SB 2205 / SB 2209

One of the particular pieces of angst expressed by governors and others with state merit selection systems is the limitation on the names submitted by the merit selection commission. Arizona’s SCR 1001, for example, expands the number of choices for the governor from “not less than 3″ to “not less than 8″ (a two-thirds majority can reject an applicant and submit less than 8). Other proposals have sought similar expansions.

That is what sets Hawaii’s proposed constitutional amendment SB 2205 apart. Currently, the state’s judicial nominating commission sends “not less than four, and not more than six” names to the Governor for vacancies on the Supreme, Intermediate Appellate & Circuit Courts. For the state’s limited jurisdiction District Courts, the Chief Justice selects “from not less than 6″ names.

SB 2205, however, reduces the selection down to 3 in all instances/courts. Senator Clayton Hill, the chair of the Senate Committee on Judiciary and Labor, stated that by reducing the number “you reduce the politics”.

A companion constitutional amendment, SB 2209, would require the judicial selection commission disclose the names of and other statistical information regarding active nominees and applicants to fill justice and judge vacancies (amendment language in bold)

The deliberations of the commission shall be confidential with the exception of disclosing the names of nominees and the names of applicants to fill any justice or judge vacancies.  The commission shall disclose the names of active applicants to fill a justice or judge vacancy at the close of each application period as well as statistical information that serves the public interest, including but not limited to the total number, gender, and experience of applicants.

This issue of gender diversity is one the Hawaii Senate is on record as being concerned by. SR 26 and SCR 37, both adopted by the Senate in 2010, recited a litany of statistics regarding the gender diversity of the state’s bench and “strongly urged” then-Governor Linda Lingle “to use and consider gender equality when appointing judges and justices in the future…”

SB 2206

In 2006 Hawaii’s (heavily Democratic) legislature suddenly became interested in increasing the mandatory retirement age for the state’s judiciary. It may, or may not, have been a coincidence that the interest occurred right when the first Republican governor in 5 decades was about to appoint several judges and justices who were being forced out of office due to the mandatory retirement age of 70. SB 995 of 2006 to simply eliminate the mandatory retirement age was rejected 2-1 by voters.

In 2012, with a Democratic governor in office, SB 2006 was introduced to amend the state’s constitution and allow judges and justices to serve until age 80. If approved by voters, it would give Hawaii one of the highest mandatory retirement age in the U.S. (Vermont judges can serve until the end of the year they turn 90).

He has made Judges dependent on his Will alone for the tenure of their offices, and the amount and payment of their salaries.

For this reason, among others, the U.S. Constitution assures federal judges are to “receive for their Services a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.”

Most (but not all) states have similar provisions in their constitutions. However, legislative efforts to overturn these clauses have been increasingly introduced as states cut budgets. Consider the following:

• 79% of voters in Ireland last week approved a referendum to weaken their constitution’s protection of judicial salaries, allowing for laws to be passed reducing the pay of judges proportionately if the pay of public servants is being or has been reduced and that reduction is stated to be “in the public interest”.
• New Jersey Governor Chris Christie’s plan to change the pension contributions for that state’s judges was also struck down as running afoul of that state’s guarantee that judicial salaries “shall not be diminished” (see prior post here). The Governor has vowed to introduce a constitutional amendment to curtail or eliminate the provision protecting judicial salaries.
• In 2006, Hawaii voters voted to end the state’s judicial compensation commission and replace it with a compensation commission that would set salaries for most state elected officials. A lesser known provision of the amendment also stripped the constitutional guarantee that judicial salaries “shall not be decreased during their respective terms of office, unless by general law applying to all salaried officers of the State”. In 2009, all judicial salaries were “reduced by five per cent from what the salary [was] as of June 30, 2009, and shall remain at that salary rate until June 30, 2011″ (HB 1536 of 2009). The June 30, 2011 deadline has since been extended to June 30, 2013 (HB 575 of 2011).

Details of the various recent constitutional amendments below the fold.

Hawaii HB 1102 (1999) Repeals judiciary salary commission. Repeals provision that “[Judicial] compensation shall not be decreased during their respective terms of office, unless by general law applying to all salaried officers of the State.” Died in committee.

Hawaii SB 1310 (1999) Repeals judiciary salary commission. Repeals provision that “[Judicial] compensation shall not be decreased during their respective terms of office, unless by general law applying to all salaried officers of the State.” Died in committee.

Hawaii HB 1918 (2006) Repeals judiciary salary commission and replaces with commission on salaries to establish salaries for most state elected and appointed officials. Repeals provision that “[Judicial] compensation shall not be decreased during their respective terms of office, unless by general law applying to all salaried officers of the State.” Approved by voters 53%-47% in November 2006.

Michigan HJR 61 (2009) Provides that the salaries of all judges are to be reduced 5% for three years starting in 2011. Died in committee.

