonstrate otherwise (see 51-44a (e) and (f), of the Connecticut General Statutes). Commission sends reappoint/don’t reappoint recommendation to Governor who renominates incumbent judge. Legislature jointly reconfirms.

Delaware: 12 year term for the Supreme Court. Governor renominates. Senate reconfirms.

Hawaii: 10 year term for Supreme Court and Intermediate Appellate Court. Judicial selection commission reappoints.

Maine: 7 year term for Supreme Judicial Court. Governor renominates. Joint House/Senate legislative committee recommends reconfirmation or rejection. That recommendation is binding unless the Senate overrides with 2/3 vote.

Maryland: 1 year (at least) initial term for Court of Appeals and Court of Special Appeals. Yes/no retention election. 10 year subsequent term.

New Jersey: 7 year initial term. Governor renominates. Senate reconfirms. Service until 70 for subsequent term.

New York (Court of Appeals, state’s court of last resort): 14 year term for Court of Appeals. Commission on Judicial Nomination resubmits names along incumbent’s to Governor. Governor renominates incumbent or nominates new person. Senate confirms or reconfirms.

NOTE: the state’s primary intermediate appellate court, the Appellate Division, has no role for the legislature in terms of reconfirmation. The Governor elevates and may reappoint to the Appellate Division from the judges elected locally in partisan elections to the general jurisdiction court (confusingly called the “Supreme Court”). For example, when his 14 year term in the trial court ended in 2011, the Hon. Henry J. Scudder had to run for re-election and then be reappointed back to the Appellate Division, Fourth Department (see story here).

Rhode Island: N/A (Serve for life)

South Carolina: 10 year term for the Supreme Court, 6 year term for the Court of Appeals. Judicial Merit Selection Commission evaluates incumbent judge and all others seeking position. Commission sends names to Legislature. Legislature jointly reappoints or appoints someone else. (See Title 2, Chapter 19 S.C. Code)

Utah: 3 year (at least) initial term. Yes/no retention election. 10 year subsequent term for Supreme Court, 6 year subsequent term for Court of Appeals.

 

Virginia: 12 year term for the Supreme Court, 6 year term for the Court of Appeals. Legislature jointly reappoints or appoints someone else.

 

 

Why Senate confirmation for state judicial nominees? Why not House? Or joint?

October 11th, 2011

Numerous state legislatures in 2011 that have a version of merit selection (Arizona, Florida, Oklahoma) or have considered adopting merit selection (Mississippi, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin) have put in provisions for Senate confirmation. Additionally, Rhode Island (HB 5675) considered removing the state senate’s existing confirmation power with respect to a trial court (Superior Court) and transferring the power to the house.

But the question arises: why Senate confirmation? There’s the case for reference to the U.S. Senate and its role in federal judicial confirmations. And this was consistent when a) state senators were elected by counties to represent the county as a whole (as in New Jersey) or clusters of counties (as in New York) and b) trial judges (and occasionally appellate judges) were picked by districts made up of clusters of counties.

Thanks to one person/one vote decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court over the years, the practice of Senate districts following county lines is over. The practice of appellate judges being chosen based on geography is also on the decline with only 10 states continuing to use the practice for courts of last resort and 17 of 40 states with intermediate appellate courts using district based selection (although Montana may buck the trend in 2012, Oregon voters rejected the idea 2-1 in 2006).

Moreover, as I noted in March, such proposals have fared much better in state senates than in state houses, and history bears this out. In short, when the power to confirm has been handed solely to the state senate, it has had mixed support in the state’s house. The only way it happens, normally, is when there is a litany of other issues in play.

When does Senate confirmation of appellate nominees come into a constitution?

  • Conventions changing entire constitution: Delaware, Hawaii, and New Jersey
  • Constitutional amendment changing most/entire Judiciary Article: Maryland (1970 attempt) and Utah
  • Constitutional amendment changing judicial selection only: Maryland (1976), New York
  • Constitutional amendment changing most/entire Executive Branch Article: Maine, Vermont

In the case of Maryland (1976) and New York (1977) the amendments to have Senate confirmation met with lower House approval as part of a package of bills related to the courts.

This institutional inertia may explain some 2011 activity. Consider the following:

  • The original Florida House proposal HJR 7111, introduced March 22, 2011 included nothing about Senate confirmation of justices of the planned modified supreme court with civil and criminal panels. The only mention of the Senate was a provision stripping the power of the court(s) to name their chief justice and giving it to the Governor with Senate confirmation. Six days later, SJR 1664 requiring Senate confirmation for the Supreme Court was passed by the Senate Judiciary Committee. On April 5, the Senate Governmental Oversight and Accountability Committee gave its approval of SJR 1664. By April 8, SCR 1046) and Oklahoma Senate (SB 621) did not fare as well. The Arizona bill went nowhere. The Oklahoma bill moved through the Senate and was not even brought up for a House committee hearing.

