Archive for the ‘Structure Changes’ category

Wisconsin Assembly committee will vote on plan to change way chief justice is elected

January 9th, 2012

Wisconsin’s Assembly Committee on Judiciary and Ethics is set to vote on Thursday on a constitutional amendment that would end the state’s practice of having the most senior justice of the state’s supreme court serve as Chief Justice.

Under AJR 49 and SJR 36 the court’s justices would chose among themselves after every election to determine who would serve as chief. At a December 15 hearing, the lead proponent of the bill admitted that he had not spoken with anyone on the court, court staff, or the state court administrator about whether or not they wanted the change and did not indicate if he intended on speaking to the justices or court staff prior to the vote (see video from 1:35:00-1:37:30).

Video of the hearing, if available, will be found here.

 

Florida bills would provide additional funding for courts, but only if judicial immunity is retroactively ended and judicial disciplinary commission changed

January 9th, 2012

Ever since the 2006 effort in South Dakota to end judicial immunity and allow for civil and criminal prosecution for judicial decisions, called bluntly enough JAIL4Judges and defeated 89%-11%, legislators have taken an interest in similar efforts. Simultaneous with this interest has been the ongoing state budgetary crises. For the second time in as many years, Florida legislators are looking to consolidate both issues (see here for my post on the 2010 effort).

SB 1524 requires a retroactive elimination of judicial immunity in a variety of specified contexts dealing with court proceedings.  Additionally, it expands the Judicial Qualifications Commission (JQC) and requires JQC investigation panels include at least 5 “common citizen electors” as a staff committee, none of whom may be “officers of the court” and who must prepare a separate report on the investigation that is to be made publicly available. Both the state courts system in general, and the JQC in particular, would be subject to an immediate audit by the state’s Auditor General and the Office of Program Policy Analysis and Government Accountability conduct full audit review of commission, a review to be repeated every two years.

Additionally, SB 1524 requires the Supreme Court create a plan “promoting civics for residents of this state, together with education concerning the judicial branch in order to develop trust and confidence in the state’s judicial system.” It also creates unified family courts, teen courts, drug courts and mental health courts in each judicial circuit.

If SB 1524, “or similar legislation” is passed, the provisions of SB 1526 would/could go into effect. That bill creates a Fiscal Stability Trust Fund to be administered by the Supreme Court and into which would be placed an automatic, guaranteed 1 percent of the state’s General Revenue Fund. The bill also declares “the judicial branch of state government shall be held harmless in years of fiscal deficits in the state as a matter of public safety” and permits revenues in the Fiscal Stability Trust Fund to remain in the fund at the end of every fiscal year.

Both bills have been prefiled in the Senate, with no committee assignments as of yet.

2011 Year in Review: Alterations of/to state supreme courts

December 30th, 2011

Whether called court packing or court reform, the idea of “adjusting” the membership or structure of a state court of last resort in order to register legislative displeasure is nothing particularly new. Over the last 5 years, at least 5 such efforts have been made to either remove justices from the existing court or add enough justices to alter certain prior decisions (a review of such efforts can be found here). 2011 however is unique in the extent to which such efforts moved from hypothetical to on the ground realities and, as I noted last week, 2012 already has at least 1 bill filed.

Florida’s HJR 7111 is the most obvious on this score. The plan, as introduced by the Republican House Speaker, would have split the existing 7 member Florida Supreme Court into two panels of 5, one for civil and the other criminal. All Democratically-appointed sitting justices would be transferred to the criminal panel and the Republican-appointed justices (plus new appointees by the Republican governor) to the civil panel. While the proposal was approved on party line votes in the House, Senate Republicans removed any reference to splitting the supreme court before sending it back to the House. A last ditch effort by the Speaker for a “study” of splitting the supreme court splitting idea was line-item vetoed by the state’s GOP governor.

Montana’s HB 245 took a different tack; rather than expanding the state’s supreme court to achieve certain decisions this proposal would have shrunk the court from 7 to  5 (under Montana’s constitition the legislature may make such a reduction with a simple statute; no constitutional amendment required as in Florida). The sponsor was abundantly clear of his reasoning for the reduction:

All of us want tort reform, well maybe not all of us.  I surely want it and a lot of folks I talk to want it. So how do we get tort reform? I would suggest that if we took the Supreme Court from 7 down to 5, they have a higher workload, guess who becomes our ally in tort reform? The Supreme Court.

