2010

Write up of all 2010 efforts here

2010 saw three efforts make their way out of their respective legislatures. The Oklahoma constitutional amendment would never take force, having been struck down by a federal district court, a determination upheld by the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in January 2012.

• Louisiana HB 785 & SB 460: “Foreign law” means any law, rule, or legal code or system established and used or applied in a jurisdiction outside of the states or territories of the United States…A court, arbitrator, administrative agency, or other adjudicative, mediation, or enforcement authority shall not enforce a foreign law if doing so would violate a right guaranteed by the constitution of this state or of the United States.
• Oklahoma HJR 1056 (Constitutional Amendment): Prohibits the courts to “look to the legal precepts of other nations or cultures. Specifically, the courts shall not consider Sharia Law or international law.” Requires courts adhere only to the U.S. & Oklahoma Constitutions, federal and state law and regulations, and where necessary the laws and regulations of another state.
• Tennessee HB 3768 & SB 3740: Defines “law, legal code, or legal system” means a law, legal code, or legal system used or applied in any jurisdiction outside of Tennessee, including any foreign state, jurisdiction, country or territory of the United States…Notwithstanding any law to the contrary, and subject to provisions of superseding federal treaties, any otherwise enforceable contract which incorporates any substantive or procedural law, legal code or legal system of another state, foreign jurisdiction or foreign country that would violate rights and privileges granted under the United States or Tennessee Constitution is declared to be against public policy of this state and is unenforceable in this state.

2011

Write up of all 2011 efforts here

Despite having far more bills introduced in 2011 than in 2010, there was only one such piece of legislation enacted

• Arizona HB 2064 Defines “foreign law” as “any law, rule or legal code or system other than the constitution, laws and ratified treaties of the united states and the territories of the united states, or the constitution and laws of this state….a court, arbitrator, administrative agency or other adjudicative, mediation or enforcement authority shall not enforce a foreign law if doing so would violate a right guaranteed by the constitution of this state or of the united states or conflict with the laws of the united states or of this state.”

2012

15 sharia/international law bans were carried over from the 2011 session. Combined with 18 newly introduced bills this puts the issue front and center for the 2012 sessions. Already there has been activity, with the Florida Senate Judiciary Committee giving its approval to a ban.

Full roster of 33 bills introduced in 2012 in 20 states and their statuses after the jump.

Chief Justice Randall Shepard delivered his 25th and final State of the Judiciary address last week. Chief Justice Shepard’s address is one of the only State of the Judiciary speeches in the nation to be constitutionally based (Art. 7, Sec 3)

The Chief Justice shall have prepared and submit to the General Assembly regular reports on the condition of the courts and such other reports as may be requested.

However unlike in recent years it does not appear a formal concurrent resolution inviting the Chief Justice to deliver it was adopted (compare HCR 1 of 2011, HCR 20 of 2010, HCR 5 of 2009, HCR 4 of 2008).

Highlights of the Chief Justice’s speech (full text here) below the jump

I’m always mindful that the Constitution calls on me to report on the state of the whole judiciary, all 400 of Indiana’s courts, a report on the larger enterprise that is moving from yesterday to tomorrow.

As for the judicial branch, when children went to court in the old days, too often no one really spoke for them because the parents were so focused on their own conflict. Today, Indiana’s courts have people who speak just for the best interests of the child—sometimes lawyers, but more often volunteer Court-Appointed Special Advocates, CASAs for short.

State and local ingenuity have produced a different world: 49 certified drug courts, highly professional probation departments with the time and tools to monitor felons who number in the tens of thousands, 56 court drug and alcohol programs, the first veterans courts, delinquency projects run jointly with school corporations and the social work community, and the new risk assessment tools that help identify the most effective sanction for individual offenders.