Roles of legislatures in appellate judicial selection

Both chambers

Connecticut: since the 1818 Constitution. An 1880 amendment (Article XXVI) allowed for the Governor to nominate, but still required confirmation by both chambers. A 1986 amendment added merit selection, permitting the Governor to nominate only from those names submitted by the Judicial Selection Commission.

Rhode Island: since the 1842 Constitution and kept as part of the 1986 constitution. A 1994 amendment added merit selection, permitting the Governor to nominate only from those names submitted by an independent non-partisan judicial nominating commission.

South Carolina: since the 1776 Constitution and kept as a part of the 1778, 1790, 1861, 1865 and 1868 constitutions, plus a 1973 revision to the judiciary article. A 1997 constitutional amendment added merit selection allowing the legislature to elect only from those names submitted by the Judicial Merit Selection Commission.

Virginia: since the 1776 Constitution and kept as part of the 1850, 1861, 1864, 1870, and 1902 constitutions.

Senate only

Delaware: since the 1897 Constitution. The 1776 Constitution specified a joint ballot of both chambers of the general assembly and the “president” (i.e. governor) of the state. The 1792 and 1831 Constitutions placed the power of appointment solely in the hands of the Governor.

Hawaii: since the 1949 Constitution.

Maryland: since a 1976 constitutional amendment. The 1776 Constitution gave appointment to the Governor with the Council “for the time being” and put it solely in the hands of the Governor via an 1837 amendment. Maryland’s 1864 Constitution provided for direct election of the judges of the top court (Court of Appeals), but provided the Governor with Senate confirmation would select the chief judge. The 1867 Constitution made 7 of the 8 chief judges of the state’s judicial circuits the state’s top court and provided the Governor with the confirmation of the Senate would select the chief judge of the Court of Appeals. This practice continued until a 1943 constitutional amendment separated the roles of chief circuit judge from judge of the Court of Appeals but still required direct election. A 1960 amendment reaffirmed direct election, while changing the geographic boundaries.

It should be noted that the Maryland proposal was initially rejected in 1970 (1970 version) and included most courts in the state (judges of the Court of Appeals, intermediate courts of appeal, Circuit Courts, and the Supreme Bench of Baltimore City), increased terms of office to 15 years, and made revisions to the power of the Commission on Judicial Disabilities which had just been created in 1966. The successful 1976 version focused exclusively on merit selection with Senate confirmation for appellate courts only.

New Jersey: since the 1844 Constitution. The 1776 Constitution made the Governor and Council the state’s top court (Court of Appeals). The current 1947 Constitution replicated the Governor-appoints-Senate confirms system of the 1844 Constitution, but with a significant change. Rather than being re-confirmed every 7 years, the justices would face only 2 Senate confirmations: one for their initial appointment and a second after 7 years. If reconfirmed a second time, they would remain in office until age 70.

New York Court of Appeals (state’s court of last resort): sporadically since the 1777 Constitution. Under the 1777 Constitution, a Council on Appointments made up of 4 Senators chosen by the Assembly, plus the Governor (to break ties) was used. The 1821 Constitution changed this to a Governor-appoints-Senate-confirms system. The 1846 Constitution created a bifurcated election system: 4 of the 8 judges would be elected by the statewide, the other 4 would be locally elected judges of the general jurisdiction court (confusingly called the “supreme court”) “having the shortest time to serve.” A new constitution was voted on, section by section, in 1869; the judicial article was the only one approved. That new article provided for statewide election. The 1894 Constitution and 1938 Constitution continued the statewide election system. A 1977 amendment that revamped much of the Judiciary Article created the present merit-selection-Senate-confirmation system.

10/24/11 update: Selection to the state’s primary intermediate appellate court, the Appellate Division, has no role for the legislature. The Governor alone elevates from the judges elected locally in partisan elections to the general jurisdiction court (confusingly called the “Supreme Court”).

Utah: since a 1984 constitutional amendment. The original 1895 constitution provided for statewide election. The 1984 amendment overhauling the entire Judiciary Article provided for the present merit-selection-Senate-confirmation system. A subsequent 1992 amendment increased the time for the Senate to consider nominations.