The effort died in committee, with all 6 House Judiciary Committee Democrats voting against and the committee Republicans splitting 8-6 in favor.

Taking page out of Gingrich playbook, New Hampshire proposal would eliminate state’s Supreme and Superior courts

December 23rd, 2011

I’ve mentioned at length the series of efforts lodged by the New Hampshire legislature against that state’s judiciary in general, and its Supreme Court in particular, including impeachment for decisions, efforts to unilaterally declare void or “repudiate” state Supreme Court decisions, etc . Now comes the latest proposal, this one an effort to eliminate the state’s Supreme Court and main trial court, the Superior Court.

Under the constitutional amendment (CACR 25) the two courts would no longer be specifically established by the state’s constitution, allowing them to be disbanded and reestablished (with new judges) based on passage of a simple statute. As a technical matter, it would repeal Article 72-a,  a 1966 amendment to the state’s 1784 constitution that added the following:

The judicial power of the state shall be vested in the supreme court, a trial court of general jurisdiction known as the superior court, and such lower courts as the legislature may establish under Article 4th of Part 2.

One co-sponsor argues to the Huffington Post this amendment would allow for a legislative check on the judiciary that he feels has been absent since the 1966 amendment. Another proponent cites prior state Supreme Court rulings on education funding saying “With certain issues they have not taken direction from the legislature.” He argues the ability to disband the courts is necessary to give them “legislative direction on certain issues”.

Full disclosure: I am cited in the Huffington Post article as follows:

Bill Rafferty [sic], an analyst for the National Center for State Courts, said both proposals were unusual. There have been no proposals in recent years to raise the minimum judicial age, but there have been pushes to raise the retirement age for state court judges, he said. Many states require judges to retire at 70.

Unusual indeed. If adopted, New Hampshire would be the sole state without a court of last resort specified in its state constitution.

Moreover, when states have either adopted new constitutions or created new courts of last resort, they have rarely simply disbanded the court and ejected the existing judges/justices. Much more typical is what occurred in the spate of new constitutions adopted in the 1970s and early 1980s: justices of the pre-existing court of last resort were carried over onto the new court and/or allowed to serve out their existing term and then be elected/appointed to the new court.

  • Georgia (1983 Constitution) Each judge holding office on the effective date of this article shall continue in office until the expiration of the term of office, as a judge of the court having the same or similar jurisdiction.
  • Louisiana (1974 Constitution) A judge serving on the effective date of this constitution shall serve through December thirty-first of the last year of his term or, if the last year of his term is not in the year of a regular congressional election, then through December thirty-first of the following year. The election for the next term shall be held in the year in which the term expires, as provided above.
  • Montana (1973 Constitution) Supreme court justices, district court judges, and justices of the peace holding office when this Constitution becomes effective shall serve the terms for which they were elected or appointed.
  • North Carolina (1971 Constitution) Except as otherwise specifically provided, the adoption of this Constitution shall not have the effect of vacating any office or term of office now filled or held by virtue of any election or appointment made under the prior Constitution of North Carolina and the laws of the State enacted pursuant thereto.
  • Virginia (1971 Constitution) Unless otherwise provided herein or by law, nothing in this revised Constitution shall affect the oath, tenure, term, status, or compensation of any person holding any public office, position, or employment in the Commonwealth, nor affect the date of filling any State or local office, elective or appointive, which shall be filled on the date on which it would otherwise have been filled…The requirement of Article VI, Section 7, that justices of the Supreme Court and judges of courts of record shall, at least five years prior to their election or appointment, have been members of the bar of the Commonwealth, shall not preclude justices or judges who were elected or appointed prior to the effective date of this revised Constitution, and who are otherwise qualified, from completing the term for which they were elected or appointed and from being reelected for one additional term.
  • Illinois (1970 Constitution) All officers filling any office by election or appointment shall continue to exercise the duties thereof, until their offices shall have been abolished or their successors selected and qualified in accordance with this Constitution or laws enacted pursuant thereto.

