Archive for the ‘Rule Making Authority’ category

Minnesota judicial discipline legislation would allow appeals to legislative committee from Board of Judicial Standards

March 23rd, 2012

Details are starting emerge about possible legislative changes to the judicial disciplinary process in Minnesota. As I noted yesterday a strike all amendment was being offered today to an existing bill (SB 2205) that as originally drafted would have let a newly reconstituted Board of Judicial Standards, made up of only legislators, open any prior complaint against any judge “for any reason.”

The amendment removes all language regarding changes to the Board, creation of a legislatively enacted Code of Judicial Conduct, etc.

Section 1 does broach the issue of reopening existing complaints. It amends existing statutes (490A.02 Subd. 4) to add a new paragraph that reads

(b) Upon receipt of a referral from the Joint Legislative Committee on Judicial Ethics, the board shall reopen a matter previously disposed of by the board.

Section 2 creates a Joint Legislative Committee on Judicial Ethics, made up of the House Ethics Committee and Senate Rules and Administration Committee’s Subcommittee on Ethical Conduct. A person who field a complaint with the Board and remained dissatisfied with the Board’s decision could send it on to the Joint Committee, which would then have several options:

  1. they could determine the judge is “disabled, incompetent, has committed conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice, or has otherwise violated the Code of Judicial Conduct or other law applicable to judicial administration or conduct” and refer the matter back to the Board
  2. they could determine grounds for impeachment exist and recommend the House in fact impeach the judge
  3. they could dismiss the complaint (though not explicit in the bill, the author stated this was an option at today’s hearing)

Joint committee meetings would be subject to the state’s open meetings law, but could be closed a majority vote of the Joint Committee at the preliminary stage only. If further proceedings were deemed warranted by the committee, the allegations or charges “must be open” unless:

  • a judge’s health records, a judge’s medical conditions, or other information not deemed publicly accessible under existing state law (Chapter 13) are discussed
  • non-publicly accessible information under the rules of the judicial branch is discussed
  • non-publicly accessible information under some other law regarding public access to records is discussed

Nevertheless, a judge could insist on an open meeting at any point in time.

The bill, as amended, was immediately tabled.

Minnesota Senate Committee on Judiciary and Public Safety to look at judicial discipline tomorrow; as-yet unreleased strike all amendment to be offered

March 22nd, 2012

I’ve mentioned that over the course of the last year, indeed the last several years, the Minnesota legislature has had a keen interest in the state’s judicial disciplinary board (the Board of Judicial Standards) and has indicated an interest in creating a statutory Code of Judicial Conduct (rather than letting the state supreme court do so).

In the Minnesota Senate this effort has taken the form of SB 2205, itself the companion bill to HB 1568 which was introduced last year. As I noted when HB 1568 was introduced, the bills:

  1. Strips the Supreme Court of the power to suspend temporarily a judge during an investigation and transfers it to the Board exclusively.
  2. Strips the Supreme Court of the power to “retire” permanently a judge and transfers it to the Board exclusively.
  3. Allows the newly constituted Board to open any prior complaint against any judge “for any reason.”
  4. Gives the Board the power to enforce a new Code of Judicial Conduct enacted by the legislature

A meeting of the Senate Committee on Judiciary and Public Safety, to which SB 2205 was referred, is set for tomorrow March 23. Interestingly, a revision has been made to the agenda, indicating an as yet unreleased “delete everything amendment will be considered for discussion… No public testimony will be taken at this time. The bill as amended will be discussed and then laid on the table. No final vote will be considered.”

The meeting is to start 9:00 local time and may have video streaming here.

 

Utah Senate OK’s plan to substantially revise state’s justice courts

March 1st, 2012

For the third time in five years, Utah’s legislature appears on the verge of making substantial revision’s the state’s justice courts.

First, some background.

In 2008, the legislature (SB 72) asserted more state-level control over these justice courts and their judges, requiring judges graduate college, be elected, and be subject to the state’s judicial performance evaluation program. In 2011, additional changes were made.  Under SB 143, candidates for justice court judgeships could run as a candidate for more than one justice court judge office. It also removed the requirement that all registered voters in a county vote in the retention election of a county justice court judge and removed the requirement that the governing bodies of a county and a municipality within that county both concur when a justice court judge is permitted to hold office as both a county and a municipal justice court judge. It removed the authorization for a justice court judge to order administrative traffic checkpoints and issue search warrants.