Vermont: since a 1971 constitutional amendment. The 1793 Constitution provide for joint election by the unicameral House and Executive Council, a practice that was continued when the Council was made the Senate via a 1836 amendment. An 1890 effort to shift this to the Senate alone was rejected by the Senate itself but was incorporated into the 1971 revision of the state’s entire Judiciary Article.

Hybrid

Maine: since a 1975 constitutional amendment (L.D. 25). The 1820 Constitution in place when Maine was separated from Massachusetts and became a state kept the Massachusetts practice of supreme court selection method of governor-appoints-and-executive-council-confirms. The 1975 amendment abolishing the Council created the current procedure for confirmation: the Governor nominates and a Joint House/Senate legislative committee recommends confirmation or rejection. That recommendation is binding unless the Senate overrides with 2/3 vote.

2011 South-Atlantic indigent defense legislation

September 13th, 2011

Law

Florida HB 7067 / SB 1016 / SB 7018 Re-creates Indigent Civil Defense Trust Fund within Justice Administrative Commission without modification. Repeals provisions that would have terminated the trust fund in 2012. (see also HB 7065 / SB 1014 / SB 7016)

Florida HB 443 / HB 7199 / SB 170 Requires that each public defender implement a system to electronically file court documents with the clerk of the court. Requires Florida Public Defender Association report to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives by a specified date on the progress made in implementing the electronic filing system.

Georgia HB 238 Reconstitutes and vacates all currently serving members of the Georgia Public Defender Standards Council. Provides for appointing new members. Alters powers and duties of the council and council director, council’s responsibility to set policy and standards, and the director’s responsibility to develop rules and regulations to efficiently administer the provisions of the law related to public defenders. Provides director to appoint circuit public defenders and requires two-thirds vote of council to remove the chairperson of the council or to overturn the director’s decision regarding the removal of a circuit public defender. Requires certain annual reports be prepared by the director, rather than the council, and a copy sent to the Supreme Court.  Changes provisions relating to the circuit public defender supervisory panel. Changes provisions relating to appointing attorneys in conflict of interest cases.

Maryland SB 515 Specifies that an individual whose assets and net annual income are less than 100% of the federal poverty guidelines may be determined eligible for services from the Office of the Public Defender (OPD) without an assessment. Clarifies that the District Court, a Circuit Court, and the Court of Special Appeals are prohibited from appointing an attorney through OPD to represent an indigent individual if (1) there is a conflict in legal representation in a matter involving multiple defendants and one of the defendants is being represented by or through OPD; or (2) OPD declines to provide representation to an indigent individual entitled to representation.

North Carolina HB 243 Provides fee charged by clerk for certificates under seal is waived for appointed attorneys representing indigent clients.

Virginia SB 902 Permits retired justices or judges to appear as counsel in cases in courts of the Commonwealth if (i) the retired justice or judge has been retired for at least two years and is not authorized for temporary recall by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, (ii) the retired justice or judge is appearing as counsel, pro bono, for an indigent person in a civil matter, (iii) such civil matter is assigned or referred to the retired justice or judge by a nonprofit legal aid program organized under the auspices of the Virginia State Bar, and (iv) the retired justice or judge is not an employee, officer, or board member of such nonprofit legal aid program.

Active/Carried over into 2012

Georgia HB 648 Implements HR 977 (Constitutional Amendment). Creates trust fund for indigent defense dollars collected by clerks. Provides and specifies certain fees and assessments are dedicated to funding legal services for indigent persons accused of crimes and delinquent acts. Provides such funds are to be remitted to the Georgia Public Defender Standards Council.

Georgia HB 977 (Constitutional Amendment) Creates trust fund for indigent defense dollars collected by clerks. Provides and specifies certain fees and assessments are dedicated to funding legal services for indigent persons accused of crimes and delinquent acts.

Approved by one chamber

West Virginia HB 3067 / SB 549 Increases certain civil filings fees currently collected by circuit courts, and impose a new docketing fee for unspecified civil appeals including family court appeals but not including Workers’ Comp cases or, presumably, actions in the Supreme Courts original jurisdiction, to be collected by the Court and paid, at its discretion, to either Legal Aid of West Virginia (LAWV) or into the Interest on Lawyer’s Trust Accounts (IOLTA) fund. Approved by full House, died in Senate Finance Committee.

West Virginia SB 568 Clarifies that an attorney from the public defender office shall be appointed by a judge in all cases where an attorney-at-law is required to be appointed for an eligible client. Approved by full Senate, died in House Judiciary Committee.

West Virginia SCR 79 Requests Joint Committee on Government and Finance study need for authorizing executive director of Public Defender Services control over public defender corporations. Approved by full Senate, died in House.

