SB 1310 would have increased the small claims of justice of the peace courts from $2,500 to $10,000. It was amended down to $5,000 on the Senate floor. The bill’s author noted in committee the history of the proposal: a constituent had sued in small claims court and when the defendant company appeared it did so both with an attorney and a counter-claim large enough to force it into the regular justice of the peace court, requiring that the constituent hire an attorney.

Governor Jan Brewer issued her veto on April 4. In her veto letter, Governor Brewer noted the case, but also noted “Arizona Revised Statute 22-504 allows either party to object to a small claims proceeding and transfer the case to justice court to preserve the right to appeal and there is no monetary threshold a party must meet  to transfer the case. This legislation does not solve the stated concern and is contrary to the purpose of the small claims division.”

The bill is now back in the Senate, but it is unclear if there are the votes for an override. The Senate passed the bill 20-10, just barely the 2/3rds (20 out of 30 senators) needed to override. The House passed it 34-22 (4 not voting), less than the 40 (out of 60) needed for an override there.

Over the next two days I’m going to look at both aspects of merit selection. Today I’ll be examining 2012 efforts to modify or end existing merit selection systems as created by constitutional provision or statute. Several states use “merit selection” entirely as the result of governors’ creating nomination panels; because these don’t involve the legislature I will not focus on them. All information as to which states have what is from the American Judicature Society’s 2011 report “Judicial Merit Selection: Current Status” located here.

Tomorrow (April 11) I will examine efforts to implement statutory and/or constitutional merit selection systems in states that do not currently have them.

Alabama – Circuit Court in select counties [interim only]: No activity

Alaska – Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, Superior Court: No activity

Arizona – Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, Superior Court in larger counties: A 2011 bill (SCR 1001) revising numerous provisions of the merit selection system (commission composition, number of names submitted, etc.) plus increasing judicial terms will be on the 2012 ballot. A 2012 effort to simply end the merit selection system and replace with partisan elections (SCR 1034 / SB 1371) was rejected in committee.

Colorado – Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, District Court: No activity

Connecticut – Supreme Court, Appellate Court, Superior Court: No activity

Florida – Supreme Court, District Court of Appeal; Circuit [interim only]: A 2011 bill (HJR 7111) requiring Supreme Court nominees chosen by the governor be subject to Senate confirmation will be on the 2012 ballot. Several attempts to change the composition of the nominating commissions and allowing a governor to fire a majority of the commissioners at will (vs. staggered terms) failed at the last minute (HB 971 / SB 1570).

Hawaii – Supreme Court, Intermediate Appellate Court of Appeals, Circuit Court, District Court: Constitutional amendments HB 2343 and SB 2209 would require judicial selection commissions to provide more public disclosure of their proceedings, specifically information about those whose names are considered to fill vacancies. The Senate version appears now to be the primary bill, having been approved by the full Senate and the House Judiciary Committee. Another constitutional amendment, SB 2205, would lower the number of names submitted to fill vacancies: for Supreme, Intermediate Appellate & Circuit: from 4-6 to specifically 3. For District: from not less than 6 to specifically 3.

Idaho – Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, District Court [interim only]: No activity

Indiana – Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, Tax Court, Superior and other trial courts in select counties: Proposals to substantially revised (SJR 13) or simply end (SJR 14) merit selection failed to advance.

Iowa – Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, District Court: Several bills introduced in 2011 to either alter or end merit selection were carried over into the 2012 session (see database for full list). None advanced.

Kansas – Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, District Court at district’s discretion : The prime focus was in ending merit selection for the Court of Appeals; because it is a statutorily created court the change would only require a change in statute rather than a constitutional amendment. While meeting with House approval in 2011 (HB 2101) the Senate failed to take up the bill. Undaunted, the House began attaching it to unrelated pieces of legislation (SB 83) and seeking to end the commission on judicial performance which makes recommendations for or against retention of judges (HB 2396).

Kentucky – Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, Circuit Court; District Court [interim only]: No activity

Maine – Supreme Judicial Court and Superior Court: No activity

Minnesota – District Court [interim only]: No activity

Missouri – Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, Circuit Courts in select counties: The state synonymous with merit selection saw efforts to outright end merit selection fail to advance (HJR 77, SJR 41, SJR 42). Efforts to modify the system were and are active. SJR 51 would allow the governor to appoint all nominating commission members subject to senate confirmation and a prohibition of members of the bar, judiciary, or their spouses from serving. HJR 44 increases the names given to the governor to chose from 3 to 5 and allows the governor to reject the first 5 person panel, ask for a second, and then select from the 10. It also alters the composition of the nominating commissions and, like the Florida provisions attempted to do, allows the governor to fire commissioners appointed by prior governors. HJR 44 was approved by the House Special Standing Committee on Judicial Reform 3/21/12 and is currently in the House Rules Committee.

