Archive for the ‘Special Edition’ category

2011 Southern court interpreters legislation

November 8th, 2011

Law

Georgia HB 24 Substantially revises, supersedes, and modernizes provisions relating to evidence. Modifies existing state laws with respect to foreign language in the courts. Provides Supreme Court to set rules and requirements for foreign language interpreters. Specifies Supreme Court may establish fees to be paid for certification.

Texas HB 2249 / SB 652 ORIGINAL: Extends licensed court interpreter advisory board until 2019. ENACTED: Extends licensed court interpreter advisory board until 2017.

Texas HB 2945 / SB 1233 Allows court in a county that borders Mexico or the Gulf of Mexico to appoint a language interpreter who is not a licensed court interpreter.

Approved by one chamber

Florida HB 7199 Creates Supreme Court of Civil Appeals and Supreme Court of Criminal Appeals as panels of the state’s Supreme Court. Assigns Supreme Court of Civil Appeals responsibility to set standards for court interpreters. Approved by full House. Killed in Senate committee.

Texas SB 286 Provides that, if after examining the proposed ward’s assets the court determines the proposed ward is unable to pay for costs allocated to the proposed ward under this section, the county is responsible for those costs, including an interpreter. Approved by full Senate. Died in House committee.

Died in committee

North Carolina SB 132 Provides if a party or witness in court does not speak or understand the English language, the cost of interpreting or translating services for the party or witness is payable from funds appropriated to the Judicial Department. Provides where individual is indigent, the Administrative Office of the Courts and the Office of Indigent Defense Services may enter into a memorandum of understanding for the payment of interpreting and translating services. Provides except in cases of indigence, Administrative Office of the Courts not obligated to bear the cost of interpreting or translating services for noncourt services and activities, such as discovery, trial, preparation, and attorney/client meetings.

Texas HB 331 Authorizes governing body of a municipality to create a municipal court equal justice and education fund, portions of which may be used for interpreter services. Requires certain defendants to pay court costs for deposit in the fund.

Texas HB 2250 Ends requirement licensed court interpreter advisory board be subject to sunset law.

Texas SB 220 ORIGINAL: Provides that, if after examining the proposed ward’s assets the court determines the proposed ward is unable to pay for costs allocated to the proposed ward under this section, the county is responsible for those costs, including an interpreter. AMENDED: Removal of reference to interpreters.

 

 

 

2011 Northeast court interpreters legislation

November 7th, 2011

Active

Massachusetts HB 2163 Increases penalties for individuals threatening or committing bodily harm on court employees, including court interpreters. In Joint Committee on the Judiciary.

Massachusetts HB 2238 Increases penalties for individuals threatening or committing bodily harm on court employees, including court interpreters. In Joint Committee on the Judiciary.

Massachusetts SB 1319 Adds court interpreters as part of Group 2 of the state’s retirement system. In Joint Committee on the Judiciary.

Massachusetts SB 867 Increases penalties for individuals threatening or committing bodily harm on court employees, including court interpreters. In Joint Committee on the Judiciary.

New York SB 1870 Requires orders of protection issued in family court or in cases of family offenses in criminal court to be translated into the native language of the parties. In Senate Judiciary Committee.

New York SB 275 Allows certain courts of record to fix the compensation of a temporary appointed interpreter at not more than two hundred fifty dollars per day. In Senate Judiciary Committee.

New York SB 1094 Establishes standards for court interpreters. Requires court interpreter file affidavit or affirmation that he/she will make a true and impartial interpretation of the proceedings and follow the standards set forth in the New York State Unified State Court System’s Interpreter Manual and the Court Interpreter Canons of Professional Responsibility. Provides procedure for waiver of a non-English speaking person’s right to an interpreter in any proceeding. In Senate Judiciary Committee.

New York AB 4697 (not identical to SB 1094) Establishes standards for court interpreters. Requires court interpreter file affidavit or affirmation that he/she will make a true and impartial interpretation of the proceedings and follow the standards set forth in the New York State Unified State Court System’s Interpreter Manual and the Court Interpreter Canons of Professional Responsibility. Provides procedure for waiver of a non-English speaking person’s right to an interpreter in any proceeding. In Assembly Judiciary Committee.