On a basic matter like deciding what evidence is admissible in court, for 175 years Indiana employed a system derived from the ancient common law, using appellate court opinions to specify how to submit evidence—how to establish that a document is genuine, what is hearsay and what is not. People confronted with these issues had to search thousands of pages of opinions for guidance…We’ve now replaced those millions of words with the Indiana Rules of Evidence, just 24 pages covering everything from the definition of hearsay to when you need the original of a document and when a copy will suffice.

Indiana became a state where lawyers have to complete continuing legal education because lawyers thought it would be good for them and for clients. The Indiana State Bar Association’s original proposal left out judges, but judges insisted that we should impose on ourselves whatever we required of lawyers.

This [increased citation of Indiana decisions in other states] is, of course, grounds for professional pride, and it’s probably one reason why more people are voting in retention elections than ever before. But there’s a much more important reason. It is the value in the public sector of what George Will recently called “reasoned judgment.” Whether the disputes people bring to us are thoughtfully and honestly decided according to facts and law is crucial to a free society.

The first efforts to alter the state’s merit selection system have now been filed. SJR 13 of 2012 repeats almost verbatim SJR 1 of 2005, a previous effort to change merit selection that was approved by the state’s Senate in that year. The constitutional amendment:

• Renames the judicial nominating commission as the commission on judicial nominations and qualifications.
• Provides that one commission member will be selected by attorneys licensed in Indiana, one commission member will be appointed by the speaker of the house of representatives, and one commission member will be appointed by the president pro tem.
• Requires at least one commission member appointed by the governor to be an attorney
• Prohibits a person who is a registered lobbyist from serving on the commission.
• Provides for the governor to fill a vacancy on the supreme court or the court of appeals from nominees recommended by the commission on judicial nominations and qualifications, subject to confirmation by the senate.
• Provides that a justice of the supreme court and a judge of the court of appeals serves until July 1 of the tenth year after the justice’s or judge’s appointment is confirmed by the senate or the justice’s or judge’s retention in office is confirmed by the senate.
• Provides that if a justice or judge wants to serve a new term, the justice or judge must apply to the senate for retention.
• Specifies that a judge or justice will be retained, unless: (1) the judge or justice does not apply to the senate for retention; and (2) at least 60% of the members of the senate vote against retention.

While SJR 13 would make changes to the state’s merit selection system, SJR 14 goes even further, ending appellate merit selection, restructuring the state’s judicial disciplinary committee (the commission on judicial qualifications), and allowing judicial candidates to speak, participate in partisan activities, and act like candidates for other offices. Specifically, it provides:

• End merit selection and replaces with gubernatorial appointment with senate confirmation.
• Requires appellate judges receive 60% of retention election vote to remain in office.
• Provides that a law, judicial rule, decree, or order may not abridge the freedom of a judge, lawyer, candidate for judicial office, or any other person from: (1) speaking, writing, or otherwise expressing the person’s views freely regarding a political issue, political party, or candidate for office, including a candidate for a judicial office; or (2) making a donation of money, services, or property to a political party or a candidate for office, including a candidate for a judicial office.
• Specifies the 3 members of the state’s commission on judicial qualifications chosen by the Governor may not be attorneys.
• Grants the legislature alone the power to set terms for commission members, their compensation, and the manner they are elected.

Welcome Post-Gazette readers!

Since the last update of this list in October, one piece of legislation has been introduced.  Pennsylvania’s HB 2029 bans court references to any “foreign legal code or system” if doing so would impair constitutional rights.

Full roster of 2010 bills are available. 2011 and 2012 bills after the jump.

2012

2011

Courts of Conciliation

Ohio Constitution (1851) Article 6, Section 19

The General Assembly may establish courts of conciliation, and prescribe their powers and duties; but such courts shall not render final judgment in any case, except upon submission, by the parties, of the matter in dispute, and their agreement to abide such judgment.