Died in committee

North Carolina SB 596 Expands state’s office of public defender system to every county in state. Realigns public defender districts accordingly.

Virginia HB 1570 / SB 908 Increases from $10 to $14 fee on most civil actions filed in trial courts to pay for free civil legal representation provided for the poor by a nonprofit legal aid program organized under the auspices of the Virginia State Bar. Changes from $9 to $13 the amount that, from such additional fee, is to be credited to the Virginia State Bar’s Legal Aid Services Fund.

West Virginia SB 482 Requires public defender corporations of all the judicial circuits to be centralized under the executive director of Public Defender Services and grants executive director rulemaking authority.

State-by-State 2011 Legislative Year in Review: Maryland

August 26th, 2011

One new law, one proposed constitutional amendment to appear on the ballot in 2012, and one resolution-created commission, were enacted or adopted by the Maryland legislature in 201:

HB 523 Requires the State Court Administrator to assess a $100 fee for the special admission of an out-of-state attorney and to pay $75 of the fee into the Janet L. Hoffman Loan Assistance Repayment Program.

SB 281 (Constitutional Amendment) ORIGINAL: Requires Orphan’s Court judges in Baltimore and Prince George’s County be attorneys. AMENDED: Removes reference to Baltimore County. Requires Orphan’s Court judges in Prince George’s County be attorneys. On November 2012 ballot.

HJR 7 Creates a Commission to Study Campaign Finance Law. Commission to examine various issues, including public financing of campaigns for judicial offices, including the costs and practical funding sources available outside of the State’s general fund. Requires interim report by December 31, 2011 & final report December 31, 2012.

2011 South-Atlantic bail/pretrial release legislation

August 16th, 2011

Law

Florida HB 347 / SB 514 Requires defendant who was arrested for leaving scene of crash involving death to be held in custody until brought before judge for admittance to bail in certain circumstances.

Florida HB 575 / SB 844 Authorizes court, in determining whether to require or set amount of bail, to consider likelihood that person will be imprisoned for violation of probation or community control.

Maryland HB 682 / SB 809 Prohibits a court that exercises criminal jurisdiction from refunding a forfeiture of bail or collateral at a specified time unless a private surety pays a forfeiture of bail or collateral within a specified time period after a defendant’s failure to appear. Requires a court to refund a forfeiture of bail bond or collateral that was not paid within a specified time period after a defendant’s failure to appear under specified circumstances.

North Carolina HB 649 Amends laws pertaining to grounds for revocation of licensure regulating bail bondsman and allowing a bail agent on behalf of a surety company to make written motions setting aside bail forfeiture and relief from final judgment of bail forfeiture under laws pertaining the criminal procedure.

Virginia HB 1713 Adds to the list of crimes charged for which there is a presumption against admission to bail, subject to rebuttal, obstruction of justice where a person threatens bodily harm or force to knowingly attempt to intimidate or impede a witness.

Virginia HB 2060 Provides that a magistrate who is to set the terms of bail of a person arrested and brought before him pursuant to a capias shall, unless circumstances exist that require him to impose more restrictive terms of bail, set bail in accordance with the order of the court that issued the capias if such an order is affixed to or made a part of the capias by the court.

Virginia HB 2106  / SB 925 Allows GPS for persons on secured bond.

Virginia HB 2437 Provides that a licensed bail bondsman shall not charge less than 10 percent or more than 15 percent of the amount of the bond for a bail bond premium and shall not loan money with interest for the purpose of helping another obtain a bail bond. Defines bail bond premium as the amount of money paid to a licensed bail bondsman for the execution of a bail bond.

Introduced with committee and/or floor approval

Florida HB 1379 Provides that a defendant is eligible to receive government-funded pretrial release only by order of the court after the court finds in writing, upon consideration of the defendant’s affidavit of indigence: That the defendant is indigent or partially indigent as set forth in the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure and that the defendant has not previously failed to appear at any required court proceeding. Prohibits defendants from participating in a pretrial release program if the defendant’s income is over 300 percent of the federal poverty guidelines prescribed for the size of the household of the defendant by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, unless the defendant is receiving certain financial assistance. Requires that defendants who seek to post a surety bond pursuant to a bond schedule established by administrative order as an alternative to government-funded pretrial release be permitted to do so without any interference or restriction by a pretrial release program. Requires pretrial release programs certify annually, in writing, to the chief circuit court judge, that the program has complied with the reporting requirements in current statutes.

Florida HB 265 Requires court considering whether to release defendant on bail to determine whether defendant is subject to registration as sexual offender or predator and, if so, to hold defendant without bail until first appearance on case.