Michigan SJR 21 (2009) Provides that the salaries of all judges are to be reduced 5% for three years starting in 2011. Died in committee.

Michigan SJR 2 (2011) Provides that the salaries of all judges are to be reduced 5% for three years starting in 2012. In Senate Committee on Reforms, Restructuring and Reinvention.

Montana HB 602 (2005) Amends guarantee of non-diminishment to require judges decide cases in 90 days or have salary revoked. Obtained majority (55-44) but not two-thirds required (67) in House.

North Carolina HB 1494 (2001) Repeals provision that “salaries of Judges shall not be diminished during their continuance in office.” Killed in House Rules Committee.

New Mexico SJR 6 (2000) Repeals provision that “[Magistrate court judges] shall receive compensation as may be provided by law which compensation shall not be diminished during their term of office.” Approved by Senate Judiciary Committee. Died on Senate floor.

New Mexico SJR 6 (2001) Repeals provision that “[Magistrate court judges] shall receive compensation as may be provided by law which compensation shall not be diminished during their term of office.” Approved by Senate Judiciary Committee. Died on Senate floor.

Four legislatures have adopted statutes to alter retirement (Indiana 2011; Kansas 2003 & 2010; North Carolina 1992; Vermont 2003). Moreover, Arizona has advanced a proposed change for the 2012 ballot while New York voters will probably address the issue in 2014. This marks a trend over the last several year in particular of state legislatures confronting judges living longer and the question of whether there should be any limits on service at all.

State by state breakdown below the fold.

Alabama

In the last decade, Alabama’s House and Senate have at various times both passed constitutional amendments for the elimination of mandatory judicial retirement and rejected them as well.

Arizona

All efforts since 1990 to change the state’s mandatory retirement age of 70 have focused on increasing it to 75. The first round of bills (2002-2004) met with some success in the House but not the Senate. A second round (2005-2006) included a Senate effort to increase for the state’s main trial court judges (Superior Court) only. The Senate approved, the House balked. The third and continuing round (2007-2011) tied the increase to 75 with changes to the state’s merit selection system. Such a connective bill was passed in 2011 and is set to be voted on in 2012. Under SCR1001 the mandatory retirement age would go to 75, but the composition of the state’s merit selection commissions would be altered.

Florida

As with Arizona, the Florida interest in changing the mandatory retirement age was connected to changes to judicial selection. Bills introduced in 1994 and 1996 would have raised the limit or allowed the legislature to do so at a later date. The constitutional amendment that appeared on the ballot excluded the reference to the mandatory retirement age.

Hawaii

In 2005, Hawaii was faced with a Republican Governor (something which had not happened since 1962), a very Democratic legislature, and several members of the state’s courts up against the mandatory retirement age of 70. The state’s senate proposed a standalone constitutional amendment eliminating the retirement age which went down to a nearly 2-1 defeat. A 2008/2009 effort to increase the age to 80 for justices and judges appointed after November 4, 2008 (i.e. after the Republican governor would be term limited out of office) died in a conference committee.

Indiana

Kansas

Kansas had been considering a change to its statutes regarding mandatory judicial retirement at 70 for several years before a 2002 Supreme Court order reset the dynamics. In March of that year, in response to legislative cuts to the courts, the Supreme Court entered an order for emergency surcharges on various court filings, fees, and fines. The language of a 2000 bill was then reintroduced in 2003 to increase the mandatory retirement age for judges, even the Court of Appeals, except the Supreme Court. That version was enacted. It was not until 2010 that the law was further amended to include the Supreme Court in the increase.

Louisiana

Louisiana has had two efforts to increase the retirement ages of its judges. The first was in the early 1990s and sought an increase from 70 to 75. It was put up on the ballot in 1995, along with 14 other items, as Amendment 4. It was one of only 2 proposals to lose. The loss can at least in part be attributed to bad timing; the same 1995 ballot included as Amendment 2 term limits for the legislature. It passed overwhelmingly 75%-25%, making the “mere” 62%-38% drubbing Amendment 4 took somewhat remarkable. Thereafter the issue lay dormant for almost a decade until 2003 when a change was proposed to allow judges to serve out the term in which they turned 70. Like its 1995 its counterpart it was one of 14 items on an October ballot. The 2003 effort, however, succeeded.

Michigan

Massachusetts

Minnesota

Missouri

Missouri is one of only a handful of states that have a different retirement age for trial and appellate judges. Moreover, municipal judges have a higher retirement age (75) than that of the judges of all the other courts (Circuit, Court of Appeals, and Supreme Court = 70).

North Carolina

New Jersey

New York

Ohio

Pennsylvania

Throughout the 1990s several attempts were made to extend judicial terms to the end of the calendar year a judge turned 70.The extension was added onto a bill related to reapportionment, but approved by the voters in a separate vote in May 2001 where it won on a 2-1 vote.