New York Constitution (1846) Article 6, Section 23

Tribunals of conciliation may be established, with such powers and duties as may be prescribed by law; but such tribunals shall have no power to render judgment to be obligatory on the parties, except they voluntarily submit their matters in difference, and agree to abide the judgment, or assent thereto, in the presence of such tribunal, in such cases as shall be prescribed by law.

Provisions for tribunals of conciliation or courts of conciliation can be found in the 1800s constitutions of not only Ohio (1851), but Wisconsin (1848), California (1849), Michigan (1850), Indiana (1851), and North Dakota (1889). They are all taken, almost verbatim, from the 1846 New York Constitution, which for its time was considered revolutionary in terms of judicial proceedings (and also was the genesis for the appellate commissions discussed below).

Courts of conciliation were akin to small claims courts (Minnesota’s small claims courts are still called “conciliation courts”) and arbitration or mediation (statutes in Arizona, California, Montana, and Nebraska reference conciliation courts that focus to amicably resolve martial and domestic relations issues). The report of the debates of the 1851 Ohio Constitutional convention note the intent behind these courts:

This plan of a court of conciliation has many advocates, who desire to see it established. It has been tried in other countries, with excellent effect—greatly diminish litigation and subduing a litigious spirit—a spirit which is the bane of a community. It sets neighbor against neighbor, brother against brother and even father against son, and son against father. Such litigation have I often witnessed, and in some cases seen it prosecuted with an embittered spirit, little short of devilish. Every means which promises only a mitigation if the evil should be employed. The expense and time wasted in such controversies, employing judges, jurors, witnesses, lawyers and suitors, is but a little of the mischief. The monstrous evil consists in the engendering and perpetuating of strife and contention among neighbors, begetting and nursing discord and hatred in families, and in disturbing the harmony and peace of society. A judicious peace loving and peace making officer of this kind may be more useful, far more useful than the first judge of your State, whom you propose to dignify with title of Chief Justice of Ohio.

It should be noted that despite the above ringing endorsement, the provision almost never happened. According to the reports of the debates at the 1851 Ohio Constitutional Convention, the vote to put in the provision was adopted 42-39.

All references to such courts can trace back (constitutionally speaking) to similar courts in Denmark and Norway, the “other countries” alluded to above. Although intended as separate and independent from regular courts, most courts of conciliation instead became divisions of existing courts. For example, a 1909 report indicates Cleveland’s Municipal Court had a Conciliation Division.

According to a history of the New York Constitution, the courts were seldom used because existing laws, with respect to arbitration, were already in place and accessible. In New York, it wasn’t until 1862 that an actual  tribunal of conciliation was set up in a judicial district. The statute authorizing the court was repealed 3 years later. As the Ohio Legislative Service Commission’s review of Measure 1 (then called HJR 1) indicates, Ohio too opted to put in mediation/conciliation practices rather than create free-standing courts.

Supreme Court Commissions

Ohio Constitution (1875) Article 6, Section 22

A commission, which shall consist of five members, shall be appointed by the governor, with the advice and consent of the senate, the members of which shall hold office for the term of three years from and after the first day of February, 1876, to dispose of such part of the business then on the dockets of the supreme court, as shall, by arrangement between said commission and said court, be transferred to such commission; and said commission shall have like jurisdiction and power in respect to such business as are or may be vested in said court; and the members of said commission shall receive a like compensation for the time being, with the judges of said court. A majority of the members of said commission shall be necessary to form a quorum or pronounce a decision, and its decision shall be certified, entered, and enforced as the judgments of the supreme court, and at the expiration of the term of said commission, all business undisposed of shall by it be certified to the supreme court and disposed of as if said commission had never existed. The clerk and reporter of said court shall be the clerk and reporter of said commission, and the commission shall have such other attendants not exceeding in number those provided by law for said court, which attendants said commission may appoint and remove at its pleasure. Any vacancy occurring in said commission, shall be filled by appointment of the governor, with the advice and consent of the senate, if the senate be in session, and if the senate be not in session, by the governor, but in such last case, such appointment shall expire at the end of the next session of the general assembly. The general assembly may, on application of the supreme court duly entered on the journal of the court and certified, provide by law, whenever two-thirds of such [each] house shall concur therein, from time to time, for the appointment, in like manner, of a like commission with like powers, jurisdiction and duties; provided, that the term of any such commission shall not exceed two years, nor shall it be created oftener than once in ten years.