Montana – Supreme Court and District Court [interim only]-: Legislature not in session.

Nebraska – Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, District Court, County Court: No activity

Nevada – Supreme Court and District Court [interim only]: Legislature not in session.

New Mexico – Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, District Court, Metropolitan Court: SB 24, which was approved by the Senate but not the House, would have created a special fund to help pay for the judicial nominating commissions associated with the state’s merit selection system. Funds were to have come from gifts, donations, etc. plus $50,000 a year from the legislature itself as an automatic, recurring appropriation.

New York – Court of Appeals (court of last resort in state): A single bill introduced in 2011 (AB 309) would have required the nominating commission submit all qualified names to governor. It has failed to advance.

North Dakota – Supreme Court and District Court: Legislature out of session

Oklahoma – Supreme Court, Court of Criminal Appeals, Court of Civil Appeals, District Court [interim only]: 2011 carry over bills SJR 36 would have ended merit selection for the appellate courts, allowing the governor to appoint anyone qualified subject to senate confirmation while SB 621 would have required nominees chosen via the state’s merit selection system be subject to senate confirmation. Neither have advanced in 2012. Other carry over bills from 2011 to end merit (HJR 1008 & HJR 1009 for appellate courts; SB 543 to fill interim vacancies in District Courts) went nowhere.

Rhode Island – Supreme Court, Superior Court, Family Court, District Court : No activity Update 4/11/12: HB 8043 filed just days ago extends until 2013 an existing law allowing any individual whose name was publicly submitted to the governor by the judicial nominating commission to be eligible for subsequent nomination by the governor.

South Dakota – Supreme Court, Circuit Court [Interim only]: No activity

Tennessee – Supreme Court, Court of Criminal Appeals, Court of Appeals, Trial Courts [interim only]: Tennessee has seen literally dozens of bills introduced in 2011 and carried over, plus new bills in 2012, dealing with the state’s merit selection system which is due to “sunset” and expire soon.

Put merit selection explicitly in constitution:

HJR 753 Adds legislative confirmation of nominees

HJR 830

SJR 183

SJR 710 Adds legislative confirmation of nominees

Extend merit to June 30, 2013:

HB 3575 / SB 3321

HB 2356 / SB 2346

HB 2537 / SB 2345

Extend merit to June 30, 2014:

HB 3451 (nominating commission only)

End merit:

HB 173 / SB 127

HB 231 / SB 281

HB 958 / SB 699

HB 3615 / SB 3714

SJR 475

SJR 635

Modify:

HB 1017 / SB 82 Retains merit selection, but makes judicial nomination commission recommendations advisory; allows governor to ignore recommendations.

HB 1702 / SB 646 Requires judges selected via merit selection system receive 75% yes in retention election.

HB 3452 / SB 2794 Retains merit selection, but alters nomination process and adds confirmation.

HB 3691 / SB 3652 Requires House and Senate speakers appoint all nine members of the judicial evaluation commission since the judicial council no longer exists.

Utah – Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, District Court, Juvenile Court: No activity

Vermont – Supreme Court, Superior Court, District Court: No activity

West Virginia – Supreme Court of Appeals, Circuit Court, Family Court [interim only]: No activity

Wyoming – Supreme Court, District Court, Circuit Court: No activity

The same senator has now introduced SB 1372 which would effectively remove 2/3 of the judges from the state’s Court of Appeals.

Under existing law, the Court of Appeals is made up of 2 divisions. Division 1 has a Chief judge + 15 judges (sitting in panels of 5 labeled A, B, C, D, and E. Division 2 has 6 judges with panels A & B. The two Divisions combine for a total of 22 judges.

Under SB 1372 Division 1 would shrink from 16 to 3 while Division 2 would go from 6 to 3. The reduction from 22 down to 6 would also cut funding for the court. Under current law the Court of Appeals retains 8.36% of all of the monies it collects monthly as fees and costs associated with appeals. SB 1372 would reduce that to 1% and transfer the other 7.36% to the state general fund.

The bill is currently pending in the Senate Judiciary Committee.

SCR 1001 of 2011 was approved in April, before the state’s Supreme Court overturned an effort by the state’s governor and senate to remove from office the chair of the state’s redistricting commission.

Early indications are that SCR 1001 may now be taken off the ballot and replaced with something different. Already introduced by the chair of the Senate Appropriations Committee is SCR 1034 of 2012, a constitutional amendment to outright end merit selection in the state. In addition to ending the state’s merit selection system, it would also undo the provisions of SCR 1001 extending judicial terms and mandatory retirement ages.