The last time I can find of a state disbanding its court of last resort and, in effect, firing all the existing justices was New York in 1869 and then the court was disbanded only because a) it was grossly behind in its docket and b) since half its membership was trial judges, it meant that trial judges were sitting on appeals from their own decisions below (See page 13 of this history of the New York courts). Even then the judges of the older court were not simply shown the door; the 4 members of the pre-existing court elected statewide were established as a “Commission on Appeals” to finish up the cases on their docket.

Nearly 3 dozen bills introduced reforming Michigan’s judicial structure, geography

November 18th, 2011

In the last several years, three major efforts to consolidate or restructure a state’s courts have been enacted: Vermont (2010 merger of Probate, Family, and District Court), New Hampshire (2011 merger of District, Probate, and Judicial Branch Family Division into newly created Circuit Court) and Indiana 2011 (granting all Circuit, Superior, and Probate courts original and concurrent jurisdiction in all civil and criminal cases).

Each of these, however, took the form of a single bill. Michigan’s effort at restructuring its judiciary been introduced as a series of nearly 36 bills, all of which are focused on elimination of judgeships, merging Probate courts with District by making Probate Judges serve as District Judges (or vice versa), and the consolidation of geographic districts/circuits. This is addition to the effort to the legislative push for concurrent jurisdiction and consolidation plans developed independently by courts.

Details are below

Eliminate District Judgeship(s); require probate judges in district serve as District Judges in their respective counties

HB 5071 / SB 830: 84th District. Also reduces from three to two the number of District Court judgeships in 86th District.

HB 5072 / SB 829 93rd, 97th, and 98th Districts.

HB 5075 / SB 838 79th District. Also reduces from 2 to 1 the number of Circuit Court judgeships in the 27th Judicial Circuit.

HB 5094 / SB 837 87-A, 88th and 89th Districts.

HB 5095 / SB 831 95-A District. Also reduces from 2 to 1 the number of Circuit Court judgeships in the 41st Judicial Circuit.

HB 5101 / SB 840 23rd, 81st, and 83rd District. Also reduces from 2 to 1 the number of Circuit Court judgeships in the 23rd Judicial Circuit.

 

Reduces judgeships but retains Districts/Circuits

HB 5073 / SB 843 54A District and 68th District: from 5 to 4.

HB 5074 / SB 833 66th District: from 2 to 1.

HB 5093 / SB 832 7th District: from 2 to 1. County of Kalamazoo Probate: from 3 to 2.

HB 5104 / SB 839 18th Judicial Circuit: from 3 to 2. 74th District Court: from 3 to 2.

HB 5105 / SB 844 3rd Judicial Circuit: from 61 to 60. 52nd District: from 11 to 10. 71A District: from 2 to 1.

HB 5106 / SB 841 25th Judicial Circuit: from 2 to 1. 96th District: from 2 to 1.

HB 5107 / SB 836 42nd Judicial Circuit: from 2 to 1. 75th District: from 2 to 1.

SB 416 3rd Circuit: 61 to 60. 26th District: 2 to 1. Eliminates District judgeship in 85th Judicial District. Splits 85th District into 85-A and 85-B and requires probate judges in district serve as District Judges in their respective counties.

District/Circuit Consolidation

HB 4313 Consolidates 20th and 21nd Circuits into 20th, with the consent of the cities involved.

HB 5102 / SB 834 Consolidates 24th and 52nd Circuits into the 24th. Provides new 24th to have one Circuit Judge.

HB 5103 / SB 835 Consolidates 43rd District & 44th District into the 43rd and 45A and 45B District into the 45th District. Also reduces judgeships in 25th District (2 to 1), 30th District (2 to 1), 33rd District (3 to 2), 48th District (3 to 2), and 50th District (4 to 3) . Retains provision giving 47th District two judgeships, but eliminates clause allowing an additional judgeship if and when a district court judgeship was eliminated anywhere in the state, subject to review and recommendation by SCAO and subsequent legislation.