South Dakota

Texas

The 2007 Texas amendment noted below was the first effort in a decade to change the state’s judicial retirement. It was one of 16 ballot items voters cast ballots on in November 2007, all of which passed.

Virginia

For each of the past 5 years it appeared that Virginia General Assembly would raise the mandatory retirement age for judges and in each one of those years it failed, often at the last minute. Part of the challenge is the statutory placement of the law itself; Virginia Code 51.1-305(B1) not only sets 70 as the mandatory age for judges, but for members of the state Corporation Commission who are also members of the Judicial Retirement System. Trying to craft a bill that does, or does not, also change the retirement provisions for the members of the Commission has been a sticking point. The result has been numerous attempts, including three tie-vote-failures in committee.

Vermont

When originally proposed in the Vermont Senate, the bill to simply eliminate the retirement age. A committee amendment changed it to a range to be set by the legislature instead. The legislature would later opt for the high end, passing a statute in 2003 to set it as being the end of the calendar year the judge turns 90.

Washington

Wyoming

It should be noted that of the 11 states that give their legislature some role in the confirmation of appellate judges:

• 6 give at least some appellate  judges a decade or more on the bench between reconfirmations: Delaware (12 years), Hawaii (10 years), South Carolina (10 years), Utah (Supreme Court: 10 years), Virginia (Supreme Court: 12 years),  and New York (Court of Appeals: 14 years)
• 3 give reconfirmation to the House and Senate: Connecticut, South Carolina, and Virginia
• 3 remove the legislature outright from reconfirmation: Hawaii (judicial nominating commission); Maryland and Utah (retention election)
• 2 at least have the option of lifetime or near-lifetime appointment: Rhode Island (life) and New Jersey (until 70 after reconfirmation)

Roles of legislatures in appellate judicial re-confirmation

Connecticut: 8 year term for Supreme Court and Appellate Court. Judicial Selection Commission evaluates incumbent judge, with statutory presumption “that each incumbent judge who seeks reappointment to the same court qualifies for retention in judicial office” and provides burden on commission to demonstrate otherwise (see 51-44a (e) and (f), of the Connecticut General Statutes). Commission sends reappoint/don’t reappoint recommendation to Governor who renominates incumbent judge. Legislature jointly reconfirms.

Delaware: 12 year term for the Supreme Court. Governor renominates. Senate reconfirms.

Hawaii: 10 year term for Supreme Court and Intermediate Appellate Court. Judicial selection commission reappoints.

Maine: 7 year term for Supreme Judicial Court. Governor renominates. Joint House/Senate legislative committee recommends reconfirmation or rejection. That recommendation is binding unless the Senate overrides with 2/3 vote.

Maryland: 1 year (at least) initial term for Court of Appeals and Court of Special Appeals. Yes/no retention election. 10 year subsequent term.

New Jersey: 7 year initial term. Governor renominates. Senate reconfirms. Service until 70 for subsequent term.

New York (Court of Appeals, state’s court of last resort): 14 year term for Court of Appeals. Commission on Judicial Nomination resubmits names along incumbent’s to Governor. Governor renominates incumbent or nominates new person. Senate confirms or reconfirms.

NOTE: the state’s primary intermediate appellate court, the Appellate Division, has no role for the legislature in terms of reconfirmation. The Governor elevates and may reappoint to the Appellate Division from the judges elected locally in partisan elections to the general jurisdiction court (confusingly called the “Supreme Court”). For example, when his 14 year term in the trial court ended in 2011, the Hon. Henry J. Scudder had to run for re-election and then be reappointed back to the Appellate Division, Fourth Department (see story here).

Rhode Island: N/A (Serve for life)

South Carolina: 10 year term for the Supreme Court, 6 year term for the Court of Appeals. Judicial Merit Selection Commission evaluates incumbent judge and all others seeking position. Commission sends names to Legislature. Legislature jointly reappoints or appoints someone else. (See Title 2, Chapter 19 S.C. Code)

Virginia: 12 year term for the Supreme Court, 6 year term for the Court of Appeals. Legislature jointly reappoints or appoints someone else.

Utah: 3 year (at least) initial term. Yes/no retention election. 10 year subsequent term for Supreme Court, 6 year subsequent term for Court of Appeals.

But the question arises: why Senate confirmation? There’s the case for reference to the U.S. Senate and its role in federal judicial confirmations. And this was consistent when a) state senators were elected by counties to represent the county as a whole (as in New Jersey) or clusters of counties (as in New York) and b) trial judges (and occasionally appellate judges) were picked by districts made up of clusters of counties.

Thanks to one person/one vote decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court over the years, the practice of Senate districts following county lines is over. The practice of appellate judges being chosen based on geography is also on the decline with only 10 states continuing to use the practice for courts of last resort and 17 of 40 states with intermediate appellate courts using district based selection (although Montana may buck the trend in 2012, Oregon voters rejected the idea 2-1 in 2006).