New York Constitution (1869) Article 6, Section 4 & 5

Sec. 4 Upon the organization of the [new] Court of Appeals [New York's top court], under this article, the causes then pending in the present Court of Appeals shall become vested in the Court of Appeals hereby established. Such of said causes as are pending on the first day of January, eighteen hundred and sixty-nine, shall be heard and determined by a Commission, to be composed of five Commissioners of Appeals, four of whom shall be necessary to constitute a quorum; but the Court of Appeals hereby established may order any of said causes to be heard therein. Such Commission shall be composed of the Judges of the present Court of Appeals, elected or appointed thereto, and a fifth Commissioner who shall be appointed by the Governor, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate; or, if the Senate be not in session, by the Governor; but in such case, the appointment shall expire at the end of the next session.

Sec. 5 If any vacancy shall occur in the office of the said Commissioners, it shall be filled by appointment by the Governor by and with the advice and consent of the Senate; or if the Senate is not in session, by the Governor; but in such case, the appointment shall expire at the end of the next session. The Commissioners shall appoint, from their number, a Chief Commissioner; and may appoint and remove such attendants as may be necessary. The reporter of the Court of Appeals shall be the reporter of said Commission. The decisions of the Commission shall be certified to, and entered and enforced, as the judgments of the Court of Appeals. The Commission shall continue until the causes committed to it are determined, but not exceeding three years; and all causes then undetermined shall be heard by the Court of Appeals.

We take for granted the system in place in 40 states of an intermediate appellate court (usually called the Court of Appeals), however the creation of these courts met with fierce resistance both from voters and, on occasion, state supreme courts. Consider, for example, that Nevada voters have three times in the last three decades rejected the creation of such a court, most recently in 2010 (a fourth attempt may be made in 2014). When Colorado’s legislature made an attempt to create such a court in 1886, the state’s supreme court issued an advisory opinion that the proposed Court of Appeal was an unconstitutional infringement on the Supreme Court’s role as the supreme court of the state (the Supreme Court upheld a different version of the Court of Appeals in 1891).

Ohio and other large states like Texas tried to grapple with this problem through the use of appellate commissions. The appointment of special judicial officers to hear certain motions or matters was, and is, not uncommon. To this day subordinate judicial officers in California trial courts are called “commissioners“.

What made the New York, Ohio, and Texas provisions unique was that they provided for panels of commissioners to sit and render judgments. This avoided the exceptionally untenable situation of creating an intermediate appellate court or adding judges to existing courts which, as noted, had no real political support. The commission idea, however, got the votes in 1869 as part of a massive overhaul of New York’s judiciary article. The provisions appear to have been for the most part duplicated in Ohio (1875) and Texas (1879 by statute) a few years later.

Eventually these commissions fell out of favor for two reasons. First, states large and small simply needed dedicated, permanent intermediate appellate courts to handle the caseload. Second, there was a very real possibility that decisions of the commissions would be in conflict with the courts.

New York got such a dedicated court (the Appellate Divisions) in its 1894 constitution. Ohio got Circuit Courts of Appeals in 1851 consisting of 1 Supreme Court Justice riding circuit and sitting with the judges of the courts of common pleas, but it was not until an 1883 amendment that the Circuit Courts of Appeals consisted of judges specifically elected to serve in those courts. These eventually were made into the modern District Courts of Appeals.