Now in 2012 comes SB 200. This bill

  • establishes and amends procedures to establish and expand the territorial jurisdiction of justice courts
  • amends and consolidates the minimum operating standards of justice courts
  • amends the Judicial Council’s authority to establish rules and procedures concerning the creation and expansion of justice courts
  • provides for uniform fees of the justice courts
  • requires every prospective justice court judge to attend an orientation program conducted under the direction of the Judicial Council before the justice court can be certified and qualified to hold office
  • authorizes the governing body of a justice court to create specialized calendars and exempts judges who hear these calendars from being assigned at random
  • modifies the procedures and penalties for failure to comply with continuing education requirements
  • modifies the procedures and penalties for failure to comply with compensation limits, limits on secondary employment, and limits on holding elected or political offices and requires the Judicial Council to file a formal complaint for violations
  • amends the procedures to appoint a temporary justice court judge and prohibits a retired justice court judge from serving as a temporary justice court judge
  • modifies and establishes new standards for when and where a municipality and county may hold justice court and authorizes the Judicial Council to determine when and where justice courts my hold court.

The changes were approved by full Senate 2/29/12 and are now in the House awaiting committee assignment

New Hampshire House committee moves to strip supreme court of rule making, create special panel to ensure “balanced and neutral judiciary”, end mandatory bar

February 24th, 2012

Long time readers will no doubt be aware of the litany of efforts by the New Hampshire House to undercut or attack the state’s judiciary, from impeachment threats, to attempts to strip the courts of the power of judicial review, to voting to “repudiate” the opinion’s of the state’s supreme court, to outright writing the state’s supreme court out of the constitution.

The latest such efforts made it out of committee this week, including:

CACR 22 (Constitutional Amendment) Provides that the chief justice shall adopt court rules only with the concurrence of the legislature.

CACR 26 (Constitutional Amendment) Repeals constitutional provision authorizing the chief justice of the supreme court to make rules governing the administration of all the courts.

HB 1131 ORIGINAL: Establishes a committee to study the revisions to laws which would be necessary if the supreme court and superior court were abolished as constitutional courts. AS AMENDED: Establishes committee of 3 House members and 2 Senate members to “to study methods of creating a balanced and neutral judiciary.” Committee to report by November 2, 2012.

HB 1474 Eliminates requirement that attorneys be members of New Hampshire Bar Association. (Unified bar established by state supreme court in 1968, see In re Unification of N.H. Bar, 248 A.2d 709).

This is in addition to an effort passed by the House earlier in February the sought to unilaterally “revoke” rules established by the supreme court under its existing rule making authority.

All four items adopted by the House Judiciary Committee will be voted on by the full House March 7.

New Hampshire House on constitutional collision course with Supreme Court over rulemaking authority; finds IOLTA rules create “welfare state” & are “slavery” under 13th Amendment

February 10th, 2012

New Hampshire’s House, having “repudiated” an advisory opinion of the state’s Supreme Court, once again appears poised to challenge the court, this time over its rule making authority and Interest on Lawyers Trust Accounts (IOLTA).

First, some background:

Part II, Article 73-a, added in 1978, of the New Hampshire Constitution speaks of the Supreme Court’s rule making power:

The chief justice of the supreme court shall be the administrative head of all the courts. He shall, with the concurrence of a majority of the supreme court justices, make rules governing the administration of all courts in the state and the practice and procedure to be followed in all such courts. The rules so promulgated shall have the force and effect of law.

The legislature has taken up several efforts in the last few years to repeal (CACR 26) or require legislative approval for rules adopted by the supreme court (CACR 22).

On December 29, 2010 the supreme court, citing Article 73-a, issued an order changing existing provisions related to Interest on Lawyers Trust Accounts (IOLTAs). The ABA’s Commission on Interest on Lawyers Trust Accounts defines IOLTAs thusly:

attorneys who handle nominal or short-term client funds that cannot earn net income for the client place these funds in a single, pooled, interest-bearing trust account. Banks in turn forward the interest earned on these accounts to the state IOLTA program, which uses the money to fund a variety of charitable causes.

The rule changes went into effect March 2011.