Moreover, as I noted in March, such proposals have fared much better in state senates than in state houses, and history bears this out. In short, when the power to confirm has been handed solely to the state senate, it has had mixed support in the state’s house. The only way it happens, normally, is when there is a litany of other issues in play.

When does Senate confirmation of appellate nominees come into a constitution?

• Conventions changing entire constitution: Delaware, Hawaii, and New Jersey
• Constitutional amendment changing most/entire Judiciary Article: Maryland (1970 attempt) and Utah
• Constitutional amendment changing judicial selection only: Maryland (1976), New York
• Constitutional amendment changing most/entire Executive Branch Article: Maine, Vermont

In the case of Maryland (1976) and New York (1977) the amendments to have Senate confirmation met with lower House approval as part of a package of bills related to the courts.

• Maryland’s 1976 attempt for merit-selection-with-Senate-confirmation was part of a package of bills that included constitutional amendments guaranteeing every county would have at least 1 circuit judge (House Bill 1048), giving District Court juvenile jurisdiction (SB 219), and giving the state’s Chief Judge the power to recall retired judges back into service (SB 817). Voters approved 16 different items on the ballot that year.
• Similarly, New York’s 1977 shift to end elections and have merit-selection-with-Senate-confirmation was one of four judiciary-related constitutional amendments, including a revamp of the state’s entire judicial governance structure and the creation of a commission on judicial conduct. The fourth item, changes to the jurisdiction of town, village and (most) city courts, was rejected.

This institutional inertia may explain some 2011 activity. Consider the following:

• The original Florida House proposal HJR 7111, introduced March 22, 2011 included nothing about Senate confirmation of justices of the planned modified supreme court with civil and criminal panels. The only mention of the Senate was a provision stripping the power of the court(s) to name their chief justice and giving it to the Governor with Senate confirmation. Six days later, SJR 1664 requiring Senate confirmation for the Supreme Court was passed by the Senate Judiciary Committee. On April 5, the Senate Governmental Oversight and Accountability Committee gave its approval of SJR 1664. By April 8, SCR 1046) and Oklahoma Senate (SB 621) did not fare as well. The Arizona bill went nowhere. The Oklahoma bill moved through the Senate and was not even brought up for a House committee hearing.

Roles of legislatures in appellate judicial selection

Both chambers

Connecticut: since the 1818 Constitution. An 1880 amendment (Article XXVI) allowed for the Governor to nominate, but still required confirmation by both chambers. A 1986 amendment added merit selection, permitting the Governor to nominate only from those names submitted by the Judicial Selection Commission.

Rhode Island: since the 1842 Constitution and kept as part of the 1986 constitution. A 1994 amendment added merit selection, permitting the Governor to nominate only from those names submitted by an independent non-partisan judicial nominating commission.

South Carolina: since the 1776 Constitution and kept as a part of the 1778, 1790, 1861, 1865 and 1868 constitutions, plus a 1973 revision to the judiciary article. A 1997 constitutional amendment added merit selection allowing the legislature to elect only from those names submitted by the Judicial Merit Selection Commission.

Virginia: since the 1776 Constitution and kept as part of the 1850, 1861, 1864, 1870, and 1902 constitutions.

Senate only

Delaware: since the 1897 Constitution. The 1776 Constitution specified a joint ballot of both chambers of the general assembly and the “president” (i.e. governor) of the state. The 1792 and 1831 Constitutions placed the power of appointment solely in the hands of the Governor.

Hawaii: since the 1949 Constitution.

Maryland: since a 1976 constitutional amendment. The 1776 Constitution gave appointment to the Governor with the Council “for the time being” and put it solely in the hands of the Governor via an 1837 amendment. Maryland’s 1864 Constitution provided for direct election of the judges of the top court (Court of Appeals), but provided the Governor with Senate confirmation would select the chief judge. The 1867 Constitution made 7 of the 8 chief judges of the state’s judicial circuits the state’s top court and provided the Governor with the confirmation of the Senate would select the chief judge of the Court of Appeals. This practice continued until a 1943 constitutional amendment separated the roles of chief circuit judge from judge of the Court of Appeals but still required direct election. A 1960 amendment reaffirmed direct election, while changing the geographic boundaries.

It should be noted that the Maryland proposal was initially rejected in 1970 (1970 version) and included most courts in the state (judges of the Court of Appeals, intermediate courts of appeal, Circuit Courts, and the Supreme Bench of Baltimore City), increased terms of office to 15 years, and made revisions to the power of the Commission on Judicial Disabilities which had just been created in 1966. The successful 1976 version focused exclusively on merit selection with Senate confirmation for appellate courts only.

New Jersey: since the 1844 Constitution. The 1776 Constitution made the Governor and Council the state’s top court (Court of Appeals). The current 1947 Constitution replicated the Governor-appoints-Senate confirms system of the 1844 Constitution, but with a significant change. Rather than being re-confirmed every 7 years, the justices would face only 2 Senate confirmations: one for their initial appointment and a second after 7 years. If reconfirmed a second time, they would remain in office until age 70.