Florida HB 7089 Requires a court, when determining whether to release a defendant on bail or other conditions, to consider the defendant’s legal residency status in the United States.

North Carolina SB 756 Revises laws related to pretrial release programs. Eliminates unsecured appearance bond as a pretrial release condition. Provides no state funds may be appropriated for the support of a pretrial release program.

South Carolina HB 3895 / SB 795 Provides that an appearance bond is valid for a certain time period in circuit and magistrates or municipal courts under certain circumstances. Provides a procedure to relieve the surety of liability when the time period has run.

Virginia HB 2332  Provides if judicial officer concurs in the determination of police officer that defendant is present in U.S. illegally and finds probable cause to believe that the person will not appear for trial or hearing, the judicial officer may refuse to admit the person to bail.

Introduced with committee rejection

Florida SB 372 Requires each pretrial release program established by ordinance of a county commission, by administrative order of a court, or by any other means in order to assist in the release of a defendant from pretrial custody to conform to the eligibility criteria set forth by the act. Preempts any conflicting local ordinances, orders, or practices. Requires that the defendant satisfy certain eligibility criteria in order to be assigned to a pretrial release program, etc

Florida SB 494 Requires a court considering whether to release a defendant on bail to determine whether the defendant is subject to registration as a sexual offender or predator and, if so, to hold the defendant without bail until the first appearance on the case.

Maryland HB 272 Requires, notwithstanding any other law or Maryland Rule, that a court or a District Court commissioner ask a defendant to provide information on the defendant’s legal status in the United States before the court or a District Court commissioner authorizes the defendant’s pretrial release on bail or personal recognizance. Authorizes the court or a District Court commissioner to consider the information on the defendant’s legal status in deciding whether to authorize the pretrial release of the defendant.

Maryland HB 1264 Prohibits a District Court commissioner from authorizing the pretrial release of a defendant charged with causing abuse or neglect of a vulnerable adult in the first or second degree.

Maryland HB 768 / SB 940 Allows a defendant in a circuit court or the District Court or a private surety acting for the defendant who posts a bail bond in an amount that is 10% of the penalty amount to deposit with the clerk of court half of the amount immediately and the other half within 6 months later.

Introduced with other or no activity

Georgia HB 32 Revises the requirements for releasing a person on his or her own recognizance.

Georgia HB 252 Add violations for which cash bonds can be accepted in lieu of bail and proceedings for failure to appear.

Georgia HB 288 Require as a condition of bail for certain offenses that DNA collection be performed on the person seeking bond.

Maryland HB 898 / SB 686 Provides that if a bail bondsman arranges to accept payment of a bail bond premium in installments, the installment agreement shall include information about the total premium amount owed, down payment made, and other terms of the installment contract. Requires that information about the bail bond premium installment payment agreement be included in an affidavit of surety. Requires bail bondsmen, if arranging bail bond premium installment agreements, to follow specified collection procedures.

North Carolina SB 740 Allows a bail agent on behalf of a surety company to make written motions setting aside bail forfeiture and relief from final judgment of bail forfeiture under laws pertaining the criminal procedure.

South Carolina SB 45 & SB 266 Provides Circuit Court to hear  motions regarding reconsideration of bond for general sessions offenses. Provides defense motions to reconsider may be heard by the circuit court only upon the defendant’s prima facie showing of a material change in circumstances.

South Carolina SB 267 Provides a person committing or attempting to commit a general sessions offense while on bail bond must be imprisoned five years in addition to the punishment for the principal offense.

West Virginia HB 2068 Provides certain specific statutory conditions of bond in cases involving crimes between family or household members in lieu of allowing the issuing authority to set conditions of bail.

Should small claims limits be increased? Maryland in 2011 says no.

August 8th, 2011

Since the ongoing economic downturn, courts are finding their civil dockets flooded with cases involving debts and broken contracts. Perhaps it is this that has inspired the unprecedented level of interest in changing the small claims jurisdiction of state courts.

In its 2011 session, the Maryland General Assembly considered raising the existing limit from $5,000 to $10,000. Although ultimately rejected, this video is testimony before the House Judiciary Committee on February 16, 2011 on the subject gives a fairly broad overview of the pros and cons.

Proponents’ Testimony

Opponents’ Testimony

Special Edition: 2012 Ballot and the Courts

July 27th, 2011

While a great deal of focus is already being drawn to the 2012 presidential elections, next year is set to be an incredibly busy year for ballot items related to state courts.

This special edition of Gavel to Gavel released today looks at those items as well as those currently circulating for signatures.