Despite no clear provision for such a move in Part II, Article 73-a of the state constitution, the House took up an effort to “revoke” the Supreme Court rules changes. Under HB 1395, the legislature seeks to unilaterally declare the changes void.

Pursuant to the authority of the general court under part II, articles 4 and 5 of the New Hampshire constitution, and in the absence of contrary authority of the supreme court under article 73-a thereof, the amendments to supreme court rules 50 and 50-A issued by the New Hampshire supreme court on December 29, 2010, to take effect on March 1, 2011, purporting to require attorneys to create or maintain a pooled interest-bearing trust account for clients’ funds nominal in amount or to be held for a short period of time, and to remit the interest earned thereby to the New Hampshire Bar Foundation, are hereby declared to be unconstitutional and are rescinded and revoked ab initio.

Part II, Article 4, discusses the creation of courts (except the Supreme and Superior Courts) are at the discretion of the legislature, while Article 5 discusses the legislature’s “Power to Make Laws, Elect Officers, Define Their Powers and Duties, Impose Fines and Assess Taxes; Prohibited from Authorizing Towns to Aid Certain Corporations”

Proponents argue the rules changes violate the separation of powers, exceed the court’s power under Article 73-a, creates a “welfare state”,  and violate the Thirteen Amendment to the U.S. Constitution which “forbids slavery or involuntary servitude, even of lawyers.”

Opponents are the inherent power of the supreme court to regulate the practice of law includes the power to require attorneys to participate in the IOLTA program.

HB 1395 was approved on 13-4 vote by the House Judiciary Committee on February 7 and is set for a floor vote on February 15.

Showdown in California Assembly over Judicial Council’s budgetary power over state’s courts set for next week

January 27th, 2012

Angst and anger at the California Administrative Office of the Courts and the constitutionally-established Judicial Council will be coming to a head next week in the state’s Assembly. Under AB 1208, much of the Judicial Council’s power over local court budgeting and policy would be curtailed or ended with local courts given a veto over budget issues. According to an analysis written by the Assembly, AB 1208

  1. Deletes the existing provision of law that states that the Judicial Council shall retain the ultimate responsibility to adopt a budget and allocate funding for the trial courts and perform specified activities that best assure their ability to carry out their functions, promote implementation of statewide policies, and promote the immediate implementation of efficiencies and cost saving measures in court operations, in order to guarantee equal access to the courts.
  2. Deletes existing provisions which empower the Judicial Council to authorize a trial court to carry unexpended funds over from one fiscal year to the next, and instead provides that unexpended funds shall be the funds of that trial court, which may carry those unexpended funds over from one fiscal year to the next. Prohibits those funds from being reallocated or redirected without the consent of the management of the trial court.
  3. Requires the Judicial Council, or its designee, to allocate 100% of the funds appropriated for support of trial court operations according to each court’s share of statewide operational funding. Provides that all funds, once allocated, are funds of the trial court, and authorizes courts to transfer funds between functions, line items or programs as directed by management of the trial court.
  4. Deletes existing provisions relating to the manner in which the Judicial Council allocates funding for trial court operations, and instead requires that the amount allocated to each trial court from the amount appropriated for trial court operations be equal to the pro rata share of the prior fiscal year’s adjusted base budget, except as provided.
  5. Requires the Legislature, based on the information submitted in the Governor’s proposed budget, and prior to the allocation of funds to each local trial court, to specify, in each annual Budget Act, the funding amounts to be allocated for programs of statewide concern from the total funds appropriated for trial court operations by the Legislature.
  6. Prohibits the Judicial Council, or its designee, from withholding or expending any portion of the total funds appropriated for trial court operations by the Legislature for any statewide information technology or administrative infrastructure program that was not identified in the annual Budget Act, unless the Judicial Council, or its designee, first obtains the written approval of 66 2/3% of a proportional representation of all local trial courts as determined by the number of judges in each court.

Introduced in 2011, the bill has been stalled since May of last year, however time is running out. The state’s constitution (Art. IV, Sec. 10(c)) requires bills introduced in the first year of a legislative session be adopted by its originating house by January 31 of the second year. This is confirmed by the Assembly’s own deadline calendar as being Tuesday of next week.