New York Court of Appeals (state’s court of last resort): sporadically since the 1777 Constitution. Under the 1777 Constitution, a Council on Appointments made up of 4 Senators chosen by the Assembly, plus the Governor (to break ties) was used. The 1821 Constitution changed this to a Governor-appoints-Senate-confirms system. The 1846 Constitution created a bifurcated election system: 4 of the 8 judges would be elected by the statewide, the other 4 would be locally elected judges of the general jurisdiction court (confusingly called the “supreme court”) “having the shortest time to serve.” A new constitution was voted on, section by section, in 1869; the judicial article was the only one approved. That new article provided for statewide election. The 1894 Constitution and 1938 Constitution continued the statewide election system. A 1977 amendment that revamped much of the Judiciary Article created the present merit-selection-Senate-confirmation system.

10/24/11 update: Selection to the state’s primary intermediate appellate court, the Appellate Division, has no role for the legislature. The Governor alone elevates from the judges elected locally in partisan elections to the general jurisdiction court (confusingly called the “Supreme Court”).

Utah: since a 1984 constitutional amendment. The original 1895 constitution provided for statewide election. The 1984 amendment overhauling the entire Judiciary Article provided for the present merit-selection-Senate-confirmation system. A subsequent 1992 amendment increased the time for the Senate to consider nominations.

Vermont: since a 1971 constitutional amendment. The 1793 Constitution provide for joint election by the unicameral House and Executive Council, a practice that was continued when the Council was made the Senate via a 1836 amendment. An 1890 effort to shift this to the Senate alone was rejected by the Senate itself but was incorporated into the 1971 revision of the state’s entire Judiciary Article.

Hybrid

Maine: since a 1975 constitutional amendment (L.D. 25). The 1820 Constitution in place when Maine was separated from Massachusetts and became a state kept the Massachusetts practice of supreme court selection method of governor-appoints-and-executive-council-confirms. The 1975 amendment abolishing the Council created the current procedure for confirmation: the Governor nominates and a Joint House/Senate legislative committee recommends confirmation or rejection. That recommendation is binding unless the Senate overrides with 2/3 vote.

HB 298 Exempts court interpreters who appear at the request of the circuit court, family court, or district court from parking violations for expired meters.

HB 301 Directs into the judiciary computer system special fund fees collected for electronic document certification, electronic copies of documents, and for providing bulk access to electronic court records and compilations of data.

HB 575 Extends the five per cent legislative salary decrease from June 30, 2011, to June 30, 2013. Applies the five per cent salary reduction to executive and judicial branch positions

HB 1038 Amends retirement benefits for judges and other state/county employees who become members of the employees’ retirement system after June 30, 2012.

HB 1333 Increases small claims jurisdiction from $3,500 to $5,000.

HR 171 Urges Judiciary expedite selection for Kona judiciary complex and consider La’i’Opua as a potential site.

HR 174 Requests Supreme Court study implementation of Hawaii Uniform Collaborative Law Act.

SB 1073 Increases the amount of surcharges for indigent legal fees. Requires biennial review and report by fund administrator.

Arizona HB 2377 Continues the State Capital Postconviction Public Defender Office until July 1, 2016.

California AB 118 Defines public safety programs, including public defenders, as local responsibilities. Creates Local Revenue Fund 2011 with District Attorney and Public Defender Account.

Hawaii SB 1073 Increases the amount of the indigent legal services fee surcharge on court filing fees in civil actions. January  2012: trial level – $10 to $35; appellate courts – $25 to $50.  January 2014: trial level – $35 to $50; appellate courts – $50 to $65. Requires Hawaii Justice Foundation to review, on a biennial basis, whether the Indigent Legal Assistance Fund is meeting the civil legal needs of indigent persons, and report its findings.

Idaho SB 1048 Allows governor to select anyone, subject to senate confirmation, to serve as State Appellate Public Defender (currently, may only chose from list submitted by panel consisting of bar president, chairs of Senate and House judiciary committees, appointee of governor and, ex-officio, the chief justice). (see also SB 1117)

Montana HB 96 Allows state public defender to recover costs in cases involving involuntary commitment of a developmentally disabled person when the respondent is determined to have the financial ability to pay for a public defender and a judge orders payment.

Montana HB 97 Transfers supervision of Office of Appellate Defender from Chief Public Defender to Public Defender Commission.