The amendment is currently pending in the Senate Judiciary Committee.

Welcome Post-Gazette readers!

Since the last update of this list in October, one piece of legislation has been introduced.  Pennsylvania’s HB 2029 bans court references to any “foreign legal code or system” if doing so would impair constitutional rights.

Full roster of 2010 bills are available. 2011 and 2012 bills after the jump.

2012

2011

Courts of Conciliation

Ohio Constitution (1851) Article 6, Section 19

The General Assembly may establish courts of conciliation, and prescribe their powers and duties; but such courts shall not render final judgment in any case, except upon submission, by the parties, of the matter in dispute, and their agreement to abide such judgment.

New York Constitution (1846) Article 6, Section 23

Tribunals of conciliation may be established, with such powers and duties as may be prescribed by law; but such tribunals shall have no power to render judgment to be obligatory on the parties, except they voluntarily submit their matters in difference, and agree to abide the judgment, or assent thereto, in the presence of such tribunal, in such cases as shall be prescribed by law.

Provisions for tribunals of conciliation or courts of conciliation can be found in the 1800s constitutions of not only Ohio (1851), but Wisconsin (1848), California (1849), Michigan (1850), Indiana (1851), and North Dakota (1889). They are all taken, almost verbatim, from the 1846 New York Constitution, which for its time was considered revolutionary in terms of judicial proceedings (and also was the genesis for the appellate commissions discussed below).

Courts of conciliation were akin to small claims courts (Minnesota’s small claims courts are still called “conciliation courts”) and arbitration or mediation (statutes in Arizona, California, Montana, and Nebraska reference conciliation courts that focus to amicably resolve martial and domestic relations issues). The report of the debates of the 1851 Ohio Constitutional convention note the intent behind these courts:

This plan of a court of conciliation has many advocates, who desire to see it established. It has been tried in other countries, with excellent effect—greatly diminish litigation and subduing a litigious spirit—a spirit which is the bane of a community. It sets neighbor against neighbor, brother against brother and even father against son, and son against father. Such litigation have I often witnessed, and in some cases seen it prosecuted with an embittered spirit, little short of devilish. Every means which promises only a mitigation if the evil should be employed. The expense and time wasted in such controversies, employing judges, jurors, witnesses, lawyers and suitors, is but a little of the mischief. The monstrous evil consists in the engendering and perpetuating of strife and contention among neighbors, begetting and nursing discord and hatred in families, and in disturbing the harmony and peace of society. A judicious peace loving and peace making officer of this kind may be more useful, far more useful than the first judge of your State, whom you propose to dignify with title of Chief Justice of Ohio.

It should be noted that despite the above ringing endorsement, the provision almost never happened. According to the reports of the debates at the 1851 Ohio Constitutional Convention, the vote to put in the provision was adopted 42-39.

All references to such courts can trace back (constitutionally speaking) to similar courts in Denmark and Norway, the “other countries” alluded to above. Although intended as separate and independent from regular courts, most courts of conciliation instead became divisions of existing courts. For example, a 1909 report indicates Cleveland’s Municipal Court had a Conciliation Division.

According to a history of the New York Constitution, the courts were seldom used because existing laws, with respect to arbitration, were already in place and accessible. In New York, it wasn’t until 1862 that an actual  tribunal of conciliation was set up in a judicial district. The statute authorizing the court was repealed 3 years later. As the Ohio Legislative Service Commission’s review of Measure 1 (then called HJR 1) indicates, Ohio too opted to put in mediation/conciliation practices rather than create free-standing courts.

Supreme Court Commissions

Ohio Constitution (1875) Article 6, Section 22

A commission, which shall consist of five members, shall be appointed by the governor, with the advice and consent of the senate, the members of which shall hold office for the term of three years from and after the first day of February, 1876, to dispose of such part of the business then on the dockets of the supreme court, as shall, by arrangement between said commission and said court, be transferred to such commission; and said commission shall have like jurisdiction and power in respect to such business as are or may be vested in said court; and the members of said commission shall receive a like compensation for the time being, with the judges of said court. A majority of the members of said commission shall be necessary to form a quorum or pronounce a decision, and its decision shall be certified, entered, and enforced as the judgments of the supreme court, and at the expiration of the term of said commission, all business undisposed of shall by it be certified to the supreme court and disposed of as if said commission had never existed. The clerk and reporter of said court shall be the clerk and reporter of said commission, and the commission shall have such other attendants not exceeding in number those provided by law for said court, which attendants said commission may appoint and remove at its pleasure. Any vacancy occurring in said commission, shall be filled by appointment of the governor, with the advice and consent of the senate, if the senate be in session, and if the senate be not in session, by the governor, but in such last case, such appointment shall expire at the end of the next session of the general assembly. The general assembly may, on application of the supreme court duly entered on the journal of the court and certified, provide by law, whenever two-thirds of such [each] house shall concur therein, from time to time, for the appointment, in like manner, of a like commission with like powers, jurisdiction and duties; provided, that the term of any such commission shall not exceed two years, nor shall it be created oftener than once in ten years.