Florida House and Senate bills tie judicial retirement benefits & funding to changes to state merit selection system

January 10th, 2012

I mentioned yesterday the Florida Senate plan to tie funding for the state courts to a revocation of judicial immunity and changes to the state judicial disciplinary commission. Carrying on the linkage pattern is HB 971 and the similar SB 1570. Rather than tying funding to allowing for judges to be sued personally for their decisions, the bills tie judicial retirement benefits to changes to the state’s merit selection system.

Both bills address the impact on retirement benefits for those judges already in retirement but called back into temporary service by the Chief Justice. In sum, the bills would provide such temporary assignment does not affect eligibility for benefits under the Florida Retirement System.

The bills then, in differing ways, alter the composition and membership of the state’s judicial nominating commissions.

HB 971, on the House House Judiciary’s Civil Justice Subcommittee agenda for January 11, removes a requirement that attorneys nominated by the Board of Governors of The Florida Bar and appointed to judicial nominating commission(s) by the governor be “engaged in the practice of law”. The bill then specifies appointments to a judicial nominating commission, except an appointment to fill a vacant, unexpired term, are for a set 4 years and specifies that acts of judicial nominating commissions must be made with concurrence of majority of its current members.

SB 1570 goes even further in changing merit selection in the state. It provides that, with the exception of members selected from a list of nominees provided by the Board of Governors of The Florida Bar, a current member of a judicial nominating commission appointed by the Governor serves at the pleasure of the Governor. Moreover, the provision appears to be retroactive (“Notwithstanding any other law, each current member of a judicial nominating commission appointed by the Governor, other than those selected from a list of nominees provided by the Board of Governors of The Florida Bar, shall serve at the pleasure of the Governor”) allowing current governor Rick Scott to remake the state’s judicial nominating commissions at any time. In this, it nearly parallels a similar 2011 effort (HB 7101) passed on a party line vote in the House that would have made the terms of all commission members the same as the Governor.

Moreover, even those members of the commissions nominated by the Board of Governors of The Florida Bar could more easily be removed. SB 1570 repeals a provision that commission members may only be removed for cause “pursuant to uniform rules of procedure established by the Executive Office of the Governor”.

Florida bills would provide additional funding for courts, but only if judicial immunity is retroactively ended and judicial disciplinary commission changed

January 9th, 2012

Ever since the 2006 effort in South Dakota to end judicial immunity and allow for civil and criminal prosecution for judicial decisions, called bluntly enough JAIL4Judges and defeated 89%-11%, legislators have taken an interest in similar efforts. Simultaneous with this interest has been the ongoing state budgetary crises. For the second time in as many years, Florida legislators are looking to consolidate both issues (see here for my post on the 2010 effort).

SB 1524 requires a retroactive elimination of judicial immunity in a variety of specified contexts dealing with court proceedings.  Additionally, it expands the Judicial Qualifications Commission (JQC) and requires JQC investigation panels include at least 5 “common citizen electors” as a staff committee, none of whom may be “officers of the court” and who must prepare a separate report on the investigation that is to be made publicly available. Both the state courts system in general, and the JQC in particular, would be subject to an immediate audit by the state’s Auditor General and the Office of Program Policy Analysis and Government Accountability conduct full audit review of commission, a review to be repeated every two years.

Additionally, SB 1524 requires the Supreme Court create a plan “promoting civics for residents of this state, together with education concerning the judicial branch in order to develop trust and confidence in the state’s judicial system.” It also creates unified family courts, teen courts, drug courts and mental health courts in each judicial circuit.

If SB 1524, “or similar legislation” is passed, the provisions of SB 1526 would/could go into effect. That bill creates a Fiscal Stability Trust Fund to be administered by the Supreme Court and into which would be placed an automatic, guaranteed 1 percent of the state’s General Revenue Fund. The bill also declares “the judicial branch of state government shall be held harmless in years of fiscal deficits in the state as a matter of public safety” and permits revenues in the Fiscal Stability Trust Fund to remain in the fund at the end of every fiscal year.

Both bills have been prefiled in the Senate, with no committee assignments as of yet.

Indiana Senators, angry over state supreme court decision, look to take up efforts to alter or end merit selection, judicial disciplinary commission

January 6th, 2012

I noted back in June 2011 several members of the Indiana legislature were angered by an Indiana supreme court decision on the right of a homeowner to stop with force an unlawful entrance by a police officer. Several legislators indicated they would attempt to change the state’s merit selection system as a result. The court, in a September order granting rehearing, clarified some elements of their earlier decision, but the angst failed to melt away.