New York AB 6113 / SB 1870 Requires court to direct a court appointed interpreter who is present in court to assist in a proceeding, to direct the interpreter to translate on the record the essential terms outlined clearly by the court of any temporary or final order of protection issued by a court. Assembly version: Approved by full Assembly 3/29/11. Senate version: In Senate Finance committee.

2011 court interpreters legislation week

November 7th, 2011

This latest Gavel to Gavel special week will focus on court interpreters legislation considered in state legislatures in 2011.

Have an idea for a court-related topic you’d like to see tracked? Just send an email!

The bills will be broken out using the 4 main US Census regions.

Monday (Northeast): Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont
Tuesday (Southern): Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, West Virginia
Wedensday (Midwest): Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, South Dakota, Wisconsin
Thursday (West): Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, Utah, Washington, Wyoming

Ohio Issue 1: Supreme Court Commissions? Courts of Conciliation? Thank (or blame) New York…

October 28th, 2011

While much of the focus regarding Issue 1 has been on the proposed change to the judicial retirement age, Ohio voters will decide on the outright repeal of two sections of the state constitution’s Article 6. Both sections can be traced back to New York’s 1846 constitution.

Courts of Conciliation

Ohio Constitution (1851) Article 6, Section 19

The General Assembly may establish courts of conciliation, and prescribe their powers and duties; but such courts shall not render final judgment in any case, except upon submission, by the parties, of the matter in dispute, and their agreement to abide such judgment.

New York Constitution (1846) Article 6, Section 23

Tribunals of conciliation may be established, with such powers and duties as may be prescribed by law; but such tribunals shall have no power to render judgment to be obligatory on the parties, except they voluntarily submit their matters in difference, and agree to abide the judgment, or assent thereto, in the presence of such tribunal, in such cases as shall be prescribed by law.

Provisions for tribunals of conciliation or courts of conciliation can be found in the 1800s constitutions of not only Ohio (1851), but Wisconsin (1848), California (1849), Michigan (1850), Indiana (1851), and North Dakota (1889). They are all taken, almost verbatim, from the 1846 New York Constitution, which for its time was considered revolutionary in terms of judicial proceedings (and also was the genesis for the appellate commissions discussed below).

Courts of conciliation were akin to small claims courts (Minnesota’s small claims courts are still called “conciliation courts”) and arbitration or mediation (statutes in Arizona, California, Montana, and Nebraska reference conciliation courts that focus to amicably resolve martial and domestic relations issues). The report of the debates of the 1851 Ohio Constitutional convention note the intent behind these courts:

This plan of a court of conciliation has many advocates, who desire to see it established. It has been tried in other countries, with excellent effect—greatly diminish litigation and subduing a litigious spirit—a spirit which is the bane of a community. It sets neighbor against neighbor, brother against brother and even father against son, and son against father. Such litigation have I often witnessed, and in some cases seen it prosecuted with an embittered spirit, little short of devilish. Every means which promises only a mitigation if the evil should be employed. The expense and time wasted in such controversies, employing judges, jurors, witnesses, lawyers and suitors, is but a little of the mischief. The monstrous evil consists in the engendering and perpetuating of strife and contention among neighbors, begetting and nursing discord and hatred in families, and in disturbing the harmony and peace of society. A judicious peace loving and peace making officer of this kind may be more useful, far more useful than the first judge of your State, whom you propose to dignify with title of Chief Justice of Ohio.

It should be noted that despite the above ringing endorsement, the provision almost never happened. According to the reports of the debates at the 1851 Ohio Constitutional Convention, the vote to put in the provision was adopted 42-39.

All references to such courts can trace back (constitutionally speaking) to similar courts in Denmark and Norway, the “other countries” alluded to above. Although intended as separate and independent from regular courts, most courts of conciliation instead became divisions of existing courts. For example, a 1909 report indicates Cleveland’s Municipal Court had a Conciliation Division.

According to a history of the New York Constitution, the courts were seldom used because existing laws, with respect to arbitration, were already in place and accessible. In New York, it wasn’t until 1862 that an actual  tribunal of conciliation was set up in a judicial district. The statute authorizing the court was repealed 3 years later. As the Ohio Legislative Service Commission’s review of Measure 1 (then called HJR 1) indicates, Ohio too opted to put in mediation/conciliation practices rather than create free-standing courts.