New York Constitution (1869) Article 6, Section 4 & 5

Sec. 4 Upon the organization of the [new] Court of Appeals [New York's top court], under this article, the causes then pending in the present Court of Appeals shall become vested in the Court of Appeals hereby established. Such of said causes as are pending on the first day of January, eighteen hundred and sixty-nine, shall be heard and determined by a Commission, to be composed of five Commissioners of Appeals, four of whom shall be necessary to constitute a quorum; but the Court of Appeals hereby established may order any of said causes to be heard therein. Such Commission shall be composed of the Judges of the present Court of Appeals, elected or appointed thereto, and a fifth Commissioner who shall be appointed by the Governor, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate; or, if the Senate be not in session, by the Governor; but in such case, the appointment shall expire at the end of the next session.

Sec. 5 If any vacancy shall occur in the office of the said Commissioners, it shall be filled by appointment by the Governor by and with the advice and consent of the Senate; or if the Senate is not in session, by the Governor; but in such case, the appointment shall expire at the end of the next session. The Commissioners shall appoint, from their number, a Chief Commissioner; and may appoint and remove such attendants as may be necessary. The reporter of the Court of Appeals shall be the reporter of said Commission. The decisions of the Commission shall be certified to, and entered and enforced, as the judgments of the Court of Appeals. The Commission shall continue until the causes committed to it are determined, but not exceeding three years; and all causes then undetermined shall be heard by the Court of Appeals.

We take for granted the system in place in 40 states of an intermediate appellate court (usually called the Court of Appeals), however the creation of these courts met with fierce resistance both from voters and, on occasion, state supreme courts. Consider, for example, that Nevada voters have three times in the last three decades rejected the creation of such a court, most recently in 2010 (a fourth attempt may be made in 2014). When Colorado’s legislature made an attempt to create such a court in 1886, the state’s supreme court issued an advisory opinion that the proposed Court of Appeal was an unconstitutional infringement on the Supreme Court’s role as the supreme court of the state (the Supreme Court upheld a different version of the Court of Appeals in 1891).

Ohio and other large states like Texas tried to grapple with this problem through the use of appellate commissions. The appointment of special judicial officers to hear certain motions or matters was, and is, not uncommon. To this day subordinate judicial officers in California trial courts are called “commissioners“.

What made the New York, Ohio, and Texas provisions unique was that they provided for panels of commissioners to sit and render judgments. This avoided the exceptionally untenable situation of creating an intermediate appellate court or adding judges to existing courts which, as noted, had no real political support. The commission idea, however, got the votes in 1869 as part of a massive overhaul of New York’s judiciary article. The provisions appear to have been for the most part duplicated in Ohio (1875) and Texas (1879 by statute) a few years later.

Eventually these commissions fell out of favor for two reasons. First, states large and small simply needed dedicated, permanent intermediate appellate courts to handle the caseload. Second, there was a very real possibility that decisions of the commissions would be in conflict with the courts.

New York got such a dedicated court (the Appellate Divisions) in its 1894 constitution. Ohio got Circuit Courts of Appeals in 1851 consisting of 1 Supreme Court Justice riding circuit and sitting with the judges of the courts of common pleas, but it was not until an 1883 amendment that the Circuit Courts of Appeals consisted of judges specifically elected to serve in those courts. These eventually were made into the modern District Courts of Appeals.

What appellate commissioners remain today (such as in Oregon) are hearing officers who handle motion practice, not panels. Perhaps the only remaining vestiges of the old system are in Ohio’s constitution and North Dakota’s “Court of Appeals” which, despite the name, functions much the same as the commissions did, with panels coming into existence or only being used when the state’s top court is overwhelmed.

Four legislatures have adopted statutes to alter retirement (Indiana 2011; Kansas 2003 & 2010; North Carolina 1992; Vermont 2003). Moreover, Arizona has advanced a proposed change for the 2012 ballot while New York voters will probably address the issue in 2014. This marks a trend over the last several year in particular of state legislatures confronting judges living longer and the question of whether there should be any limits on service at all.