Montana SB 187 Provides if the defendant desires assigned counsel because of financial inability to retain private counsel and the offense charged is a misdemeanor and incarceration is a sentencing option if the defendant is convicted, during the initial appearance the court may order that incarceration not be exercised as a sentencing option if the defendant is convicted. Further provides if the court so orders, the court shall inform the defendant that the assistance of counsel at public expense through the office of state public defender is not available and that time will be given to consult with an attorney before a plea is entered. Further provides if incarceration is waived as a sentencing option, a public defender may not be assigned.” Increases amount of fee to be paid by defendant for representation to various amounts depending on case outcome and severity of crime. Provides, during application and at other points in time, court advise defendant is subject to criminal charges for any false statement made regarding their finances, ability to pay, etc. on the financial statement. Requiring defendant sign affidavit and specifies affidavit must include statement regarding perjury and possible criminal prosecution for false statements regarding finances. Adds as a purpose of state public defender commission “ensure that clients of the statewide public defender system pay reasonable costs for services provided by the system based on the clients’ financial ability to pay”. Requires commission establish and oversee a conflicts office with a conflicts manager responsible for conflicts of interest and for ensuring that cases involving a conflict of interest are handled according to professional ethical standards. Provides new staff positions for the public defender commission may be added only when the public defender account received sufficient revenue pursuant maintain a balance in the account that would sustain any staff position approved by the commission for at least 1 year. Ends requirement that chief public defender serve as secretary to commission. Provides neither the chief public defender nor the chief contract manager may not maintain a client caseload. Requires commission limit number of contract attorneys so they may be meaningfully evaluated and requires commission establish biennial reviews.  Provides contract attorneys may not take any money or benefit from an appointed client or from anyone for the benefit of the appointed client.

Nevada AB 259 Authorizes certain fees to be charged and collected in civil actions be used to support legal services for the indigent in counties whose population is less than 100,000.  Provides in counties over 100,000, $10 of certain fees related to transfer of cases between courts, must be submitted to a program for legal services for the operation of programs for the indigent. Provides $5 collected at the time of recording a notice of default and election to sell must be submitted to a program for legal services for the operation of programs for the indigent.

Oregon HB 2710 Establishes Legal Aid Account in General Fund and directs state court administrator as to funding and distribution of account funds.

Utah HB 272 Requires the court, when making a determination of indigency for a defendant. consider the reasonableness of the fees and expenses charge by privately retained defense counsel.

Approved by one chamber

California AB 259 Allows the appointment to the office of public defender 1) a sitting or retired judge, and as a judge meets specified qualifications, or 2) a judicial commissioner, magistrate, or referee, or elected public official meeting specified qualifications.

Idaho HB 300 Establishes an Access to Justice Fund in the state treasury to assist Idaho Legal Aid Services in providing free legal representation for indigent persons in civil matters and to meet the costs of maintaining the operation of ILAS.  Provides for $10 fee on most civil cases filed in state to pay for Fund.

Nevada SB 26 Provides standards for determining whether the parent or guardian of a child for whom the juvenile court has appointed an attorney is  required to pay for such legal representation or reimburse the county or State for such legal representation.

Died in committee

Arizona HB 2375 Makes an assault on a public defender an aggravated assault.

Hawaii HB 1381 Increases the surcharges on court filing fees in civil actions used to fund indigent legal services : trial level – $10 to $35; appellate courts- $25 to $65.

Montana SB 147 Allows public defender access to jailed persons prior to court appointment.

Nevada AB 49 Establishes the Fund for Legal Defense of Indigent Persons and authorizes certain counties to apply to the Board of Trustees of the Fund for reimbursement of certain extraordinary costs of providing public defender services. Provides for additional administrative assessments or increase is existing assessments for guilty pleas in misdemeanors and in other instances to pay for Fund. Imposes additional sales and use tax and authorizes county commissioners to impose an additional sales and use tax for legal services to indigent persons.

Nevada AB 520 Requires all the compensation and expenses of a court-appointed attorney to be paid from the treasury of the county in which a court appointed the attorney.

Nevada SB 123 Moves Office of State Public Defender  from Department of Health and Human Services to the Office of the Governor.

New Mexico SB 106 Removes Public Defender Department as administratively attached to the Department of Corrections, making it a “stand alone” “adjunct” agency.

Law

Arizona HB 2355 Redefines various “assessments” with respect to bail as “surcharges”.

Arizona SB 1023 Authorizes adult probation officers, in counties with more than two million, to serve warrants and make arrests on anyone who has violated a condition of pretrial release while under the supervision of the pretrial services division.

California SB 291 Provides that after a person has been brought back to the state by extradition proceedings, the person shall be committed to a county jail with bail set in the amount of $100,000 in addition to the amount of bail appearing on the underlying arrest warrant. Specifies a 48-hour noticed bail hearing, excluding weekends and holidays, is required to deviate from this prescribed bail amount. Clarifies that nothing in this law is intended to preclude the existing ex parte process for raising bail through an affidavit of a law enforcement officer in a felony or specified misdemeanor domestic violence case, as specified.

Colorado HB 1189 Provides if a person is arrested for driving under the influence or driving while ability impaired and has been convicted of either offense at least
twice previously, the bill requires the court to impose participation in a substance abuse treatment program, electronic monitoring, drug or alcohol testing, and use of an interlock device (if appropriate) as bail conditions.