Supreme Court Commissions

Ohio Constitution (1875) Article 6, Section 22

A commission, which shall consist of five members, shall be appointed by the governor, with the advice and consent of the senate, the members of which shall hold office for the term of three years from and after the first day of February, 1876, to dispose of such part of the business then on the dockets of the supreme court, as shall, by arrangement between said commission and said court, be transferred to such commission; and said commission shall have like jurisdiction and power in respect to such business as are or may be vested in said court; and the members of said commission shall receive a like compensation for the time being, with the judges of said court. A majority of the members of said commission shall be necessary to form a quorum or pronounce a decision, and its decision shall be certified, entered, and enforced as the judgments of the supreme court, and at the expiration of the term of said commission, all business undisposed of shall by it be certified to the supreme court and disposed of as if said commission had never existed. The clerk and reporter of said court shall be the clerk and reporter of said commission, and the commission shall have such other attendants not exceeding in number those provided by law for said court, which attendants said commission may appoint and remove at its pleasure. Any vacancy occurring in said commission, shall be filled by appointment of the governor, with the advice and consent of the senate, if the senate be in session, and if the senate be not in session, by the governor, but in such last case, such appointment shall expire at the end of the next session of the general assembly. The general assembly may, on application of the supreme court duly entered on the journal of the court and certified, provide by law, whenever two-thirds of such [each] house shall concur therein, from time to time, for the appointment, in like manner, of a like commission with like powers, jurisdiction and duties; provided, that the term of any such commission shall not exceed two years, nor shall it be created oftener than once in ten years.

New York Constitution (1869) Article 6, Section 4 & 5

Sec. 4 Upon the organization of the [new] Court of Appeals [New York's top court], under this article, the causes then pending in the present Court of Appeals shall become vested in the Court of Appeals hereby established. Such of said causes as are pending on the first day of January, eighteen hundred and sixty-nine, shall be heard and determined by a Commission, to be composed of five Commissioners of Appeals, four of whom shall be necessary to constitute a quorum; but the Court of Appeals hereby established may order any of said causes to be heard therein. Such Commission shall be composed of the Judges of the present Court of Appeals, elected or appointed thereto, and a fifth Commissioner who shall be appointed by the Governor, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate; or, if the Senate be not in session, by the Governor; but in such case, the appointment shall expire at the end of the next session.

Sec. 5 If any vacancy shall occur in the office of the said Commissioners, it shall be filled by appointment by the Governor by and with the advice and consent of the Senate; or if the Senate is not in session, by the Governor; but in such case, the appointment shall expire at the end of the next session. The Commissioners shall appoint, from their number, a Chief Commissioner; and may appoint and remove such attendants as may be necessary. The reporter of the Court of Appeals shall be the reporter of said Commission. The decisions of the Commission shall be certified to, and entered and enforced, as the judgments of the Court of Appeals. The Commission shall continue until the causes committed to it are determined, but not exceeding three years; and all causes then undetermined shall be heard by the Court of Appeals.

We take for granted the system in place in 40 states of an intermediate appellate court (usually called the Court of Appeals), however the creation of these courts met with fierce resistance both from voters and, on occasion, state supreme courts. Consider, for example, that Nevada voters have three times in the last three decades rejected the creation of such a court, most recently in 2010 (a fourth attempt may be made in 2014). When Colorado’s legislature made an attempt to create such a court in 1886, the state’s supreme court issued an advisory opinion that the proposed Court of Appeal was an unconstitutional infringement on the Supreme Court’s role as the supreme court of the state (the Supreme Court upheld a different version of the Court of Appeals in 1891).

Ohio and other large states like Texas tried to grapple with this problem through the use of appellate commissions. The appointment of special judicial officers to hear certain motions or matters was, and is, not uncommon. To this day subordinate judicial officers in California trial courts are called “commissioners“.