What appellate commissioners remain today (such as in Oregon) are hearing officers who handle motion practice, not panels. Perhaps the only remaining vestiges of the old system are in Ohio’s constitution and North Dakota’s “Court of Appeals” which, despite the name, functions much the same as the commissions did, with panels coming into existence or only being used when the state’s top court is overwhelmed.

Four legislatures have adopted statutes to alter retirement (Indiana 2011; Kansas 2003 & 2010; North Carolina 1992; Vermont 2003). Moreover, Arizona has advanced a proposed change for the 2012 ballot while New York voters will probably address the issue in 2014. This marks a trend over the last several year in particular of state legislatures confronting judges living longer and the question of whether there should be any limits on service at all.

State by state breakdown below the fold.

Alabama

In the last decade, Alabama’s House and Senate have at various times both passed constitutional amendments for the elimination of mandatory judicial retirement and rejected them as well.

Arizona

All efforts since 1990 to change the state’s mandatory retirement age of 70 have focused on increasing it to 75. The first round of bills (2002-2004) met with some success in the House but not the Senate. A second round (2005-2006) included a Senate effort to increase for the state’s main trial court judges (Superior Court) only. The Senate approved, the House balked. The third and continuing round (2007-2011) tied the increase to 75 with changes to the state’s merit selection system. Such a connective bill was passed in 2011 and is set to be voted on in 2012. Under SCR1001 the mandatory retirement age would go to 75, but the composition of the state’s merit selection commissions would be altered.

Florida

As with Arizona, the Florida interest in changing the mandatory retirement age was connected to changes to judicial selection. Bills introduced in 1994 and 1996 would have raised the limit or allowed the legislature to do so at a later date. The constitutional amendment that appeared on the ballot excluded the reference to the mandatory retirement age.

Hawaii

In 2005, Hawaii was faced with a Republican Governor (something which had not happened since 1962), a very Democratic legislature, and several members of the state’s courts up against the mandatory retirement age of 70. The state’s senate proposed a standalone constitutional amendment eliminating the retirement age which went down to a nearly 2-1 defeat. A 2008/2009 effort to increase the age to 80 for justices and judges appointed after November 4, 2008 (i.e. after the Republican governor would be term limited out of office) died in a conference committee.

Indiana

Kansas

Kansas had been considering a change to its statutes regarding mandatory judicial retirement at 70 for several years before a 2002 Supreme Court order reset the dynamics. In March of that year, in response to legislative cuts to the courts, the Supreme Court entered an order for emergency surcharges on various court filings, fees, and fines. The language of a 2000 bill was then reintroduced in 2003 to increase the mandatory retirement age for judges, even the Court of Appeals, except the Supreme Court. That version was enacted. It was not until 2010 that the law was further amended to include the Supreme Court in the increase.

Louisiana

Louisiana has had two efforts to increase the retirement ages of its judges. The first was in the early 1990s and sought an increase from 70 to 75. It was put up on the ballot in 1995, along with 14 other items, as Amendment 4. It was one of only 2 proposals to lose. The loss can at least in part be attributed to bad timing; the same 1995 ballot included as Amendment 2 term limits for the legislature. It passed overwhelmingly 75%-25%, making the “mere” 62%-38% drubbing Amendment 4 took somewhat remarkable. Thereafter the issue lay dormant for almost a decade until 2003 when a change was proposed to allow judges to serve out the term in which they turned 70. Like its 1995 its counterpart it was one of 14 items on an October ballot. The 2003 effort, however, succeeded.

Michigan

Massachusetts

Minnesota

Missouri

Missouri is one of only a handful of states that have a different retirement age for trial and appellate judges. Moreover, municipal judges have a higher retirement age (75) than that of the judges of all the other courts (Circuit, Court of Appeals, and Supreme Court = 70).

North Carolina

New Jersey

New York

Ohio

Pennsylvania

Throughout the 1990s several attempts were made to extend judicial terms to the end of the calendar year a judge turned 70.The extension was added onto a bill related to reapportionment, but approved by the voters in a separate vote in May 2001 where it won on a 2-1 vote.