Wyoming SB 17 Provides that “conditional release” does not include release on bail; probation and parole agents will not supervise individuals on bail.

Introduced with committee and/or floor approval

Alaska HB 175 Makes corrections in the law to conform to the changes in the bail statutes adopted in 2010. Makes conforming amendments to statutes that are in conflict with the bail schedules in the court rules and directly and indirectly amends various rules of court, including the Alaska Rules of Criminal Procedure and Alaska Rules of Administration.

Arizona SB 1611 Prohibits a person from being admitted to bail if the proof is evident or the presumption great that the person is guilty of a class 5 or 6 felony if there is probable cause to believe that the person has entered or remained in the U.S. illegally.

California AB 178 Requires any person released from county jail before sentencing due to a court order or policy to relieve overcrowding to sign a release agreement, as specified; apply the same penalties to a person released under court order or policy to relieve overcrowding and who fails to appear as would apply to a person released on their “own recognizance”; and apply the same penalty enhancement to a person released due to a court order or policy to relieve overcrowding who commits a new felony offense while on release as would apply to a person who commits such an offense while on an “own recognizance” release.

Colorado HB 1088 Provides a law enforcement agency holding a defendant for a felony or class 1 or 2 misdemeanor whom the law enforcement agency has reasonable grounds to believe is present in the country illegally must notify the district attorney and any pretrial services agency of the defendant’s presumed immigration status. Requires a court, when considering the amount of bond to set, consider whether there are reasonable grounds to believe the defendant is present in the country illegally.

Colorado SB 186 Permits an alternative bond program to be established in any judicial district. Allows courts to provide the option of the alternative bond program to a defendant if there is such a program in that judicial district. Provides a law enforcement agency may work with an alternative bond program to secure the appearance of defendants in the program. Provides a pretrial services program with an alternative bond program is permitted to expend a portion of the moneys collected for pretrial services.

Hawaii HCR 140 Urges criminal justice system provide additional rights to victims, including right to be notified and heard regarding pretrial release/bail.

Hawaii HR 122 Urges criminal justice system provide additional rights to victims, including right to be notified and heard regarding pretrial release/bail.

New Mexico HJR 20 (Constitutional Amendment) Eliminates right to bail under state’s constitution. Provides bail may be granted or denied by a court based on the flight risk of the defendant, the nature and seriousness of the offense, the danger that would be posed to any person or the community by the defendant’s release, and other factors as provided by law. Eliminates the presumption of no bail in capital cases. Eliminates prohibitions against excessive bail, excessive fines, and cruel and unusual punishment. Eliminates requirement that courts give preference to an appeal from an order denying bail over all other matters.

Washington HB 1194 Provides when a person is arrested and detained for a class A or B felony, a judicial officer must make a bail determination on an individualized basis. Requires courts notify sureties of a defendant’s failure to appear within 14 calendar days of the date on which the defendant failed to appear, rather than 30 days. Provides a surety may surrender a client in a criminal case for good cause and if accompanied by a notice of forfeiture or a notarized affidavit specifying the reasons for surrender. Provides if the court finds that good cause does not exist for the surrender, the surety must return the premium paid as well as any recovery fee. Specifies good cause does not include circumstances in which the client failed to make timely payment to the surety for the bond premium. Requires presiding judge of a court notify the Administrative Office of the Courts (AOC) when the court revokes the justification or certification of a bail bond agent to post bonds in the court. Requires AOC notify superior courts and courts of limited jurisdiction statewide or revocation.

Washington SB 5056 Subject to the availability of funds, requires Administrator for the Courts provide superior courts and courts of limited jurisdiction access to the risk assessment tool developed by the Washington State Institute for Public Policy (WSIPP). Subject to the availability of funds, requires Washington State Center for Court Research (WSCCR) research, evaluate, monitor, and report on the validity of the risk assessment tool to ensure the predictive value of the tool. Requires every two years WSCCR submit a report and recommendations regarding the validity of the risk assessment tool to the Governor, the Supreme Court, and the Legislature. Provides a court may, in its consideration of pretrial release or detention, issue an order requesting information related to mental health services that a defendant has received. Limits information that may be requested to information related to violent acts. Provides court may delay the setting of bail pending receipt of the information, not to exceed 48 hours. Subject to the availability of funds, requires WSIPP develop and validate a pretrial risk assessment tool to assess whether an individual is likely to fail to appear at subsequent court hearings by December 1, 2011. Requires WSIPP submit a report, describing the methodology for developing and validating the pretrial risk assessment tool and the predictive value of the tool, to the Governor, the Supreme Court, and the Legislature by December 1, 2011. Provides presiding judge of a court must notify AOC when the court revokes the justification or certification of a bail bond agent to post bonds in the court. This notice must include the reasons for revocation. Provides once AOC receives the information it must notify superior courts and courts of limited jurisdiction statewide. Requires AOC develop a model form that law enforcement and jails may use to collect information about persons arrested or held in custody so that courts have more information at the bail hearing, including any history of domestic violence, protection orders known to law enforcement or the facility holding the person, and input from individuals reasonably believed to be a victim of the person in custody regarding pretrial release determinations.