What made the New York, Ohio, and Texas provisions unique was that they provided for panels of commissioners to sit and render judgments. This avoided the exceptionally untenable situation of creating an intermediate appellate court or adding judges to existing courts which, as noted, had no real political support. The commission idea, however, got the votes in 1869 as part of a massive overhaul of New York’s judiciary article. The provisions appear to have been for the most part duplicated in Ohio (1875) and Texas (1879 by statute) a few years later.

Eventually these commissions fell out of favor for two reasons. First, states large and small simply needed dedicated, permanent intermediate appellate courts to handle the caseload. Second, there was a very real possibility that decisions of the commissions would be in conflict with the courts.

New York got such a dedicated court (the Appellate Divisions) in its 1894 constitution. Ohio got Circuit Courts of Appeals in 1851 consisting of 1 Supreme Court Justice riding circuit and sitting with the judges of the courts of common pleas, but it was not until an 1883 amendment that the Circuit Courts of Appeals consisted of judges specifically elected to serve in those courts. These eventually were made into the modern District Courts of Appeals.

What appellate commissioners remain today (such as in Oregon) are hearing officers who handle motion practice, not panels. Perhaps the only remaining vestiges of the old system are in Ohio’s constitution and North Dakota’s “Court of Appeals” which, despite the name, functions much the same as the commissions did, with panels coming into existence or only being used when the state’s top court is overwhelmed.

 

Ohio Issue 1: What other states tried to increase or remove their judicial retirement ages and how did they do?

October 27th, 2011

Ohio voters will head to the polls November 8 to decide the fate of Issue 1, marking the sixth time in 20 years the question of judicial retirement has been on the ballot (Hawaii 2006; Louisiana 1995 & 2003; Pennsylvania 2001; Texas 2007; Vermont 2002), with 4 victories to 2 defeats.

Four legislatures have adopted statutes to alter retirement (Indiana 2011; Kansas 2003 & 2010; North Carolina 1992; Vermont 2003). Moreover, Arizona has advanced a proposed change for the 2012 ballot while New York voters will probably address the issue in 2014. This marks a trend over the last several year in particular of state legislatures confronting judges living longer and the question of whether there should be any limits on service at all.

State by state breakdown below the fold.

» Read more: Ohio Issue 1: What other states tried to increase or remove their judicial retirement ages and how did they do?

Ohio Issue 1: What courts/states have mandatory judicial retirement and at what age?

October 26th, 2011

Ohio is not alone in having a mandatory retirement age for its jurists. 33 states plus D.C. have age limits for at least some of their judges. While Ohio’s current 70 is the most typical age, several states use 75: Kansas, Missouri (municipal court judges), Oregon, Texas (Appellate + District), Utah, and Washington.

A chart listing all mandatory retirement ages for state judges is below.

» Read more: Ohio Issue 1: What courts/states have mandatory judicial retirement and at what age?

Ohio Issue 1: Legislative Opponents

October 25th, 2011

Proponents of Issue 1 (then known as HJR 1) in the Ohio House* made several arguments against the proposal. The video below outlines many of them, but they can be (and have been for electoral purposes here) summarized as follows:

  • The current system works fine
  • The current age limit prevents an entrenched judiciary
  • Retired judges can be recalled to service by the Supreme Court; this will make that pool of retired judges even older
  • The sections repealing Supreme Court commissions and courts of conciliation should be dealt with separately

*There was no Senate opposition

Ohio Issue 1: Legislative Proponents

October 24th, 2011

Proponents of Issue 1 (then known as HJR 1) in the Ohio House and Senate made several arguments in favor of the proposal. The video below outlines many of them, but they can be (and have been for electoral purposes here) summarized as follows:

  • The proposal keeps experience, knowledge, and integrity in the judicial system
  • The proposal includes rigorous judicial accountability
  • The proposal creates no additional financial burden

Looking at Ohio Issue 1 all week

October 24th, 2011

On November 8, 2011 voters in Ohio will be faced with three ballot questions. Issue 1 (called HJR 1  when it was initially introduced in the Ohio House) would amend the state’s constitution with respect to the judiciary in three ways:

  1. Increase the maximum age for assuming elected or appointed judicial office from seventy to seventy-five.
  2. Eliminate the General Assembly’s authority to establish courts of conciliation.
  3. Eliminate the Governor’s authority to appoint members to a Supreme Court Commission.