South Dakota

Texas

The 2007 Texas amendment noted below was the first effort in a decade to change the state’s judicial retirement. It was one of 16 ballot items voters cast ballots on in November 2007, all of which passed.

Virginia

For each of the past 5 years it appeared that Virginia General Assembly would raise the mandatory retirement age for judges and in each one of those years it failed, often at the last minute. Part of the challenge is the statutory placement of the law itself; Virginia Code 51.1-305(B1) not only sets 70 as the mandatory age for judges, but for members of the state Corporation Commission who are also members of the Judicial Retirement System. Trying to craft a bill that does, or does not, also change the retirement provisions for the members of the Commission has been a sticking point. The result has been numerous attempts, including three tie-vote-failures in committee.

Vermont

When originally proposed in the Vermont Senate, the bill to simply eliminate the retirement age. A committee amendment changed it to a range to be set by the legislature instead. The legislature would later opt for the high end, passing a statute in 2003 to set it as being the end of the calendar year the judge turns 90.

Washington

Wyoming

The other bill is Alabama SB 33 of 2012, a prefiled bill for the next session. SB 33 of 2012 is a constitutional amendment that looks more like HB 607 / SB 61 than HB 597 / SB 62 in that it does not specifically mention “sharia”.

It should be noted that at least some 2011 bills will make a return in 2012; roughly half of states allow bills to be “carried over” from one session to the next. Definitive answers as to which bills will return will be available as the legislatures come back into session in January.

Full roster of bills going back to 2010 after the jump.

2012

2011

2010

North Dakota HB 1023 Strikes provision that certain court fees must be used to contract for indigent defense.

North Dakota HB 1065 Clarifies that the cities are responsible for indigent defense services in all prosecutions for violations of city ordinances, whether in city court, district court, or on appeal.

Vetoed

Minnesota HB 988 Requires the court, prior to appointing a public defender, to inquire whether a prosecutor intends to certify a misdemeanor as a petty misdemeanor. Provides that if an offense is certified as a petty misdemeanor, a defendant would not be eligible for a public defender. Clarifies that only those persons with a statutory right to a public defender under law may request appointment of a public defender. Establishes criteria to determine eligibility for public defender representation based on the offense level charged and the defendant’s income: misdemeanor 125% of federal poverty guideline; gross misdemeanor 150%; felony 175%. Maintains current language allowing the court to also determine eligibility based on defendant’s ability to pay for private counsel with current income and liquid assets. Strikes language limiting applicant’s duty to disclose information about changes in financial circumstances that is only relevant to eligibility for a public defender; language that allows only the public defender representing the applicant to see information in the application; and language providing that the court has the sole duty to conduct a financial inquiry, not the public defender. Requires all district courts to use financial statement forms furnished by the state public defender. Authorizes the court to reduce the $75 copayment for public defender representation. Provides that the court shall not appoint a public defender if a defendant: is financially able to retain counsel but refuses to do so; refuses to execute the required financial statement or provide information; or waives appointment of a public defender. Provides that the chief appellate public defender represents persons pursuing an appeal or post-conviction relief and the district public defender represents persons in all other statutorily defined cases. Strikes language mandating continued representation of an arrested individual and maintains permissive language allowing the public defender discretion in such cases. Eliminates restrictions on how reimbursements collected from defendants may be used by a district public defender’s office. Adds language requiring a defendant who is or becomes able to make partial payments to reimburse the state for the cost of the public defender. Strikes language referring to reimbursement guidelines (which is repealed in section 9). Directs the court, in determining a defendant’s payment schedule, to consider the defendant’s financial statement application. Requires the court to evaluate a defendant’s ability to make partial payments if the court originally determined that the defendant was financially unable to afford counsel due to the private retainer fee. Provides that the Board of Public Defense must fund all items and services necessary to satisfy its obligations law. Provides that a county is not responsible for public defender costs, expect for costs currently paid by Hennepin County.