State by state breakdown below the fold.

Alabama

In the last decade, Alabama’s House and Senate have at various times both passed constitutional amendments for the elimination of mandatory judicial retirement and rejected them as well.

Arizona

All efforts since 1990 to change the state’s mandatory retirement age of 70 have focused on increasing it to 75. The first round of bills (2002-2004) met with some success in the House but not the Senate. A second round (2005-2006) included a Senate effort to increase for the state’s main trial court judges (Superior Court) only. The Senate approved, the House balked. The third and continuing round (2007-2011) tied the increase to 75 with changes to the state’s merit selection system. Such a connective bill was passed in 2011 and is set to be voted on in 2012. Under SCR1001 the mandatory retirement age would go to 75, but the composition of the state’s merit selection commissions would be altered.

Florida

As with Arizona, the Florida interest in changing the mandatory retirement age was connected to changes to judicial selection. Bills introduced in 1994 and 1996 would have raised the limit or allowed the legislature to do so at a later date. The constitutional amendment that appeared on the ballot excluded the reference to the mandatory retirement age.

Hawaii

In 2005, Hawaii was faced with a Republican Governor (something which had not happened since 1962), a very Democratic legislature, and several members of the state’s courts up against the mandatory retirement age of 70. The state’s senate proposed a standalone constitutional amendment eliminating the retirement age which went down to a nearly 2-1 defeat. A 2008/2009 effort to increase the age to 80 for justices and judges appointed after November 4, 2008 (i.e. after the Republican governor would be term limited out of office) died in a conference committee.

Indiana

Kansas

Kansas had been considering a change to its statutes regarding mandatory judicial retirement at 70 for several years before a 2002 Supreme Court order reset the dynamics. In March of that year, in response to legislative cuts to the courts, the Supreme Court entered an order for emergency surcharges on various court filings, fees, and fines. The language of a 2000 bill was then reintroduced in 2003 to increase the mandatory retirement age for judges, even the Court of Appeals, except the Supreme Court. That version was enacted. It was not until 2010 that the law was further amended to include the Supreme Court in the increase.

Louisiana

Louisiana has had two efforts to increase the retirement ages of its judges. The first was in the early 1990s and sought an increase from 70 to 75. It was put up on the ballot in 1995, along with 14 other items, as Amendment 4. It was one of only 2 proposals to lose. The loss can at least in part be attributed to bad timing; the same 1995 ballot included as Amendment 2 term limits for the legislature. It passed overwhelmingly 75%-25%, making the “mere” 62%-38% drubbing Amendment 4 took somewhat remarkable. Thereafter the issue lay dormant for almost a decade until 2003 when a change was proposed to allow judges to serve out the term in which they turned 70. Like its 1995 its counterpart it was one of 14 items on an October ballot. The 2003 effort, however, succeeded.

Michigan

Massachusetts

Minnesota

Missouri

Missouri is one of only a handful of states that have a different retirement age for trial and appellate judges. Moreover, municipal judges have a higher retirement age (75) than that of the judges of all the other courts (Circuit, Court of Appeals, and Supreme Court = 70).

North Carolina

New Jersey

New York

Ohio

Pennsylvania

Throughout the 1990s several attempts were made to extend judicial terms to the end of the calendar year a judge turned 70.The extension was added onto a bill related to reapportionment, but approved by the voters in a separate vote in May 2001 where it won on a 2-1 vote.

South Dakota

Texas

The 2007 Texas amendment noted below was the first effort in a decade to change the state’s judicial retirement. It was one of 16 ballot items voters cast ballots on in November 2007, all of which passed.

Virginia

For each of the past 5 years it appeared that Virginia General Assembly would raise the mandatory retirement age for judges and in each one of those years it failed, often at the last minute. Part of the challenge is the statutory placement of the law itself; Virginia Code 51.1-305(B1) not only sets 70 as the mandatory age for judges, but for members of the state Corporation Commission who are also members of the Judicial Retirement System. Trying to craft a bill that does, or does not, also change the retirement provisions for the members of the Commission has been a sticking point. The result has been numerous attempts, including three tie-vote-failures in committee.

Vermont

When originally proposed in the Vermont Senate, the bill to simply eliminate the retirement age. A committee amendment changed it to a range to be set by the legislature instead. The legislature would later opt for the high end, passing a statute in 2003 to set it as being the end of the calendar year the judge turns 90.