Over the course of the next week, Gavel to Gavel will look at Issue 1 as follows:

Monday: Video of Legislative Proponents
Tuesday: Video of Legislative Opponents
Wednesday: Other states- What courts/states have mandatory retirement and at what age?
Thursday: Other states- In the last 20 years, what states tried to increase or remove their retirement ages, and how did they do in the legislature or at the ballot box?
Friday: The other provisions- What are (or were) “conciliation courts” and “appellate commissions”?

Why Senate reconfirmation for incumbent state judges? Why not House? Or joint? Or election?

October 24th, 2011

Several weeks ago I looked at the historical development of why some states have legislative involvement in judicial confirmation for their appellate courts and whether it was only the state’s senate that had a role or if it was a joint process. To reiterate, one of the big presses in the last year has been to put into place something akin to the “federal model” of senate (only) confirmation. But unlike the federal model, which includes life tenure, almost all these proposals include a reconfirmation at some point.

It should be noted that of the 11 states that give their legislature some role in the confirmation of appellate judges:

  • 6 give at least some appellate  judges a decade or more on the bench between reconfirmations: Delaware (12 years), Hawaii (10 years), South Carolina (10 years), Utah (Supreme Court: 10 years), Virginia (Supreme Court: 12 years),  and New York (Court of Appeals: 14 years)
  • 3 give reconfirmation to the House and Senate: Connecticut, South Carolina, and Virginia
  • 3 remove the legislature outright from reconfirmation: Hawaii (judicial nominating commission); Maryland and Utah (retention election)
  • 2 at least have the option of lifetime or near-lifetime appointment: Rhode Island (life) and New Jersey (until 70 after reconfirmation)

Roles of legislatures in appellate judicial re-confirmation

Connecticut: 8 year term for Supreme Court and Appellate Court. Judicial Selection Commission evaluates incumbent judge, with statutory presumption “that each incumbent judge who seeks reappointment to the same court qualifies for retention in judicial office” and provides burden on commission to demonstrate otherwise (see 51-44a (e) and (f), of the Connecticut General Statutes). Commission sends reappoint/don’t reappoint recommendation to Governor who renominates incumbent judge. Legislature jointly reconfirms.

Delaware: 12 year term for the Supreme Court. Governor renominates. Senate reconfirms.

Hawaii: 10 year term for Supreme Court and Intermediate Appellate Court. Judicial selection commission reappoints.

Maine: 7 year term for Supreme Judicial Court. Governor renominates. Joint House/Senate legislative committee recommends reconfirmation or rejection. That recommendation is binding unless the Senate overrides with 2/3 vote.

Maryland: 1 year (at least) initial term for Court of Appeals and Court of Special Appeals. Yes/no retention election. 10 year subsequent term.

New Jersey: 7 year initial term. Governor renominates. Senate reconfirms. Service until 70 for subsequent term.

New York (Court of Appeals, state’s court of last resort): 14 year term for Court of Appeals. Commission on Judicial Nomination resubmits names along incumbent’s to Governor. Governor renominates incumbent or nominates new person. Senate confirms or reconfirms.

NOTE: the state’s primary intermediate appellate court, the Appellate Division, has no role for the legislature in terms of reconfirmation. The Governor elevates and may reappoint to the Appellate Division from the judges elected locally in partisan elections to the general jurisdiction court (confusingly called the “Supreme Court”). For example, when his 14 year term in the trial court ended in 2011, the Hon. Henry J. Scudder had to run for re-election and then be reappointed back to the Appellate Division, Fourth Department (see story here).

Rhode Island: N/A (Serve for life)

South Carolina: 10 year term for the Supreme Court, 6 year term for the Court of Appeals. Judicial Merit Selection Commission evaluates incumbent judge and all others seeking position. Commission sends names to Legislature. Legislature jointly reappoints or appoints someone else. (See Title 2, Chapter 19 S.C. Code)

Utah: 3 year (at least) initial term. Yes/no retention election. 10 year subsequent term for Supreme Court, 6 year subsequent term for Court of Appeals.

 

Virginia: 12 year term for the Supreme Court, 6 year term for the Court of Appeals. Legislature jointly reappoints or appoints someone else.