Active/Carried over in 2012

Michigan HB 4742 Creates statewide public defense commission. Require commission develop, implement, and administer public defense system. Specifies manner for attorney representation of indigent criminal and juvenile defendants and standards for the appointment of legal counsel.

Ohio HB 49 Provides that specified fees, costs, and fines that currently are deposited into the state treasury to the credit of funds that help pay for the defense of indigent criminal defendants be deposited instead into the municipal treasury to help compensate counsel appointed by the court to represent indigent defendants if the court that imposed the fees, costs, or fines is a municipal court that is not a county?operated municipal court and that appoints counsel for indigent defendants in a manner other than that in law.

Died in committee

Indiana HB 1454 Establishes a statutory right to counsel for a child who is alleged or adjudicated to be a child in need of services or the subject of a parent- child termination proceeding. Establishes the office of the state juvenile public defender. Provides for representation of indigent children in cases filed in a juvenile court under a plan developed by the office of the state juvenile public defender and approved by the supreme court. Provides for counties to distribute to the state the average net amount (after deducting certain reimbursements) that the counties spent for these services over a five year period.

Indiana HB 1456 Provides that if a person is represented by a public defender in a probation violation hearing and the court determines the person is able to pay for part of the costs of the representation, the court shall order the person to pay $100. Provides that a court may make a finding of ability to pay the costs of representation for a probation violation hearing.

Indiana SB 253 Specifies that 20% of the late surrender fees collected under the Indiana bail law must be deposited in the county supplemental public defender services fund. (see also SB 518)

Iowa HB 602 Provides that legal services for indigent persons contracted through the state public defender may be paid based on other than an hourly rate, including a fixed rate basis. Provides for the handling of appeals for indigent persons by the state appellate defender or by transfer of the case to a person under contract with the state public defender. Provides that the expenses of the public defender in determining the amount of restitution for a case include all expenses approved by the state public defender together with the attorney fees for the public defender. Specifies an exception to payment of fees for appointed counsel by the person filing or on whose behalf a petition for termination of parental rights is filed.

Kansas HB 2197 Allows a public defender to withdraw from a court-appointed case when the defender determines a conflict of interest exists or when the defender’s current caseload would preclude them from providing adequate representation to new or existing clients. Requires withdrawal be communicated to Chief Judge of the District Court. Provides any public defender, with the approval of the Executive Director of the State Board of Indigents Defense Services, would be allowed to accept misdemeanor or juvenile appointments not covered by contract or agreement in the district county of jurisdiction. Requires public defender keep a record of time spent on a case and submit the timesheet to the Executive Director of BIDS and the Clerk of the District Court of the county in which the case was heard.

Kansas HB 2305 Reduces the number of members of the State Board of Indigents Defense Services from nine to seven. Reduces the number of members required to be lawyers from five to four and the number required not to be lawyers from four to three. Allows a member to represent both a congressional district and a county with a population of over 100,000.

Minnesota HB 987 Eliminates restrictions on use of reimbursements received by the Board of Public Defense.

Minnesota SB 1027 Authorizing counties and contiguous county groups to withdraw from the statewide public defense system for a certain specified period and allowing renewal of election to withdraw. Requires state board of public defense and commissioner of management and budget notification. Requires withdrawing counties to agree to provide court-ordered representation of indigent people Requires advisory board formation for comprehensive plan development. Requires state board of public defense to transfer a portion of state funding to withdrawing counties. Requires continued chief appellate public defender continued representation in appeals.

Missouri SB 89 Abolishes the state public defender system and requires circuit courts to provide legal defense for indigents.

Nebraska LB 214 In those areas where public defenders are elected, converts election from partisan to nonpartisan.