Washington

Wyoming

But the question arises: why Senate confirmation? There’s the case for reference to the U.S. Senate and its role in federal judicial confirmations. And this was consistent when a) state senators were elected by counties to represent the county as a whole (as in New Jersey) or clusters of counties (as in New York) and b) trial judges (and occasionally appellate judges) were picked by districts made up of clusters of counties.

Thanks to one person/one vote decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court over the years, the practice of Senate districts following county lines is over. The practice of appellate judges being chosen based on geography is also on the decline with only 10 states continuing to use the practice for courts of last resort and 17 of 40 states with intermediate appellate courts using district based selection (although Montana may buck the trend in 2012, Oregon voters rejected the idea 2-1 in 2006).

Moreover, as I noted in March, such proposals have fared much better in state senates than in state houses, and history bears this out. In short, when the power to confirm has been handed solely to the state senate, it has had mixed support in the state’s house. The only way it happens, normally, is when there is a litany of other issues in play.

When does Senate confirmation of appellate nominees come into a constitution?

• Conventions changing entire constitution: Delaware, Hawaii, and New Jersey
• Constitutional amendment changing most/entire Judiciary Article: Maryland (1970 attempt) and Utah
• Constitutional amendment changing judicial selection only: Maryland (1976), New York
• Constitutional amendment changing most/entire Executive Branch Article: Maine, Vermont

In the case of Maryland (1976) and New York (1977) the amendments to have Senate confirmation met with lower House approval as part of a package of bills related to the courts.

• Maryland’s 1976 attempt for merit-selection-with-Senate-confirmation was part of a package of bills that included constitutional amendments guaranteeing every county would have at least 1 circuit judge (House Bill 1048), giving District Court juvenile jurisdiction (SB 219), and giving the state’s Chief Judge the power to recall retired judges back into service (SB 817). Voters approved 16 different items on the ballot that year.
• Similarly, New York’s 1977 shift to end elections and have merit-selection-with-Senate-confirmation was one of four judiciary-related constitutional amendments, including a revamp of the state’s entire judicial governance structure and the creation of a commission on judicial conduct. The fourth item, changes to the jurisdiction of town, village and (most) city courts, was rejected.

This institutional inertia may explain some 2011 activity. Consider the following:

• The original Florida House proposal HJR 7111, introduced March 22, 2011 included nothing about Senate confirmation of justices of the planned modified supreme court with civil and criminal panels. The only mention of the Senate was a provision stripping the power of the court(s) to name their chief justice and giving it to the Governor with Senate confirmation. Six days later, SJR 1664 requiring Senate confirmation for the Supreme Court was passed by the Senate Judiciary Committee. On April 5, the Senate Governmental Oversight and Accountability Committee gave its approval of SJR 1664. By April 8, SCR 1046) and Oklahoma Senate (SB 621) did not fare as well. The Arizona bill went nowhere. The Oklahoma bill moved through the Senate and was not even brought up for a House committee hearing.

Roles of legislatures in appellate judicial selection

Both chambers

Connecticut: since the 1818 Constitution. An 1880 amendment (Article XXVI) allowed for the Governor to nominate, but still required confirmation by both chambers. A 1986 amendment added merit selection, permitting the Governor to nominate only from those names submitted by the Judicial Selection Commission.

Rhode Island: since the 1842 Constitution and kept as part of the 1986 constitution. A 1994 amendment added merit selection, permitting the Governor to nominate only from those names submitted by an independent non-partisan judicial nominating commission.

South Carolina: since the 1776 Constitution and kept as a part of the 1778, 1790, 1861, 1865 and 1868 constitutions, plus a 1973 revision to the judiciary article. A 1997 constitutional amendment added merit selection allowing the legislature to elect only from those names submitted by the Judicial Merit Selection Commission.

Virginia: since the 1776 Constitution and kept as part of the 1850, 1861, 1864, 1870, and 1902 constitutions.

Senate only

Delaware: since the 1897 Constitution. The 1776 Constitution specified a joint ballot of both chambers of the general assembly and the “president” (i.e. governor) of the state. The 1792 and 1831 Constitutions placed the power of appointment solely in the hands of the Governor.

Hawaii: since the 1949 Constitution.

Maryland: since a 1976 constitutional amendment. The 1776 Constitution gave appointment to the Governor with the Council “for the time being” and put it solely in the hands of the Governor via an 1837 amendment. Maryland’s 1864 Constitution provided for direct election of the judges of the top court (Court of Appeals), but provided the Governor with Senate confirmation would select the chief judge. The 1867 Constitution made 7 of the 8 chief judges of the state’s judicial circuits the state’s top court and provided the Governor with the confirmation of the Senate would select the chief judge of the Court of Appeals. This practice continued until a 1943 constitutional amendment separated the roles of chief circuit judge from judge of the Court of Appeals but still required direct election. A 1960 amendment reaffirmed direct election, while changing the geographic boundaries.