The first efforts to alter the state’s merit selection system have now been filed. SJR 13 of 2012 repeats almost verbatim SJR 1 of 2005, a previous effort to change merit selection that was approved by the state’s Senate in that year. The constitutional amendment:

  • Renames the judicial nominating commission as the commission on judicial nominations and qualifications.
  • Provides that one commission member will be selected by attorneys licensed in Indiana, one commission member will be appointed by the speaker of the house of representatives, and one commission member will be appointed by the president pro tem.
  • Requires at least one commission member appointed by the governor to be an attorney
  • Prohibits a person who is a registered lobbyist from serving on the commission.
  • Provides for the governor to fill a vacancy on the supreme court or the court of appeals from nominees recommended by the commission on judicial nominations and qualifications, subject to confirmation by the senate.
  • Provides that a justice of the supreme court and a judge of the court of appeals serves until July 1 of the tenth year after the justice’s or judge’s appointment is confirmed by the senate or the justice’s or judge’s retention in office is confirmed by the senate.
  • Provides that if a justice or judge wants to serve a new term, the justice or judge must apply to the senate for retention.
  • Specifies that a judge or justice will be retained, unless: (1) the judge or justice does not apply to the senate for retention; and (2) at least 60% of the members of the senate vote against retention.

While SJR 13 would make changes to the state’s merit selection system, SJR 14 goes even further, ending appellate merit selection, restructuring the state’s judicial disciplinary committee (the commission on judicial qualifications), and allowing judicial candidates to speak, participate in partisan activities, and act like candidates for other offices. Specifically, it provides:

  • End merit selection and replaces with gubernatorial appointment with senate confirmation.
  • Requires appellate judges receive 60% of retention election vote to remain in office.
  • Provides that a law, judicial rule, decree, or order may not abridge the freedom of a judge, lawyer, candidate for judicial office, or any other person from: (1) speaking, writing, or otherwise expressing the person’s views freely regarding a political issue, political party, or candidate for office, including a candidate for a judicial office; or (2) making a donation of money, services, or property to a political party or a candidate for office, including a candidate for a judicial office.
  • Specifies the 3 members of the state’s commission on judicial qualifications chosen by the Governor may not be attorneys.
  • Grants the legislature alone the power to set terms for commission members, their compensation, and the manner they are elected.

Minnesota: Should judicial disciplinary board be used to review merits of judicial decisions?

November 21st, 2011

Several states have seen legislative efforts to change the composition and role/function of their judicial disciplinary bodies in 2011. Among the motivating factors are disgruntled litigants who, finding their appeals rejected, wish nevertheless to “hold judges accountable.” Such language was and is at the forefront of the impeachment efforts underway in New Hampshire. Media reports indicate much of the testimony heard before a Tennessee committee regarding that state’s judicial disciplinary body focused on disagreements with the decisions rendered by judges as well.

Minnesota’s Senate considered the issue in the form of hearings conducted on November 17 before its Committee on Judiciary and Public Safety. At issue was HB 1568, the latest in a series of bills introduced in the last several years that would have allowed the Board of Judicial Standards to examine the merits of judicial decisions and used the Boards disapproval or disagreement as the basis for disciplinary actions against the jurist. Several Senators who spoke in favor of the bill did so with an eye towards using the judicial disciplinary process as a means to put pressure on the courts to rule certain ways or to provide a free or low cost alternative to an appeal.

Sen. Michael Jungbauer (R): “I’ve heard many, many issues about judges and cases and people always tell me they feel just this empty feeling when a judge rules something and they disagree with it but maybe don’t have the money or the wherewithal to bring it somewhere else.”

Sen. Dave Thompson (R): “The judiciary has taken on a much more significant role in our society that it should have through asserting itself overly aggressively in the area of judicial review and other things…So the problem we have here is judges are too significant, which is why how we select them and how we discipline them and how we review their performance has become far more important that it ought to be and until the judiciary is willing to see its role as less significant in our society and until legislatures are willing to do the politically difficult thing and ask judges about the decisions that they make, we’ll never solve the problem.”

The video below is from that November 17 and includes those portions that discussed changes to the Board and its role/function.