North Dakota SB 2105 Requires Commission on Legal Counsel for Indigents to provide legal counsel services to persons who refuse to retain their own counsel, if the court has determined that they are incompetent to represent themselves.

HB 1004 Requires creation of website that lists all state and local expenditures and fund balances, include the judicial branch and courts.

HB 1153 Expands the types of persons that may participate in court established alcohol and drug services programs. Establishes procedures to be used by a problem solving court to terminate an individual’s participation in a problem solving court program. Specifies that a city or town user fee fund or county user fee fund includes problem solving court fees collected by the clerk of the court

HB 1266 Makes numerous changes to laws related to judiciary. Changes the expiration date of the commission on courts from June 30, 2011, to June 30, 2015. Provides that all circuit courts, superior courts, and probate courts have: (1) original and concurrent jurisdiction in all civil cases and in all criminal cases; (2) de novo appellate jurisdiction of appeals from city and town courts; and (3) in Marion County, de novo appellate jurisdiction of appeals from township small claims courts. Makes conforming amendments. Repeals the law concerning the establishment and operation of county courts. (Since January 1, 2009, no county court exists in Indiana.) Makes conforming amendments. Repeals or otherwise removes all provisions that establish a mandatory retirement age for superior court and county court judges. Makes conforming amendments. Establishes a unified circuit court for Clark County by combining the current judge of the Clark circuit court and the three judges of the Clark superior court into a unified circuit court with four judges. Specifies that the Clark superior court judges serving on December 31, 2011, serve as judges of the unified circuit court beginning January 1, 2012. Transfers all cases and other matters pending in the Clark superior court at the close of business on December 31, 2011, to the unified circuit court on January 1, 2012. Repeals provisions concerning the establishment and operation of the Clark superior court. Establishes a unified circuit court for Madison County by combining the current judge of the Madison circuit court and the five judges of the Madison superior court into a unified circuit court with six judges. Specifies that the Madison superior court judges serving on June 30, 2011, serve as judges of the unified circuit courts beginning July 1, 2011. Transfers all cases and other matters pending in the Madison superior court at the close of business on June 30, 2011, to their respective circuit courts on July 1, 2011. Repeals provisions concerning the establishment and operation of the Madison superior court. Establishes a unified circuit court for Henry County by combining the current judge of the Henry circuit court and the two judges of the Henry superior court into a unified circuit court with three judges. Specifies that the Henry superior court judges serving on June 30, 2011, serve as judges of the unified circuit court beginning July 1, 2011. Transfers all cases and other matters pending in the Henry superior court at the close of business on June 30, 2011, to the circuit court on July 1, 2011. Repeals provisions concerning the establishment and operation of the Henry superior court. Provides for the four judges of the Lake superior court county division to be: (1) nominated by the Lake County superior court judicial nominating commission and appointed by the governor; and (2) subject to the question of retention or rejection by the Lake County electorate every six years. (Current law provides that the judges of the Lake superior court county division are elected by the electorate of Lake County every six years.) Repeals provisions concerning elected judges of the county division.

SB 76 Requires that the board of trustees of the public employees’ retirement fund (PERF) specify by rule the interest rate credited to a participant’s contributions for the judges’ retirement system. Provides that a judge or a magistrate who is a participant in the judges’ retirement system and who purchases prior service credit in PERF waives credit for the PERF service only for the amount of PERF service purchased.

SB 463 Repeals or otherwise removes all provisions that establish a mandatory retirement age for superior court and county court judges.

SB 549 Consolidates judges’ retirement fund and 9 other retirement funds into a new Indiana Public Retirement System.

• Presentation by the Strategic Planning Committee of the Indiana Judicial Conference
• Requests for new judges and magistrates from various counties
• Discussion of laws concerning salaries of probation officers
• Discussion and votes on the Commission’s findings and recommendations for 2011
• Adoption of the Commission’s Final Report for 2011

Streaming video will be available here starting at 1:30 P.M. Eastern.