It should be noted that the Maryland proposal was initially rejected in 1970 (1970 version) and included most courts in the state (judges of the Court of Appeals, intermediate courts of appeal, Circuit Courts, and the Supreme Bench of Baltimore City), increased terms of office to 15 years, and made revisions to the power of the Commission on Judicial Disabilities which had just been created in 1966. The successful 1976 version focused exclusively on merit selection with Senate confirmation for appellate courts only.

New Jersey: since the 1844 Constitution. The 1776 Constitution made the Governor and Council the state’s top court (Court of Appeals). The current 1947 Constitution replicated the Governor-appoints-Senate confirms system of the 1844 Constitution, but with a significant change. Rather than being re-confirmed every 7 years, the justices would face only 2 Senate confirmations: one for their initial appointment and a second after 7 years. If reconfirmed a second time, they would remain in office until age 70.

New York Court of Appeals (state’s court of last resort): sporadically since the 1777 Constitution. Under the 1777 Constitution, a Council on Appointments made up of 4 Senators chosen by the Assembly, plus the Governor (to break ties) was used. The 1821 Constitution changed this to a Governor-appoints-Senate-confirms system. The 1846 Constitution created a bifurcated election system: 4 of the 8 judges would be elected by the statewide, the other 4 would be locally elected judges of the general jurisdiction court (confusingly called the “supreme court”) “having the shortest time to serve.” A new constitution was voted on, section by section, in 1869; the judicial article was the only one approved. That new article provided for statewide election. The 1894 Constitution and 1938 Constitution continued the statewide election system. A 1977 amendment that revamped much of the Judiciary Article created the present merit-selection-Senate-confirmation system.

10/24/11 update: Selection to the state’s primary intermediate appellate court, the Appellate Division, has no role for the legislature. The Governor alone elevates from the judges elected locally in partisan elections to the general jurisdiction court (confusingly called the “Supreme Court”).

Utah: since a 1984 constitutional amendment. The original 1895 constitution provided for statewide election. The 1984 amendment overhauling the entire Judiciary Article provided for the present merit-selection-Senate-confirmation system. A subsequent 1992 amendment increased the time for the Senate to consider nominations.

Vermont: since a 1971 constitutional amendment. The 1793 Constitution provide for joint election by the unicameral House and Executive Council, a practice that was continued when the Council was made the Senate via a 1836 amendment. An 1890 effort to shift this to the Senate alone was rejected by the Senate itself but was incorporated into the 1971 revision of the state’s entire Judiciary Article.

Hybrid

Maine: since a 1975 constitutional amendment (L.D. 25). The 1820 Constitution in place when Maine was separated from Massachusetts and became a state kept the Massachusetts practice of supreme court selection method of governor-appoints-and-executive-council-confirms. The 1975 amendment abolishing the Council created the current procedure for confirmation: the Governor nominates and a Joint House/Senate legislative committee recommends confirmation or rejection. That recommendation is binding unless the Senate overrides with 2/3 vote.

The other bill is Alabama SB 33 of 2012, a prefiled bill for the next session. SB 33 of 2012 is a constitutional amendment that looks more like HB 607 / SB 61 than HB 597 / SB 62 in that it does not specifically mention “sharia”.

It should be noted that at least some 2011 bills will make a return in 2012; roughly half of states allow bills to be “carried over” from one session to the next. Definitive answers as to which bills will return will be available as the legislatures come back into session in January.

Full roster of bills going back to 2010 after the jump.

2012

2011

2010

Arizona HB 2377 Continues the State Capital Postconviction Public Defender Office until July 1, 2016.

California AB 118 Defines public safety programs, including public defenders, as local responsibilities. Creates Local Revenue Fund 2011 with District Attorney and Public Defender Account.

Hawaii SB 1073 Increases the amount of the indigent legal services fee surcharge on court filing fees in civil actions. January  2012: trial level – $10 to $35; appellate courts – $25 to $50.  January 2014: trial level – $35 to $50; appellate courts – $50 to $65. Requires Hawaii Justice Foundation to review, on a biennial basis, whether the Indigent Legal Assistance Fund is meeting the civil legal needs of indigent persons, and report its findings.

Idaho SB 1048 Allows governor to select anyone, subject to senate confirmation, to serve as State Appellate Public Defender (currently, may only chose from list submitted by panel consisting of bar president, chairs of Senate and House judiciary committees, appointee of governor and, ex-officio, the chief justice). (see also SB 1117)

Montana HB 96 Allows state public defender to recover costs in cases involving involuntary commitment of a developmentally disabled person when the respondent is determined to have the financial ability to pay for a public defender and a judge orders payment.