HB 4313 Combines twentieth and twenty-first districts.

Other

HB 5108 / SB 842 In 2-B, 65-B, 91st and 94th Districts, combines District Court with Probate. Provides for two probate judges until vacancy occurs, then retains single judge of probate.

SB 319 Reduces Court of Appeals from 4 districts of 7 judges each to 4 districts of 6 judges each.

Ohio Issue 1: Supreme Court Commissions? Courts of Conciliation? Thank (or blame) New York…

October 28th, 2011

While much of the focus regarding Issue 1 has been on the proposed change to the judicial retirement age, Ohio voters will decide on the outright repeal of two sections of the state constitution’s Article 6. Both sections can be traced back to New York’s 1846 constitution.

Courts of Conciliation

Ohio Constitution (1851) Article 6, Section 19

The General Assembly may establish courts of conciliation, and prescribe their powers and duties; but such courts shall not render final judgment in any case, except upon submission, by the parties, of the matter in dispute, and their agreement to abide such judgment.

New York Constitution (1846) Article 6, Section 23

Tribunals of conciliation may be established, with such powers and duties as may be prescribed by law; but such tribunals shall have no power to render judgment to be obligatory on the parties, except they voluntarily submit their matters in difference, and agree to abide the judgment, or assent thereto, in the presence of such tribunal, in such cases as shall be prescribed by law.

Provisions for tribunals of conciliation or courts of conciliation can be found in the 1800s constitutions of not only Ohio (1851), but Wisconsin (1848), California (1849), Michigan (1850), Indiana (1851), and North Dakota (1889). They are all taken, almost verbatim, from the 1846 New York Constitution, which for its time was considered revolutionary in terms of judicial proceedings (and also was the genesis for the appellate commissions discussed below).

Courts of conciliation were akin to small claims courts (Minnesota’s small claims courts are still called “conciliation courts”) and arbitration or mediation (statutes in Arizona, California, Montana, and Nebraska reference conciliation courts that focus to amicably resolve martial and domestic relations issues). The report of the debates of the 1851 Ohio Constitutional convention note the intent behind these courts:

This plan of a court of conciliation has many advocates, who desire to see it established. It has been tried in other countries, with excellent effect—greatly diminish litigation and subduing a litigious spirit—a spirit which is the bane of a community. It sets neighbor against neighbor, brother against brother and even father against son, and son against father. Such litigation have I often witnessed, and in some cases seen it prosecuted with an embittered spirit, little short of devilish. Every means which promises only a mitigation if the evil should be employed. The expense and time wasted in such controversies, employing judges, jurors, witnesses, lawyers and suitors, is but a little of the mischief. The monstrous evil consists in the engendering and perpetuating of strife and contention among neighbors, begetting and nursing discord and hatred in families, and in disturbing the harmony and peace of society. A judicious peace loving and peace making officer of this kind may be more useful, far more useful than the first judge of your State, whom you propose to dignify with title of Chief Justice of Ohio.

It should be noted that despite the above ringing endorsement, the provision almost never happened. According to the reports of the debates at the 1851 Ohio Constitutional Convention, the vote to put in the provision was adopted 42-39.

All references to such courts can trace back (constitutionally speaking) to similar courts in Denmark and Norway, the “other countries” alluded to above. Although intended as separate and independent from regular courts, most courts of conciliation instead became divisions of existing courts. For example, a 1909 report indicates Cleveland’s Municipal Court had a Conciliation Division.

According to a history of the New York Constitution, the courts were seldom used because existing laws, with respect to arbitration, were already in place and accessible. In New York, it wasn’t until 1862 that an actual  tribunal of conciliation was set up in a judicial district. The statute authorizing the court was repealed 3 years later. As the Ohio Legislative Service Commission’s review of Measure 1 (then called HJR 1) indicates, Ohio too opted to put in mediation/conciliation practices rather than create free-standing courts.