Introduced with committee rejection

n/a

Introduced with other or no activity

California AB 1264 Repeals the uniform countywide schedule of bail. Establishes Statewide Bail Commission to prepare, adopt, and annually revise a statewide bail schedule for all bailable felony offenses and for all misdemeanor and infraction offenses except Vehicle Code infractions.

Hawaii HB 401 Creates task force to reduce contact with the criminal justice system to examine various issues, including increasing options for cost-effective pretrial release, with consideration given to enrollment and participation in an appropriate social services or treatment program.

Idaho SB 1119 Requires bail agents to collect all of the premium on the surety bail bonds they write at the time the defendant is released from custody.

Nevada SB 217 Requires each pretrial release agency prepare a register to be made available to the public that contains certain information regarding the cases and defendants who are recommended for release by the pretrial release agency and submit an annual report containing certain statistical information regarding the operations of the pretrial release agency during the preceding calendar year.

Hawaii HB 1038 Amends retirement benefits for judges and other state/county employees who become members of the employees’ retirement system after June 30, 2012. Modifies extent to which prior service as a judge may be applied to other retirement system(s) and calculation of years of service for retirement purposes.

Hawaii HB 1142 Amends retirement benefits for judges and other state/county employees who become members of the employees’ retirement system after June 30, 2012. Modifies extent to which prior service as a judge may be applied to other retirement system(s) and calculation of years of service for retirement purposes.

Hawaii SB 1265 Amends retirement benefits for judges and other state/county employees who become members of the employees’ retirement system after June 30, 2012. Modifies extent to which prior service as a judge may be applied to other retirement system(s) and calculation of years of service for retirement purposes.

Hawaii SB 1341 Amends retirement benefits for judges and other state/county employees who become members of the employees’ retirement system after June 30, 2012. Modifies extent to which prior service as a judge may be applied to other retirement system(s) and calculation of years of service for retirement purposes.

Michigan HB 4223 Requires Judges Retirement System invest at least 5% in Michigan businesses.

Michigan  HB 4484 Eliminates tax exemption for judicial pensions. Provides that distributions from employer contributions, earnings on those contributions, and distributions from employee contributions and earnings on those employee contributions would be subject to state tax, as of January 1, 2012. (Currently, they are exempt from state, county, municipal, or other local taxes.) Requires an employer to contribute four percent of salary to a participant’s Tier 2 (defined contribution system) account. Allows an employee to contribute up to three percent of salary to the account and requires the employer to match the amount contributed by the employee.

Minnesota HB 1256 & SB 813 Changes member contribution rates for judicial retirement system: 8% (present – July 2011), 11% (July 2011 onward). Changes employer contribution rates for judicial retirement system: 20.5% (present – July 2011), 17.5% (July 2011 onward).

Montana HB 70 Requires separate investment fund must be maintained for judges’ retirement system apart from any other retirement system.

Montana HB 608 Closes judicial and all other retirement systems and provide for annuity benefit program for judges elected after July 2012.

Nevada SB 436 Transfers the responsibility to deposit certain money for the purpose of paying pension benefits to justices of the Supreme Court or district judges from the State of Nevada to the Court Administrator.

New Mexico HB 58 ORIGINAL: Provides that certain amounts of the civil docket and jury fees be deposited into the General Fund. Provides contributions to judicial and magistrate retirement be provided from the General Fund. Increases contributions to judicial and magistrate retirement funds. AMENDED: Same, but strikes existing law that defines “judicial retirement fund” as including” docket and jury fees of metropolitan courts, district courts, the court of appeals and the supreme court.”

New Mexico HB 468 Makes numerous temporary and permanent changes to employee and employer contribution rates for those under Judicial Retirement Act and Magistrate Retirement Act plans.

New Mexico HB 628 Makes numerous temporary and permanent changes to employee and employer contribution rates for those under Judicial Retirement Act and Magistrate Retirement Act plans.

New Mexico SB 88 Makes numerous temporary and permanent changes to employee and employer contribution rates for those under Judicial Retirement Act and Magistrate Retirement Act plans.

New Mexico SB 248 Makes numerous temporary and permanent changes to employee and employer contribution rates for those under Judicial Retirement Act and Magistrate Retirement Act plans.

New Mexico SB 268 Makes numerous temporary and permanent changes to employee and employer contribution rates for those under Judicial Retirement Act and Magistrate Retirement Act pla

This special edition of Gavel to Gavel looks at just some of the ways state legislatures have proposed funding courts in the last several years.

The regular, weekly edition of Gavel to Gavel will appear Thursday.