Montana HB 97 Transfers supervision of Office of Appellate Defender from Chief Public Defender to Public Defender Commission.

Montana SB 187 Provides if the defendant desires assigned counsel because of financial inability to retain private counsel and the offense charged is a misdemeanor and incarceration is a sentencing option if the defendant is convicted, during the initial appearance the court may order that incarceration not be exercised as a sentencing option if the defendant is convicted. Further provides if the court so orders, the court shall inform the defendant that the assistance of counsel at public expense through the office of state public defender is not available and that time will be given to consult with an attorney before a plea is entered. Further provides if incarceration is waived as a sentencing option, a public defender may not be assigned.” Increases amount of fee to be paid by defendant for representation to various amounts depending on case outcome and severity of crime. Provides, during application and at other points in time, court advise defendant is subject to criminal charges for any false statement made regarding their finances, ability to pay, etc. on the financial statement. Requiring defendant sign affidavit and specifies affidavit must include statement regarding perjury and possible criminal prosecution for false statements regarding finances. Adds as a purpose of state public defender commission “ensure that clients of the statewide public defender system pay reasonable costs for services provided by the system based on the clients’ financial ability to pay”. Requires commission establish and oversee a conflicts office with a conflicts manager responsible for conflicts of interest and for ensuring that cases involving a conflict of interest are handled according to professional ethical standards. Provides new staff positions for the public defender commission may be added only when the public defender account received sufficient revenue pursuant maintain a balance in the account that would sustain any staff position approved by the commission for at least 1 year. Ends requirement that chief public defender serve as secretary to commission. Provides neither the chief public defender nor the chief contract manager may not maintain a client caseload. Requires commission limit number of contract attorneys so they may be meaningfully evaluated and requires commission establish biennial reviews.  Provides contract attorneys may not take any money or benefit from an appointed client or from anyone for the benefit of the appointed client.

Nevada AB 259 Authorizes certain fees to be charged and collected in civil actions be used to support legal services for the indigent in counties whose population is less than 100,000.  Provides in counties over 100,000, $10 of certain fees related to transfer of cases between courts, must be submitted to a program for legal services for the operation of programs for the indigent. Provides $5 collected at the time of recording a notice of default and election to sell must be submitted to a program for legal services for the operation of programs for the indigent.

Oregon HB 2710 Establishes Legal Aid Account in General Fund and directs state court administrator as to funding and distribution of account funds.

Utah HB 272 Requires the court, when making a determination of indigency for a defendant. consider the reasonableness of the fees and expenses charge by privately retained defense counsel.

Approved by one chamber

California AB 259 Allows the appointment to the office of public defender 1) a sitting or retired judge, and as a judge meets specified qualifications, or 2) a judicial commissioner, magistrate, or referee, or elected public official meeting specified qualifications.

Idaho HB 300 Establishes an Access to Justice Fund in the state treasury to assist Idaho Legal Aid Services in providing free legal representation for indigent persons in civil matters and to meet the costs of maintaining the operation of ILAS.  Provides for $10 fee on most civil cases filed in state to pay for Fund.

Nevada SB 26 Provides standards for determining whether the parent or guardian of a child for whom the juvenile court has appointed an attorney is  required to pay for such legal representation or reimburse the county or State for such legal representation.

Died in committee

Arizona HB 2375 Makes an assault on a public defender an aggravated assault.

Hawaii HB 1381 Increases the surcharges on court filing fees in civil actions used to fund indigent legal services : trial level – $10 to $35; appellate courts- $25 to $65.

Montana SB 147 Allows public defender access to jailed persons prior to court appointment.

Nevada AB 49 Establishes the Fund for Legal Defense of Indigent Persons and authorizes certain counties to apply to the Board of Trustees of the Fund for reimbursement of certain extraordinary costs of providing public defender services. Provides for additional administrative assessments or increase is existing assessments for guilty pleas in misdemeanors and in other instances to pay for Fund. Imposes additional sales and use tax and authorizes county commissioners to impose an additional sales and use tax for legal services to indigent persons.

Nevada AB 520 Requires all the compensation and expenses of a court-appointed attorney to be paid from the treasury of the county in which a court appointed the attorney.

Nevada SB 123 Moves Office of State Public Defender  from Department of Health and Human Services to the Office of the Governor.

New Mexico SB 106 Removes Public Defender Department as administratively attached to the Department of Corrections, making it a “stand alone” “adjunct” agency.