Supreme Court Commissions

Ohio Constitution (1875) Article 6, Section 22

A commission, which shall consist of five members, shall be appointed by the governor, with the advice and consent of the senate, the members of which shall hold office for the term of three years from and after the first day of February, 1876, to dispose of such part of the business then on the dockets of the supreme court, as shall, by arrangement between said commission and said court, be transferred to such commission; and said commission shall have like jurisdiction and power in respect to such business as are or may be vested in said court; and the members of said commission shall receive a like compensation for the time being, with the judges of said court. A majority of the members of said commission shall be necessary to form a quorum or pronounce a decision, and its decision shall be certified, entered, and enforced as the judgments of the supreme court, and at the expiration of the term of said commission, all business undisposed of shall by it be certified to the supreme court and disposed of as if said commission had never existed. The clerk and reporter of said court shall be the clerk and reporter of said commission, and the commission shall have such other attendants not exceeding in number those provided by law for said court, which attendants said commission may appoint and remove at its pleasure. Any vacancy occurring in said commission, shall be filled by appointment of the governor, with the advice and consent of the senate, if the senate be in session, and if the senate be not in session, by the governor, but in such last case, such appointment shall expire at the end of the next session of the general assembly. The general assembly may, on application of the supreme court duly entered on the journal of the court and certified, provide by law, whenever two-thirds of such [each] house shall concur therein, from time to time, for the appointment, in like manner, of a like commission with like powers, jurisdiction and duties; provided, that the term of any such commission shall not exceed two years, nor shall it be created oftener than once in ten years.

New York Constitution (1869) Article 6, Section 4 & 5

Sec. 4 Upon the organization of the [new] Court of Appeals [New York's top court], under this article, the causes then pending in the present Court of Appeals shall become vested in the Court of Appeals hereby established. Such of said causes as are pending on the first day of January, eighteen hundred and sixty-nine, shall be heard and determined by a Commission, to be composed of five Commissioners of Appeals, four of whom shall be necessary to constitute a quorum; but the Court of Appeals hereby established may order any of said causes to be heard therein. Such Commission shall be composed of the Judges of the present Court of Appeals, elected or appointed thereto, and a fifth Commissioner who shall be appointed by the Governor, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate; or, if the Senate be not in session, by the Governor; but in such case, the appointment shall expire at the end of the next session.

Sec. 5 If any vacancy shall occur in the office of the said Commissioners, it shall be filled by appointment by the Governor by and with the advice and consent of the Senate; or if the Senate is not in session, by the Governor; but in such case, the appointment shall expire at the end of the next session. The Commissioners shall appoint, from their number, a Chief Commissioner; and may appoint and remove such attendants as may be necessary. The reporter of the Court of Appeals shall be the reporter of said Commission. The decisions of the Commission shall be certified to, and entered and enforced, as the judgments of the Court of Appeals. The Commission shall continue until the causes committed to it are determined, but not exceeding three years; and all causes then undetermined shall be heard by the Court of Appeals.

We take for granted the system in place in 40 states of an intermediate appellate court (usually called the Court of Appeals), however the creation of these courts met with fierce resistance both from voters and, on occasion, state supreme courts. Consider, for example, that Nevada voters have three times in the last three decades rejected the creation of such a court, most recently in 2010 (a fourth attempt may be made in 2014). When Colorado’s legislature made an attempt to create such a court in 1886, the state’s supreme court issued an advisory opinion that the proposed Court of Appeal was an unconstitutional infringement on the Supreme Court’s role as the supreme court of the state (the Supreme Court upheld a different version of the Court of Appeals in 1891).

Ohio and other large states like Texas tried to grapple with this problem through the use of appellate commissions. The appointment of special judicial officers to hear certain motions or matters was, and is, not uncommon. To this day subordinate judicial officers in California trial courts are called “commissioners“.

What made the New York, Ohio, and Texas provisions unique was that they provided for panels of commissioners to sit and render judgments. This avoided the exceptionally untenable situation of creating an intermediate appellate court or adding judges to existing courts which, as noted, had no real political support. The commission idea, however, got the votes in 1869 as part of a massive overhaul of New York’s judiciary article. The provisions appear to have been for the most part duplicated in Ohio (1875) and Texas (1879 by statute) a few years later.

Eventually these commissions fell out of favor for two reasons. First, states large and small simply needed dedicated, permanent intermediate appellate courts to handle the caseload. Second, there was a very real possibility that decisions of the commissions would be in conflict with the courts.

New York got such a dedicated court (the Appellate Divisions) in its 1894 constitution. Ohio got Circuit Courts of Appeals in 1851 consisting of 1 Supreme Court Justice riding circuit and sitting with the judges of the courts of common pleas, but it was not until an 1883 amendment that the Circuit Courts of Appeals consisted of judges specifically elected to serve in those courts. These eventually were made into the modern District Courts of Appeals.

What appellate commissioners remain today (such as in Oregon) are hearing officers who handle motion practice, not panels. Perhaps the only remaining vestiges of the old system are in Ohio’s constitution and North Dakota’s “Court of Appeals” which, despite the name, functions much the same as the commissions did, with panels coming into existence or only being used when the state’s top court is overwhelmed.

 

Ohio Issue 1: Legislative Opponents

October 25th, 2011

Proponents of Issue 1 (then known as HJR 1) in the Ohio House* made several arguments against the proposal. The video below outlines many of them, but they can be (and have been for electoral purposes here) summarized as follows:

  • The current system works fine
  • The current age limit prevents an entrenched judiciary
  • Retired judges can be recalled to service by the Supreme Court; this will make that pool of retired judges even older
  • The sections repealing Supreme Court commissions and courts of conciliation should be dealt with separately

*There was no Senate opposition

Ohio Issue 1: Legislative Proponents

October 24th, 2011

Proponents of Issue 1 (then known as HJR 1) in the Ohio House and Senate made several arguments in favor of the proposal. The video below outlines many of them, but they can be (and have been for electoral purposes here) summarized as follows:

  • The proposal keeps experience, knowledge, and integrity in the judicial system
  • The proposal includes rigorous judicial accountability
  • The proposal creates no additional financial burden

Looking at Ohio Issue 1 all week

October 24th, 2011

On November 8, 2011 voters in Ohio will be faced with three ballot questions. Issue 1 (called HJR 1  when it was initially introduced in the Ohio House) would amend the state’s constitution with respect to the judiciary in three ways:

  1. Increase the maximum age for assuming elected or appointed judicial office from seventy to seventy-five.
  2. Eliminate the General Assembly’s authority to establish courts of conciliation.
  3. Eliminate the Governor’s authority to appoint members to a Supreme Court Commission.

Over the course of the next week, Gavel to Gavel will look at Issue 1 as follows:

Monday: Video of Legislative Proponents
Tuesday: Video of Legislative Opponents
Wednesday: Other states- What courts/states have mandatory retirement and at what age?
Thursday: Other states- In the last 20 years, what states tried to increase or remove their retirement ages, and how did they do in the legislature or at the ballot box?
Friday: The other provisions- What are (or were) “conciliation courts” and “appellate commissions”?

Virginia’s judicial redistricting committee plan to be unveiled today

September 19th, 2011

I’ve previously mentioned the 2011 legislative effort to redistrict Virginia’s judicial districts. In sum, the bill was almost on the verge of passage when it was decided to refer the matter to the state’s Supreme Court,resulting in a committee appointed by the Chief Justice to look at the issue.

Today’s interim joint meeting of Virginia’s Committee on District Courts and Judicial Council on September 19 will see the committee’s recommendations released. The Committee’s 14 members include 8 legislators, including the chairs of the Committees for Courts of Justice in the Senate and House of Delegates. The chairs also serve as members of the Council as well.

According to the Virginia Lawyer’s Weekly, the committee will recommend against redistricting, instead suggesting a system of regional chief judges for assigning judges to fill workload gaps as needed.

The Committee/Council agenda is:

  1. Welcome and Comments by Chief Justice Kinser
  2. Overview of Committee Work and Committee Recommendations Judge Thomas D. Horne, Chairman Judicial Boundary Realignment Study Committee
  3. Review of Committee Realignment Models Dr. Cyril W. Miller, Jr. Director of Judicial Planning
  4. Legislative Proposal Ms. Katya N. Herndon Director of Legislative and Public Relations
  5. Adjournment